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Chapter 1
Introduction
In a bilateral oligopoly where buyers source a good from competing suppliers over time,
firms find themselves in a situation shaped by their strategic interplay. Taking current
decisions, both buyers and suppliers have to account for the impact of their actions on the
future competitive situation since firms may exit the respective market when in the long
run they are not sufficiently profitable. Hence, buyers face a tradeoff between sourcing
solely from the supplier offering the best current conditions and sourcing from multiple
suppliers to ensure competition among these is sustained in the future. In turn, suppliers
face a tradeoff between competing fiercely, allowing them to win a large share of current
demand as well as increasing the probability of rival suppliers exiting and accommodating
to buyers who aim to sustain competition.
In reality both single and multiple sourcing as well as aggressive competition and ac-
commodating supplier behavior are observed1. Also, several industries exhibit many of
these characteristics. One is the market for large commercial aircraft, where a small num-
ber of airlines sources from two suppliers, Airbus and Boeing. These are at times accused
of exclusionary behavior2, while occasionally being also regarded as a “cosy duopoly”3.
Although some airlines have opted for sourcing from a single supplier, the majority oper-
ates aircraft from both suppliers4. Also, competing manufacturers of aircraft have exited
the market in the last decades5. Another example is provided by the automotive industry,
with a few relevant car manufacturers6 frequently accounting for a substantial share of
the sales of suppliers7, who are often in a financially vulnerable position8.
1Examples are provided in chapters 2-4.
2E.g., in a recent WTO dispute Airbus was accused of displacing Boeing from some markets through
aggressive pricing but found to be not guilty (WTO 2010).
3Cf. The Economist (2010).
4All but two of the 25 largest customers by deliveries in 1974-2009 purchased from both suppliers. The
exceptions, Ryanair and Southwest Airlines, exemplify the approach of many low cost airlines to source
from only one manufacturer (Airbus 2009; Boeing 2009).
5E.g., Fokker filed for bankruptcy in 1996 (Eglau 1996), while the aircraft models of McDonnell Douglas
were discontinued after its merger with Boeing in 1997.
6The top ten car manufacturers produced more than a third of all cars worldwide in 2008 (OICA 2009).
7This holds especially for firms such as Delphi who originated from integrated divisions (Babich 2010).
8E.g., 30% of North American suppliers declared bankruptcy in 2008 (Wadecki, Babich, and Wu 2010).
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Different aspects of this strategic interplay of buyers and suppliers are addressed by
distinct strands of literature. Traditionally, industrial organization research has focused
on the supplier side of the market and only recently has the role of powerful buyers re-
ceived considerable attention9, while the optimality of sourcing decisions is explored in
another body of works10. Regarding supplier strategies, in addition to the exclusion of
competing firms through predatory behavior11, also the use of exclusivity contracts to
prevent efficient entry has been extensively investigated12. However, only a couple of
works have explicitly analyzed the strategic interplay between buyers and suppliers who
might exit the market13. We address this gap by contributing a thorough analytical and
numerical characterization of a model designed to capture this interplay. In addition, to
the best of our knowledge, we provide the first experimental investigation of this strategic
situation and indeed the first dedicated experimental analysis of strategic sourcing from
alternative suppliers. Accordingly, our findings of the consequences of coordinating sourc-
ing decisions and of employing different procurement processes add novel perspectives to
the experimental literature.
We model the strategic interplay of buyers and suppliers as a two period asymmetric
cost Bertrand duopoly, where in the second period only those suppliers are active whose
profit is sufficiently high in the first period. Thus, the first period represents the current,
the second period the future competitive situation. One or two buyers have an inelastic de-
mand for the good in each period and decide how to source this demand from the suppliers.
While buyers thus benefit from a duopoly in the second period and therefore often have
an incentive to sustain competition, suppliers frequently have an incentive to monopolize
the market.
This model is investigated in three self-contained chapters. In chapter 2 we solve it
analytically with continuous prices and quantities for a single buyer. Employing backward
induction, we find that in the first period the buyer dual sources and sustains competi-
tion when prices are high whereas for low prices single sourcing prevails. When the cost
difference of suppliers is small, a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies
exists. The more efficient supplier sets prices at or below the cost of the less efficient
supplier and the buyer sources all demand from him. Exclusion of the competing supplier
is successful and the more efficient supplier then often enjoys a monopoly in the second
period. With multiple identical buyers, equilibrium results do not change. Implementing
the model numerically, we find that results are robust for coarse quantities. Exclusion can
then occur in equilibrium even for large cost differences, while also equilibria exist where
the buyer dual sources and competition is often sustained. In addition, we implement
9Cf., e.g., Inderst and Mazzarotto (2008), while Ruﬄe (2005) includes also experimental works.
10The relevant literature is surveyed, e.g., by Elmaghraby (2000).
11Bolton, Riordan, and Brodley (2000) provide an overview, whereas the relevant experiments are intro-
duced by Gomez, Goeree, and Holt (2008).
12This literature originates from Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000).
Experimental investigations include Landeo and Spier (2009) and Smith (2011).
13These include Lewis and Yildrim (2002), Clark and Polborn (2006) and Berge`s and Chambolle (2009).
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an alternative procurement process where the buyer first sets the quantities to be sourced
dependent on the relative prices. When sustained competition has a sufficiently high value
for the buyer, equilibria where the buyer sources from both suppliers and competition is
sustained with a high probability exist even for small cost differences. The surplus of the
buyer can, but need not, increase compared to the initial process.
Using this model with its predicted predominance of exclusion as a baseline, in the sub-
sequent chapters two routes to an increase in the probability of sustained competition are
explored experimentally with two buyers. While improved coordination of sourcing deci-
sions among buyers is not predicted to impact results, employing alternative procurement
processes often is.
Coordination improves in chapter 3 from the baseline model with two independent
buyers across experimental treatments by allowing communication, introducing a single
buyer and automating buyers. Outcomes in the second period are not observed to differ
between treatments. We then find that in the first period, buyers nearly always dual
source and sustain competition when this is rational for all treatments. When it is not
rational however, dual sourcing persists. This can be attributed mostly to errors of single
subjects whereas fairness motivations play only a limited role. With two independent
buyers we observe exclusionary pricing to be predominant and accordingly competition
is frequently not sustained. Contrary to the subgame-perfect prediction of no difference
however, with improved coordination of buyers, pricing becomes more accommodating.
Accordingly, competition is sustained more often and there is weak evidence that also
buyer surplus increases in turn. In contrast, complete rationality of buyers is not found
to have a substantial impact on results.
The role of the procurement process is analyzed in chapter 4. Again, in the non-
strategic setting of the second period, experimental outcomes for all procurement pro-
cesses are comparable. In the first period, supplier exclusion is predominant not only
in the baseline process which corresponds to a procurement auction, but also for nonlin-
ear prices in split-award auctions. Then, suppliers demand premia for small quantities
which would allow to sustain competition, an option buyers however frequently do not
use. When subsidies can be paid to suppliers or when buyers take their sourcing decisions
before suppliers bid however, suppliers price more passively and competition is sustained
substantially more often than in the baseline, in line with the prediction. Buyer sourcing is
relatively close to rational behavior across procurement processes, although buyers are not
always successful in sustaining competition when this is optimal. Therefore, the predicted
increase in buyer surplus for subsidies and pre-announced sourcing is not observed.
We thus find that both theoretically and experimentally, even with strong incentives
for buyers to sustain competition, aggressive supplier behavior often entails exclusionary
outcomes. However, both improved coordination of sourcing decisions and modifications of
the procurement process are experimentally found to induce more accommodating pricing
and lead to competition being sustained frequently.
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Our results accordingly hold valuable implications primarily for firms acting as buyers,
highlighting how coordinating sourcing with other firms and cautiously selecting procure-
ment processes can increase the power vis-a`-vis suppliers and further strategic objectives.
Meanwhile, in the realm of antitrust policy, we find predatory behavior of suppliers to
be unexpectedly widespread and confirm that powerful buyers can indeed exert a coun-
tervailing influence to sustain competition among suppliers14. However, the marked dif-
ferences between experimental treatments also highlight that this power may not always
be effective.
14As recognized by, e.g., the EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (EU 2010).
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Chapter 2
Supplier Exclusion when Selling to
Strategic Buyers
To investigate when a strategic buyer sustains competition among her suppliers, a two
period asymmetric cost Bertrand duopoly is analyzed. In the second period only suppliers
are active whose first period profit is sufficiently high. We find that for high prices, the
buyer dual sources to sustain competition while at low prices single sourcing is preferred.
When the difference of supplier costs is not too large, unique subgame-perfect equilibria
in pure strategies exist. The more efficient supplier excludes the less efficient supplier by
pricing equal to or below the marginal cost of this supplier and the buyer purchases only
from the more efficient supplier. With multiple identical buyers the equilibrium prediction
is unchanged. For large cost differences and coarse quantities, a numerical analysis yields
equilibria where exclusion is also often prevalent although there can also exist equilibria
which sustain competition. An alternative procurement process which allows to guarantee
quantities to suppliers can substantially alter the probability of sustained competition and
buyer surplus.
2.1 Introduction
Buyers who repeatedly procure a good from competing suppliers are faced with a strategic
decision of how to source the good optimally from these suppliers. Correspondingly, the
sourcing of buyers will have a profound influence on the competitive behavior of suppliers.
In practice, in many situations buyers are observed to multiple source from more than
one supplier. For example, in the market for large commercial aircraft, all but two of
the 25 largest customers in 1974-2009 purchased from both Airbus and Boeing, despite
advantages of operating a fleet of aircraft from one supplier (Airbus 2009; Boeing 2009).
Even single orders are split between the two suppliers as recently by United Airlines (Carey
and Michaels 2009)1. Nevertheless, buyers are also frequently observed to single source as
1Examples of firms which use multiple sourcing in other industries include Motorola (Metty et al. 2005),
Sun Microsystems (Tunca and Wu 2009) and General Motors (Anton, Brusco, and Lopomo 2010).
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the Department of Defense did in the second (subsequently contested) round of procuring
a new generation of tanker aircraft, where the joint Airbus/Northrup Grumman bid was
selected over the Boeing offer (Cole 2008)2.
When there is a threat that a substantial share of suppliers might exit the market,
the strategic impact of sourcing on the future supply situation is especially relevant. In
the commercial aircraft industry, e.g., the bankruptcy of Fokker in 1996 saw the exit of a
competitor for the smallest Airbus and Boeing planes3. In addition to outright bankruptcy,
firms might only exit specific markets. Strategic buyers thus have to weigh the expected
benefit of inducing fierce current competition and the advantages of sustaining future
competition among suppliers.
Accordingly, suppliers have to weigh competing aggressively, thereby potentially gain-
ing both a large share of current demand as well as excluding rival suppliers for the future,
and competing accommodatingly in the face of buyers who aim to sustain competition.
Relating to the above example, in a recent WTO dispute (WTO 2010), the US accused
Airbus of having been enabled by subsidies to price aggressively, thereby displacing Boeing
from some markets4. At the same time Airbus and Boeing are sometimes regarded as not
competing too fiercely and enjoying a “cosy duopoly” (The Economist 2010).
This interplay between strategic buyers and competing suppliers is also recognized by
antitrust policy, where, e.g., the EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (EU 2010) state
that “powerful buyers will not easily allow themselves to be cut off from the supply of
competing goods” and will therefore take sourcing decisions accordingly. This counteracts
exclusionary tendencies by suppliers, who might seek “single branding” agreements (which
need not be explicit), leading a buyer to “concentrate its orders... with one supplier”. The
possible risk is then “foreclosure of the market to competing suppliers”.
Different aspects of this situation are addressed by distinct strands of theoretical lit-
erature. Regarding the role of powerful strategic buyers, overviews are provided, e.g., by
Chen (2007) with a focus on antitrust implications and by Inderst and Mazzarotto (2008)
from a retailing perspective, while merger-related questions are highlighted by Inderst and
Shaffer (2008).
Several characteristics are found to confer power to buyers, thereby leading to better
terms of trade. Among these are a large demand of individual buyers (cf., e.g., Chipty
and Snyder 1999; Inderst and Wey 2003), the option to integrate backwards (Katz 1987;
Scheffman and Spiller 1992) and the ability to control access to downstream markets (Maz-
zarotto 2004; Inderst and Shaffer 2007). For a single supplier, quantity discounts arise only
2Beker and Hernando-Vecianaz (2009) provide further examples of single sourcing in the public and
private sector, including, e.g., medical supplies and IT outsourcing respectively. Also, as described by
Tunca and Wu (2009), Sun Microsystems awards some of its contracts to a single supplier.
3Also, McDonnell Douglas ceased to exist as a provider of aircraft through the discontinuation of its
models after the merger with Boeing in 1997. Other examples include North American car parts suppliers,
a third of which went bankrupt in the downturn of 2008 (Wadecki, Babich, and Wu 2010).
4However, Airbus was cleared of this specific charge. In other recent cases France Telecom was found
guilty (ECJ C-202/07 P 2009) but a subsidiary of AT&T acquitted (SC 555 U.S. 2009) of predatory
pricing for internet access.
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for increasing marginal costs (Chipty and Snyder 1999; Inderst and Wey 2003), while for
competing suppliers sequential interactions (Snyder 1998) as well as a commitment to sin-
gle sourcing (Inderst and Shaffer 2007) can induce lower prices. Nevertheless in some situ-
ations a large demand may also be detrimental as demonstrated by Raskovich (2003) and
Inderst (2005). In addition to extracting better terms of trade, powerful buyers may neg-
atively affect incentives of suppliers to invest (Battigalli, Fumagalli, and Polo 2007) and
reduce product variety (Chen 2004). However, innovation may also be spurred as this
allows suppliers to open alternative channels as in Inderst and Wey (2003).
Most closely related to our work, powerful buyers can make foreclosure both on the
supplier and buyer side more likely. In the latter case, buyers may compensate suppliers for
excluding other buyers, for example through upfront payments (Marx and Shaffer 2007).
Analyses of foreclosure on the supplier side often focus on contractual “naked exclusion”,
with only a couple of works addressing the exit of previously competing suppliers resulting
from market interactions. These articles are discussed below.
In addition, a large body of literature examines the optimality of single and multiple
sourcing. For an overview, cf., e.g., Elmaghraby (2000). Generally, the optimal sourcing
approach depends critically on the exact situation. While for example a single buyer
purchasing from suppliers with convex costs is often better off when committing to single
sourcing (Anton and Yao 1989), for multiple buyers in a related setting, Inderst (2008)
finds that multiple sourcing can be optimal for small buyers. Similarly, while in Anton
and Yao (1992) split-awards occur in equilibrium, this need no longer be the case with
scale economies (Anton, Brusco, and Lopomo 2010). Meanwhile, the commitment to dual
source can decrease the costs of procuring a good as in the model with costly entry of
Klotz and Chatterjee (1995a). Then, by guaranteeing a quantity to each entering supplier,
participation increases and procurement costs are reduced. A similar logic applies in
the case of a dynamic model with learning efficiencies in Klotz and Chatterjee (1995b).
However, announcing only the number of suppliers to be sourced from can also yield higher
procurement costs as shown by Seshadri, Chatterjee, and Lilien (1991).
Regarding the behavior of suppliers, these can engage in predatory behavior, excluding
competing suppliers by pricing aggressively and recouping foregone profits through the en-
suing monopolization of the market. Predatory pricing is rational in different contexts, e.g.,
with incomplete information in the literature originating from Milgrom and Roberts (1982)
and Kreps and Wilson (1982). Also, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) highlight how preda-
tory behavior can arise from the threat of funding termination. An overview is provided
by, e.g., Bolton, Riordan, and Brodley (2000).
An alternative for a monopolistic supplier is the “naked exclusion” of a more efficient
entrant. By offering contracts to buyers which grant exclusive sourcing in return for com-
pensation payments, the entrant can be successfully excluded as buyers face a coordination
problem. This is analyzed in the literature originating from Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wi-
ley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000). Allowing for discrimination exacerbates the
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problem (Segal and Whinston 2000), while the ability to profitably exclude is diminished
with downstream competition (Fumagalli and Motta 2006; Abito and Wright 2008).
In addition to these articles, a small number of works address the interplay of the issues
described in the introduction. In Romano (1991), buyers consume excessively above their
demand to realize positive surplus from a monopolist who might otherwise not produce
at all. A single strategic buyer balances the benefits of learning-by-doing with a future
reduction in competition in an infinitely repeated model in Lewis and Yildrim (2002).
Competition among suppliers is then only sustained when cost reductions from learning
are small. In Biglaiser and Vettas (2005), two firms whose capacity is constrained over
two periods compete to supply buyers. Buyers would then often benefit from being able
to procure only in the current period or from committing to single sourcing. Fumagalli
and Motta (2008) examine a model where an incumbent monopolist faces the threat of
entry of a more efficient competitor. Coordination failures among buyers may then prevent
efficient entry in the case of weak downstream competition, a problem which becomes less
pronounced with fewer buyers.
Also, Clark and Polborn (2006) examine a two period Hotelling duopoly, where in
the second period only suppliers are active who attain a profit threshold in the first pe-
riod. Then, in the subgame of the first period, buyers close to indifference may source
strategically from the myopically inferior supplier to sustain competition. However, in
equilibrium strategic sourcing may not occur, although first period prices can be different
from the corresponding one period model. Meanwhile, in the work of Berge`s and Cham-
bolle (2009) suppliers compete in a two period Bertrand duopoly. In an extreme case of
learning-by-doing, suppliers are not active in the second period when the quantity sold in
the first is too low. Then, for sufficiently different discount factors of the suppliers and the
single buyer, there exist equilibria where suppliers price above the valuation of the buyer
in the first period. Both are sustained but extract all surplus. In addition, for low supplier
discount factors there exist equilibria where the less efficient supplier is excluded.
We add to this literature by analyzing the interplay between buyers and suppliers in
a dedicated model, obtaining in parts different results than the works discussed above.
Also, we explore the dependence of results on the costs of suppliers as well as the number
of buyers and relate the findings to those for an alternative procurement process.
A two period homogeneous good Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric costs of suppliers
is analyzed. Suppliers compete to sell to a single buyer with an inelastic demand for the
good. In the second period only those suppliers are active whose profit attains a minimum
value in the first period.
We solve the model for subgame-perfect equilibria using backward induction. In the
second period, the buyer benefits from sustained competition while monopolizing the mar-
ket allows suppliers to realize an additional profit. In the buyer subgame in the first period,
the buyer strategically dual sources to sustain competition when prices are high, while for
lower prices, myopic single sourcing is optimal. The best responses of the suppliers in
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the first period are dominated by underbidding. Hence, for small cost differences unique
subgame-perfect pure strategy equilibria exist with the more efficient supplier pricing ei-
ther at or below the cost of the less efficient supplier, thereby gaining all demand of the
buyer and often enjoying a monopoly in period 2. Meanwhile, the less efficient supplier
sets a price equal to his cost or to the valuation of the buyer and exits after the first
period. Committing to myopic sourcing then never increases buyer surplus. We show that
for large cost differences, no pure strategy equilibria exist. When multiple identical buyers
source from the suppliers, aggregate sourcing behavior is identical to that of a single buyer
and the same equilibria arise.
For exemplary sets of parameters we implement the model numerically with coarse
quantities. Pure strategy equilibria for small cost differences are closely reproduced. Also
for large cost differences there often exist equilibria where the more efficient supplier ex-
cludes the other supplier. However, there are also equilibria where the buyer dual sources
and competition is sustained with positive probability. In addition, we analyze an alter-
native procurement process, where first the buyer sets the quantities to be sourced depen-
dent on relative prices. Now, when sustained competition is valued sufficiently high by
the buyer, for all cost differences often equilibria exist with a high probability of sustained
competition. For small cost differences, expected buyer surplus can therefore increase
compared to the initial process, while for higher differences it may decrease.
We thus find that in a procurement auction as in the initial model, exclusionary ten-
dencies are quite strong, while an alternative procurement process is able to mitigate
these, leading to a higher probability of sustained competition. The accompanying change
in expected surplus of the buyer then depends critically on the exact situation.
This article introduces the model in section 2.2. It is solved analytically in section 2.3
for a single buyer and results are extended to multiple buyers. Numerical analyses are
included in section 2.4, while section 2.5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2.2 Model
Two suppliers i ∈ {1, 2} produce a homogeneous good with constant but different marginal
costs 0 ≤ c1 < c2. Thereby, firm 1 designates the more efficient firm throughout this work.
Different costs are assumed to accentuate that there is a weak supplier who might need
to be sustained. Suppliers compete for two subsequent periods t ∈ {1, 2} in a Bertrand
market by posting prices for a unit quantity of the good, pti ≥ 0 as visualized in figure 2.1.
Capacity constraints do not bind so each supplier can serve the whole market.
A single buyer has an inelastic demand of D for the good in each period for prices up
to her valuation V 5, with V > ci. Given the prices, the buyer sets the quantities Q
t
i to be
sourced from each supplier i with D = Qt1 +Q
t
2. Accordingly, period 1 models the current
supply conditions while the future market structure is given by period 2.
5Cf. also the discussion of assumption 2 below.
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-Period
Suppliers
Buyer
r
t = 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
p1i
r
Q1i
pi
r
t = 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
p2i
r
Q2i
Figure 2.1: Timing and strategic variables.
A supplier is only active in the second period when his first period profit is at least
as high as pi with pi > 0. This profit threshold models the requirement for firms to op-
erate profitably in the long run to be active in a market. The positive profit may be
needed, e.g., to cover costs which have not been modeled explicitly. Also, investors are
likely to force firms to exit a market if they do not generate positive returns (cf., e.g., Bolton
and Scharfstein 1990). Various other works model firm exit based on some measure of per-
formance. While similar profit thresholds are employed by Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001)
as well as Clark and Polborn (2006), alternative approaches make use of the difference
between earnings and liabilities or the ratio of assets to liabilities (Babich 2010; Wadecki,
Babich, and Wu 2010).
Second period surplus values of the suppliers and the buyer are discounted by δ ∈ (0, 1].
The resulting total profit for supplier i is therefore
pii = Q
1
i
(
p1i − ci
)
+ δ Q2i
(
p2i − ci
)
, (2.1)
while total surplus for the buyer follows as
BS =
∑
i
Q1i
(
V − p1i
)
+ δ
∑
i
Q2i
(
V − p2i
)
. (2.2)
Both prices and quantities are modeled as continuous variables. The good is thus
either of a physical nature which allows the trading of arbitrary amounts or the number
of relevant units is so large that treating it as continuous is a good approximation.
2.3 Analytical Analysis
We solve the model for subgame-perfect pure strategy equilibria using backward induction.
2.3.1 Second Period
In the second period t = 2, either both suppliers, a single supplier or no supplier are
active. Since this is the last period, market participants behave myopically and therefore
outcomes correspond to those of the respective one period models.
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When two suppliers are active, the buyer sources all demand D from the supplier with
the lower price and thus for p2Di > p
2D
−i we have Q
2D
i = 0 and Q
2D
−i = D. Throughout this
article we designate suppliers by i ∈ {1, 2} and −i ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}. Furthermore, in the case
of equal prices p2D1 = p
2D
2 we assume the buyer to purchase only from the more efficient
supplier, Q2D1 = D and Q
2D
2 = 0. For prices p
2D
−i > V no purchases are made. If only a
single supplier i is active, the buyer sources all demand from him up to p2Mi = V .
In a duopoly, suppliers are assumed to set only prices which are continuous limits of
weakly undominated prices in a version of the model with a discrete price space. Prices of
supplier i are therefore p2Di ∈ [ci, V ]. This follows the approach introduced by Deneckere
and Kovenock (1996) and eliminates all weakly dominated prices except for the marginal
cost6. With these assumptions, the following equilibria are obtained.
Lemma 1. Three situations can arise in period 2.
A) If two suppliers are active, then a unique equilibrium of the subgame exists with pri-
ces
(
p2D1 , p
2D
2
)
=(c2, c2). The buyer sources only from supplier 1,
(
Q2D1 , Q
2D
2
)
=(D, 0).
B) If a single supplier i is active, then a unique equilibrium of the subgame exists with
a price p2Mi = V . The buyer sources only from supplier i, Q
2M
i = D.
C) If no supplier is active, no market activity occurs.
Proof of lemma 1. Omitted.
The duopoly case A) corresponds to a standard asymmetric cost Bertrand duopoly.
Then, an equilibrium in pure strategies exists with continuous prices only for the tie-
breaking rule specified above7, where for equal prices all demand is purchased from the
more efficient supplier (cf., e.g., Blume 2003; Hoernig 2007). Alternatively, this tie-breaking
rule can be interpreted as a property of the unique equilibrium of lemma 1. When discrete
prices are assumed with a smallest unit of account ∆p, then two equilibria exist
8 with
p2D1 = c2 as well as p
2D
1 = c2+∆p and p
2D
2 = p
2D
1 . The buyer purchases only from supplier 1
and the continuous limit ∆p → 0 yields again the unique solution
(
p2D1 , p
2D
2
)
= (c2, c2). If
a single supplier i is active in case B) of lemma 1, he maximizes surplus by pricing at the
valuation of the buyer, who has to purchase all demand from supplier i.
Due to the uniqueness of the equilibria, period 2 surplus of all market participants is
uniquely determined for each of the market structures. The buyer is indifferent between
a single or both suppliers exiting after period 1 since surplus is zero in both cases. Hence,
she has an incentive to preserve a duopoly, as this allows to realize a positive surplus
BS2D = δ D (V − c2). Conversely, both suppliers have a predatory incentive to monopolize
the market in the second period and thereby increase profits. Notably, the predatory
motivation can be interpreted as being equally strong for both suppliers as the differential
6Allowing all prices, every p2D1 ∈ [c1, c2] can be supported as an equilibrium by p2D2 = p2D1 .
7E.g., for equal-sharing tie-breaking no equilibrium exists as there is no profit-maximizing p2D1 ∈ [ c1 , c2 ).
8For discrete prices there exist equilibria also for equal-sharing tie-breaking. For ∆p → 0, these also
converge to
(
p2D1 , p
2D
2
)
= (c2, c2) .
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profit gain from successful predation, pi2Mi −pi2Di = δ D (V − c2) is equal for both suppliers.
Due to the inelastic demand this additional predatory profit is equal to the surplus BS2D
lost by the buyer when competition is not sustained.
2.3.2 First Period - Buyer
With the results for period 2, we identify equilibria of the buyer subgame in period 1.
Prices are thus considered as exogenously given. First we make an assumption regarding
model parameters which serves to make further analysis more straightforward while at the
same time imposing only a light restriction.
Assumption 1. The profit threshold is lower than the discounted second period monopoly
profit of supplier 2, pi < δD (V − c2).
This assumption about the relative size of the (not directly related) profit values will
generally be fulfilled. The two periods can be regarded as modeling some accounting
periods. Therefore, the discount factor should differ from δ = 1 only by a foregone
rate of return which will typically be an order of magnitude smaller. Then, generally
the monopoly profit of the less efficient supplier in the next accounting period will have a
higher present value than the minimal profit needed for firm survival in the current period.
Alternatively, δ D (V − c2) can also be interpreted as the discounted surplus increase of
the buyer when competition is sustained (cf. section 2.3.1).
Depending on the ensuing period 2 market structure, we define two types of equilibria.
Definition 1. A strategic sourcing equilibrium is an equilibrium of the buyer subgame in
period 1 where purchases are such that both suppliers are active in period 2. A myopic
sourcing equilibrium is an equilibrium which is not a strategic sourcing equilibrium.
Either a single or no supplier is therefore active in the second period when the buyer
purchases according to a myopic sourcing equilibrium. Also, with the definition, every
quantity allocation
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
which is an equilibrium can be characterized as either a
strategic sourcing or a myopic sourcing equilibrium.
As described in section 2.2, the demand of the buyer is D for prices lower or equal
to the valuation and zero above. Ensuring consistency with the behavior in the second
period we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. The buyer does not purchase at prices above the valuation V .
The buyer thus follows a procurement policy which does not allow to make losses from
individual purchases. The policy is communicated to suppliers, e.g., as part of the request
for bids. This assumption is realistic since it is generally easier for a firm to justify both
internally and externally sourcing from a myopically non-optimal supplier than incurring
actual losses from sourcing. The assumption avoids suppliers conspiring to charge prices
above V and exploiting the buyer9.
9Cf. Berge`s and Chambolle (2009) for such a situation. The buyer keeps both suppliers active to secure
second period surplus but is then indifferent to not purchasing at all in the first period.
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With assumption 2, we conclude that if both suppliers price above V , no purchases
are made at all,
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
= (0, 0). Meanwhile, for p1i > V and p
1
−i ≤ V , the buyer sources
exclusively from supplier −i. The same holds when at least one supplier prices below his
cost, as it is then not possible to sustain competition. In all cases, at most one supplier
is sustained and thus a myopic sourcing equilibrium arises. As discussed in section 2.3.3,
suppliers then set only prices p1i ∈ [ci, V ] and we therefore limit the following analysis to
P = {(p11, p12) | p11 ∈ [c1, V ] , p12 ∈ [c2, V ]}.
To describe the buyer behavior in more detail, several parameters and functions are
defined. Thereby,
µi = ci + pi/D (2.3)
gives the minimum price at which supplier i can be sustained when the buyer sources only
from this supplier. Conversely, the minimum quantity which has to be sold at price p1i to
ensure survival is
Q
i
=
pi
p1i − ci
. (2.4)
The quantities which are actually sourced at unequal prices in the strategic sourcing
equilibria (Q1Si ) and the myopic sourcing equilibria (Q
1M
i ) can then be expressed as
Q1Si =
{
D −Q−i if p1i < p1−i
Q
i
if p1i > p
1
−i
, Q1Mi =
{
D if p1i < p
1
−i
0 if p1i > p
1
−i
. (2.5)
This ensures that if supplier i posts the higher price and the buyer sources strategically,
the supplier is just kept active with the minimum required quantity. In the converse case,
when supplier i posts the lower price, the complete demand which is not required to sustain
the other supplier is sourced from him. In the myopic case, the buyer purchases only from
the supplier with the lower price.
For a strategic sourcing equilibrium to exist, two conditions on prices have to be ful-
filled. First, prices have to be such that it is possible for the buyer to source her demand D
in such a way that both suppliers are sustained with a profit of at least pi. Expressing this
as a condition on p1−i with p
1
−i < p
1
i yields (cf. the proof of proposition 1) that this price
has to be at least as high as
Pi(p
1
i ) = c−i +
pi
(
p1i − ci
)
D
(
p1i − ci
)− pi . (2.6)
Second, for strategic sourcing to be equilibrium behavior it has to be rational for the buyer
to sustain competition, i.e., total surplus must not be lower than with myopic sourcing.
This then requires p1−i to be at least as high as
Ri(p
1
i ) = p
1
i −
δ D (V − c2)
pi
(
p1i − ci
)
. (2.7)
When prices are equal it is always rational to sustain competition since no surplus can
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be foregone in period 1, while keeping both suppliers active increases surplus in period 2.
The minimum price at which competition can then be sustained is given by
η =
c1 + c2
2
+
pi
D
+
√(c2 − c1
2
)2
+
( pi
D
)2
. (2.8)
We consolidate these constraints by introducing the set SiU of unequal prices for which
strategic sourcing occurs, with supplier i being the higher-priced supplier,
SiU =
{(
p11, p
1
2
) | p1−i ∈ [max{Pi(p1i ), Ri(p1i )} , p1i ) , p1i ∈ (η , V ]} . (2.9)
The set of unequal prices for which competition is sustained then follows as SU = S1U∪S2U.
Accordingly, at equal prices the buyer sources strategically for prices in
SE =
{(
p11, p
1
2
) | p11 = p12, p12 ∈ [η , V ]} . (2.10)
In addition, we make the following assumption regarding behavior of the buyer.
Assumption 3. If the buyer is indifferent between sourcing strategically and myopically,
the buyer sources strategically.
This assumption asserts that when expected surplus from sustaining and not sustaining
competition is equal, the buyer sources such that both suppliers remain active. This is
only relevant when p1−i = Ri(p
1
i ) binds in SiU and then ensures a unique prediction of
buyer behavior. We thus assume that in the case of indifference, the buyer opts for the
safe approach of sustaining competition and securing any additional unexpected future
surplus. The following proposition then details buyer behavior in the first period.
Proposition 1. The following equilibria of the buyer subgame in period 1 exist.
A) For prices p11 6= p12, a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists if and only if (p11, p12) ∈ SU.
Then
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
=
(
Q1S1 , Q
1S
2
)
is the unique equilibrium demand allocation. A myopic
sourcing equilibrium exists if and only if no strategic sourcing equilibrium exists,
with
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
=
(
Q1M1 , Q
1M
2
)
being the unique equilibrium demand allocation.
B) For prices p11 = p
1
2, a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists if and only if (p
1
1, p
1
2) ∈ SE.
Then
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
=
(
D − Q
2
, Q
2
)
is an equilibrium demand allocation. A myopic
sourcing equilibrium exists if and only if no strategic sourcing equilibrium exists,
with
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
= (D, 0) being an equilibrium demand allocation.
Proof of proposition 1. The proof is included in the appendix.
For unequal prices
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈ SU, the buyer behavior in period 1 is uniquely determined
due to assumption 3. The buyer maximizes her surplus by sourcing the quantity Q
i
from
the supplier with the higher price, which is necessary for the supplier to realize a profit of
exactly pi1i = pi. Meanwhile, for unequal prices not in SU, all demand is single sourced
from the supplier with the lower price.
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At equal prices, often many equilibria exist as the buyer surplus in period 1 is in-
dependent of the demand allocation. As described above, if it is possible to keep both
suppliers active, this increases period 2 surplus and is therefore strictly preferred by the
buyer. Apart from this, all demand allocations are optimal. However, the proposition
asserts that for
(
p11, p
1
2
)
/∈ SE, the tie-breaking of period 2 with the buyer purchasing only
from the more efficient supplier is also equilibrium behavior in period 1. For
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈ SE
meanwhile, only strategic sourcing equilibria exist. A modified tie-breaking rule, which
has the buyer sourcing only the quantity from supplier 2 required to ensure his survival and
the remainder from supplier 1, is then an equilibrium sourcing strategy. In the following
we assume that these equilibria are implemented by the buyer10.
The proposition asserts that for every price combination either only a myopic or a
strategic sourcing equilibrium exists. Defining S = SU∪SE, competition is thus sustained
if and only if (p11, p
1
2) ∈ S. Then, competition is not sustained if and only if (p11, p12) ∈ M
withM = P \S. While in a strategic sourcing equilibrium both suppliers are active in the
second period by definition, in a myopic sourcing equilibrium one of the suppliers enjoys
a monopoly in the second period for a sufficiently high price in period 1. By proposition 1
both suppliers might exit however if the price of supplier −i at which the buyer purchases
is below µ−i. Nevertheless, for the buyer this is not worse than the monopoly outcome as
her second period surplus is zero in both cases by lemma 1.
Proposition 1 thus implies that strategic sourcing occurs when at least one of the
suppliers sets a high price. This can also be seen from figure 2.2, where S and M are
depicted for exemplary parameter values. This result is slightly counterintuitive as it might
be expected that strategic sourcing takes place particularly when the difference of posted
prices is small and accordingly also the surplus foregone by sourcing from the supplier
with the higher price is small. However, this effect is in most cases overcompensated by
the inverse dependence of the quantity required for supplier survival Q
i
on the price of the
supplier p1i (cf. equation 2.4). For high prices, this quantity can reach low levels, thereby
facilitating strategic sourcing and reducing foregone surplus.
The strategic sourcing equilibria are similar to the excessive consumption equilibria
of Romano (1991). Consuming above demand from a monopolist to ensure production
is similar to sourcing from the higher-priced supplier i to allow survival in our model.
Accordingly, myopic sourcing corresponds to the non-consumption equilibrium. However,
an important difference is that in our model a myopic sourcing equilibrium does not
necessarily exist alongside a strategic sourcing equilibrium. Indeed, for a single buyer this
is at most the case when the buyer is indifferent between equilibria, while in section 2.3.4
we find that for n ≥ 2 buyers, both equilibrium types can exist simultaneously.
We now analyze how changes in parameters impact the main characteristics of a strate-
gic sourcing equilibrium. These are the quantity purchased from the supplier with the
10Using the equal sharing tie-breaking rule in period 2 as well as in period 1 for
(
p11, p
1
2
)
/∈ SE and
equally sharing “excess demand” not required to sustain a duopoly for
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈ SE in period 1 yields,
with marginal underbidding by , equilibrium predictions similar to proposition 2 below.
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V
Η
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∆=1.0, Π=0.10, D=1.0
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V
Η
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p11
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∆=1.0, Π=0.10, D=0.5
S
M
Figure 2.2: Buyer equilibrium types in period 1. Thereby c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.3 and V = 1.0.
higher price Q
i
for given prices p1i > p
1
−i and the range of price combinations S for which
a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists.
When the discount factor decreases to δ′ < δ, for those prices for which a strategic
sourcing equilibrium exists also for δ′, the quantity Q
i
is unchanged as it is matched to
the unchanged pi. With Pi(p
1
i ) and thus also η independent of δ, but Ri(p
1
i ) decreasing
in δ, we have S(δ′) ⊆ S(δ). A lower present value of sustained competition can thus
decrease the range of prices for which strategic sourcing equilibria exist if the rationality
of sustaining competition is the limiting factor. When however Pi binds, S is unchanged
as in figure 2.2, where ranges of S and M are identical for δ = 1.0 and δ = 0.5.
A decrease in the profit threshold to pi′ < pi decreases the quantity purchased from the
supplier i with the higher price, Q
i
(pi′) < Q
i
(pi) at given prices in S(pi), as now a smaller
quantity is sufficient to attain the profit required for survival. With Pi(p
1
i ), Ri(p
1
i ) and η
decreasing, the set of prices for which a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists grows,
S(pi′) ⊃ S(pi) as shown in figure 2.2, since it is now for more prices possible and rational
to sustain both suppliers.
When instead the market demand decreases to D′ < D, then Q
i
remains constant for
prices in S(D′). Meanwhile, the range of strategic sourcing decreases by equations 2.6-2.10,
S(D′) ⊂ S(D) since a decreased market demand diminishes the options to keep both
suppliers in the market and also decreases the benefit from sustained competition in the
second period (cf. figure 2.2).
Some of these results differ from the findings of Clark and Polborn (2006) for given
prices in a related two period Hotelling duopoly with multiple buyers. While in our
model decreasing the minimum profit required for survival always decreases the quantity
sourced strategically, Clark and Polborn (2006) find that it can, dependent on parame-
ters, either increase or decrease the expected quantity purchased at the myopically inferior
supplier. Furthermore, this quantity is smaller when the benefit of sustained competition
decreases. This corresponds to a lower δ, which in our model leaves the quantity sourced
from the higher-priced supplier unchanged. These differences stem mainly from the ran-
dom distribution of buyers on the Hotelling line. Strategic sourcing thus only increases the
probability of sustained competition, while in our model the buyer can ensure survival.
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As we focus on strategic sourcing, we make the following assumption before proceeding.
Assumption 4. The set of price combinations S for which strategic sourcing equilibria
exist is non-empty.
For S to be non-empty, η ≤ V is required by equations 2.8-2.10. Rewriting this
condition yields pi ≤ D (V − cV ) with cV =
(
V 2 − c1c2
)
/ [2V − (c1 + c2)]. We observe
that c2 < cV < V . Thus, assumption 4 requires that the minimum profit pi is at most
as high as the monopoly profit of a supplier with a cost of cV . Thus the assumption will
generally be fulfilled, as in a monopoly even a supplier with costs higher than supplier 2
would be expected to realize a profit exceeding the minimum required for survival.
For further analyses, we express the conditions on parameters of assumptions 1 and 4
in terms of the marginal costs. Solving η ≤ V of assumption 4 for c1 and calculating the
maximum c2 from the bounds on c1, we obtain c1 ≤ cA41 = V −pi (V − c2) / [D (V − c2)− pi]
and c2 ≤ cA42 = V −pi V / (DV − pi), while assumption 1 yields c2 < cA12 = V −pi/δD. We
consolidate these conditions and obtain the set of all cost combinations compatible with
the assumptions
C = {(c1, c2) | c1 ∈ [0, c2) ∩ [0, cA41 ] , c2 ∈ (0, cA12 ) ∩ (0, cA42 ]} . (2.11)
This set is depicted in figure 2.3 below for different parameter values as the union
C = CH ∪ CL1 ∪ CL2. Non-emptiness of the c2 interval requires both DV > pi/δ and
DV ≥ 2pi. Thereby, DV corresponds to the monopoly profit of a supplier with a cost of
zero. In the discussion of assumption 1 we argued that often δ does not differ significantly
from one. Accordingly, by the arguments used in the discussion of assumptions 1 and 4,
the monopoly profit of a zero cost supplier will generally be substantially higher than a
small multiple of the minimum profit required for survival pi. With the c2 interval therefore
generally non-empty, by construction the c1 interval is non-empty as well.
2.3.3 First Period - Suppliers
With the previous results, supplier equilibria in period 1 and thus subgame-perfect equi-
libria of the whole model are determined. As in period 2, we assume the suppliers to
post only prices which are continuous limits of weakly undominated prices in a version
of the model with discrete prices. Prices below the marginal cost p1i < ci yield a profit
pii ≤ 0, while prices above the buyer valuation p1i > V yield pii = 0. Such prices are weakly
dominated by any price ci < p
1
i ≤ V since then pii ≥ 0, with the inequality always holding
for some prices of the other supplier −i. Thus, analyses can be limited to prices in P.
We calculate equilibria using the best responses of the suppliers. In order to deduct
these, two additional lemmas are required. The first details when a supplier i can respond
to a price of supplier −i by setting a price p1i ≥ p1−i such that both suppliers are sustained
by the buyer.
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Lemma 2. There exists a price p1i ≥ p1−i such that competition is sustained if and only if
p1−i ∈
[
p−i, V
]
. Thereby, p−i = max {Pi(V ) , Ri(V )} with p−i ∈ (µ−i , η ].
Proof of lemma 2. The proof is included in the appendix.
The lemma thus asserts that the lowest price p1−i = p−i at which both suppliers are
sustained for p1−i ≤ p1i is determined by the situation when supplier i sets the high-
est possible price V . This follows since both the minimum price p1−i making sustaining
competition possible, Pi(p
1
i ) as well as the minimum price making it rational for the
buyer, Ri(p
1
i ) decrease with an increase in p
1
i .
Hence, when supplier −i posts a price between p−i and V , supplier i can respond
with a price which will keep both suppliers active. Conversely, when supplier −i sets a
price p1−i < p−i, then competition is never sustained regardless of the price of the other
supplier, who can thus always be excluded. With the buyer single sourcing from supplier−i
and p−i > µ−i, survival is ensured and supplier −i monopolizes the market in period 2.
We now detail the relative size of p−i and the marginal cost of supplier i. For −i = 2,
any price p12 ≥ p2 is always above the marginal cost of supplier 1 since µ2 > c1. Accordingly,
supplier 1 can then not only price accommodatingly by setting a higher price but also
always match or marginally underbid the price of supplier 2 without incurring losses. In
contrast, when −i = 1 and p11 ≥ p1 the relative size of p1 and c2 determines whether these
options are also open to supplier 2. Following the approach of equation 2.11, we express
the relevant value of c1 at which p1 is equal to the cost of supplier 2 as a function of c2,
c1 = c2 −
pi (V − c2)
D (V − c2)− pi . (2.12)
Due to assumption 1, c1 is always smaller than c2. Depending on the size of the marginal
cost of supplier 1 relative to c1, we have three sets of cost combinations,
CL = {(c1, c2) | (c1, c2) ∈ C, c1 ≤ c1} , (2.13)
CH1 = {(c1, c2) | (c1, c2) ∈ C, c1 < c1 ≤ c1 + pi/D} , (2.14)
CH2 = {(c1, c2) | (c1, c2) ∈ C, c1 > c1 + pi/D} . (2.15)
Furthermore, we define CH = CH1 ∪ CH2 and observe that these sets partition the set
of cost combinations compatible with the assumptions of equation 2.11: C = CL ∪ CH
and CL ∩ CH = ∅. For a constant c2, the marginal cost of supplier 1 is then below or equal
to c1 and therefore lowest for (c1, c2) ∈ CL. For marginal costs in CH it is accordingly
higher. Correspondingly, the cost difference is large for costs in CL and small for CH. For
exemplary parameter combinations, the sets are depicted in figure 2.3 which is discussed
in more detail below.
The set CH is always non-empty when C is non-empty due to c1 < cA41 = c1 + (V − c2)
and c1 < c2. In contrast, CL is non-empty if and only ifD (V − c2) /pi ≥ V/c2, which follows
directly from requiring c1 ≥ 0. Multiplying the numerator and denominator of the right-
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hand side by D, this condition requires that the ratio of the supplier 2 monopoly profit
to the minimum profit required for survival is not smaller than the ratio of the monopoly
profit to the profit in a duopoly for a zero-cost supplier competing with supplier 2. This
inequality will often be fulfilled for sufficiently small pi, as then enjoying a monopoly is
likely to enhance the profit from the minimum required for survival by a higher factor for
supplier 2 than a change from duopoly competition to a monopoly does for a supplier with
a cost of zero.
With these definitions, the following lemma provides a relationship between the margi-
nal costs and the size of the lowest price of supplier 1 at which competition is sustained.
Lemma 3. The relative size of p
1
for supplier 1 is given by the following relations,
p
1
≤ c2 ⇐⇒ (c1, c2) ∈ CL ,
c2 < p1 ≤ µ2 ⇐⇒ (c1, c2) ∈ CH1 ,
p
1
> µ2 ⇐⇒ (c1, c2) ∈ CH2 .
Proof of lemma 3. The proof is included in the appendix.
In order to express best responses of suppliers, we formalize marginal underbidding
behavior by introducing  > 0 with  → 0 always. As prices are continuous, p1i − 
is therefore interpreted as the highest price which is smaller than p1i and for which the
difference to p1i is discernible by and relevant for the market participants. Introducing  is
necessary to avoid the non-existence of profit-maximizing prices on open price sets when
underbidding marginally. Alternatively,  can also be interpreted as a smallest unit of
account, which generally exists in real currencies. It then defines a discrete price grid, as
is used in the numerical analysis in section 2.4, yielding results which are very similar to
the continuous solution.
Observing that the profit of supplier 1 depends on both the relative price compared
to supplier 2 as well as the period 2 market structure induced by the respective supplier
behavior, the best response of supplier 1 can be deducted, yielding the next lemma.
Lemma 4. The best response of supplier 1 to a price p12 of supplier 2 is to either match
the price or underbid, p11,r(p
1
2) ≤ p12.
Proof of lemma 4. The proof is included in the appendix.
We thus find that for the more efficient supplier incentives for aggressive pricing are
quite strong. Matching occurs as a best response only because of the tie-breaking rule
which leads supplier 1 to often sell the same quantity as when marginally underbidding,
while the higher price increases the profit. As shown in the proof, for low prices p12 < η,
matching the price is optimal since this leads to myopic sourcing of the buyer. Supplier 1
thus successfully excludes supplier 2 and for sufficiently high prices enjoys a monopoly
in period 2. For even higher prices p12 ≥ η, exclusionary pricing can still prevail but
now requires supplier 1 to price below both P2(p
1
2) and R2(p
1
2). However, also matching
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can be optimal. Then, both suppliers are sustained but the buyer still sources as high
a quantity as possible from supplier 1, who in addition realizes the duopoly profit in the
second period.
To detail the corresponding best response of supplier 2, we define the inverse functions
of Pi and Ri from equations 2.6 and 2.7, which now depend on the lower price p
1
−i < p
1
i ,
P−1i (p
1
−i) = ci +
pi
(
p1−i − c−i
)
D
(
p1−i − c−i
)− pi , (2.16)
R−1i (p
1
−i) =
ci δ D (V − c2)− p1−i pi
δ D (V − c2)− pi . (2.17)
These functions allow to express SiU with conditions on p1i which depend on p1−i (cf. proof
of lemma 5). Hence, for prices to be in SiU, now p1i ≥ max
{
P−1i (p
1
−i), R
−1
i (p
1
−i)
}
has to
hold. By proceeding as for supplier 1, we acquire the best response of supplier 2.
Lemma 5. The best response of supplier 2 to a price p11 of supplier 1 is to underbid,
p12,r(p
1
1) < p
1
1, except for the following prices.
A) If (c1, c2) ∈ CL, then
p12,r(p
1
1) ∈
{
[ c2 , V ] for p
1
1 ∈
[
c1, p1
)[
max
{
P−12 (p
1
1), R
−1
2 (p
1
1)
}
, V
]
for p11 ∈
[
p
1
, µ2
] .
B) If (c1, c2) ∈ CH, then
p12,r(p
1
1) ∈
{
[c2, V ] for p
1
1 ∈ [c1, c2][
max
{
P−12 (p
1
1), R
−1
2 (p
1
1)
}
, V
]
for p11 ∈
[
p
1
, µ2
] ,
where the second interval is non-empty only for (c1, c2) ∈ CH1.
Proof of lemma 5. The proof is included in the appendix.
Thus, also for supplier 2 optimal pricing is often aggressive and dominated by under-
bidding. Due to the tie-breaking rule which confers an advantage to the more efficient
supplier, matching the price is never optimal for prices above the cost of supplier 2. In
the case of prices p11 ≤ η, if underbidding is optimal, then supplier 2 underbids marginally
and excludes supplier 1. Meanwhile, for p11 > η, exclusion of supplier 1 requires drastic
underbidding below P1 and R1. Either this is optimal or marginal underbidding is, with
both suppliers being sustained but supplier 2 selling the larger quantity share.
However, there are also intervals of supplier 1 prices where for supplier 2 it is optimal
to accommodate and respond with a higher price in S. Then, he is sustained in a duopoly
by strategic sourcing of the buyer with a profit of exactly pi2 = pi. Accordingly, supplier 2
is indifferent between all prices which induce strategic sourcing. This accommodating
response occurs for the lowest prices of supplier 1 which can lead to sustained competition,
p11 ≥ p1. They have to be so low however that supplier 2 will never be sustained when
responding by underbidding and therefore does not enjoy a monopoly in period 2, p11 ≤ µ2.
This interval is then non-empty only for large cost differences with (c1, c2) ∈ CL ∪ CH1, as
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then p
1
≤ µ2. For costs in CL this includes prices of supplier 1 below c2, i.e., even for prices
below his cost, supplier 2 can “force” strategic sourcing by setting a high price. Regardless
of the relative size of costs, when supplier 1 prices so low that supplier 2 is always ex-
cluded (p11 < p1), then the latter is indifferent between all of his prices p
1
2 ∈ [c2, V ].
To be able to deduct equilibria, the best response of supplier 1 has to be detailed for
p12 = V and costs (c1, c2) ∈ CL. In the proof of lemma 4 we found that either drastic
underbidding below p
1
or matching the price is optimal. In the latter case competition is
sustained while in the former case it is not. Via p
1
optimality depends on the costs of the
suppliers. Hence, we define three reference values of the marginal cost of supplier 1,
c˜1 = V −
[
δ D (V − c2)
pi
+
pi
D (V − c2)− pi
]
(V − c2) , (2.18)
cR1 = V −
δ D (V − c2)
pi
D (V − c2)− pi
pi
(V − c2) , (2.19)
cP1 =
V − c2
D (V − c2)− pi
[
DV − δ D (V − c2)− pi − pi V
V − c2 −
pi2
D (V − c2)− pi
]
. (2.20)
Thereby, for c1 ≤ c˜1, R2(V ) binds in p1, while for higher costs P2(V ) binds. The values
cR1 and c
P
1 are the additional upper and lower bounds for which drastic underbidding is
superior for supplier 1 to matching the price of the less efficient supplier. These cost values
then define the sets
CL2R =
{
(c1, c2) | (c1, c2) ∈ CL, c1 ≤ c˜1, c1 < cR1
}
, (2.21)
CL2P =
{
(c1, c2) | (c1, c2) ∈ CL, c1 ≥ c˜1, c1 > cP1
}
. (2.22)
Accordingly, we define CL2 = CL2R ∪ CL2P, which is the set of costs for which drastic
underbidding is a best response of supplier 1. Defining CL1 = CL \ CL2, the set of marginal
costs compatible with the assumptions is then partitioned as C = CL1 ∪ CL2 ∪ CH. We can
thus state the next lemma.
Lemma 6. For (c1, c2) ∈ CL and a price p12 = V of supplier 2, p11,r(V ) = p1 −  is a best
response of supplier 1 if and only if (c1, c2) ∈ CL2.
Proof of lemma 6. The proof is included in the appendix.
While for costs in CL2 drastic underbidding is therefore generally the unique best
response of supplier 1 to a price p12 = V , for some costs the supplier is indifferent between
underbidding drastically and matching the price. Accordingly, for (c1, c2) ∈ CL1, the
unique best response of supplier 1 to a price p12 = V is to match the price, p
1
1,r(V ) = V .
With CL non-empty by assumption and c˜1 < c1 always, CL2 is non-empty when, e.g.,
cP1 < c1. This in turn is fulfilled for δ ≥ 1 − pi/ [D (V − c2)− pi], which by assumption 1
holds, e.g., for δ = 1. Thus, there exist parameter combinations such that CL2 is non-
empty. By identifying pure strategy equilibria as mutual best responses, we can then
state the second proposition.
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Proposition 2. The following subgame-perfect pure strategy equilibria of the model exist.
A) If (c1, c2) ∈ CL2, then there exists a unique equilibrium where suppliers set prices(
p1∗1 , p1∗2
)
=
(
p
1
− , V ). The buyer sources myopically from supplier 1 only,(
Q1∗1 , Q1∗2
)
= (D, 0) and supplier 1 enjoys a monopoly in period 2.
B) If (c1, c2) ∈ CH, then there exists a unique equilibrium where suppliers set prices(
p1∗1 , p1∗2
)
= (c2, c2). The buyer sources myopically from supplier 1 only,(
Q1∗1 , Q1∗2
)
= (D, 0). Supplier 1 enjoys a monopoly in period 2 if and only if c2 ≥ µ1,
otherwise both suppliers exit.
C) If (c1, c2) ∈ CL1, then no pure strategy equilibrium exists.
Proof of proposition 2. The proof is included in the appendix.
For a price combination to be an equilibrium both p1∗1 ∈ p11,r(p1∗2 ) and p1∗2 ∈ p12,r(p1∗1 )
have to hold. With supplier 1 always matching or underbidding the price of supplier 2
according to lemma 4, only those prices p11 can be part of an equilibrium for which by
lemma 5, supplier 2 responds by matching or setting a higher price. Prices p11 ∈
[
p
1
, µ2
]
are however not part of an equilibrium, as the best response of supplier 2 is then always
such that
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈ S. In turn, supplier 1 responds according to the discussion of lemma 4
by either underbidding such that p11,r does not lie in S or by matching the price, which
is then higher than the original price, p11,r > µ2. Hence, only the ranges of p
1
1 where
supplier 2 is indifferent between all his prices can support an equilibrium. These then
yield the unique equilibria of the proposition, depending on whether p
1
−  or c2 is the
highest price at which supplier 2 is indifferent and in the former case on whether drastic
underbidding is a best response of supplier 1 to p12 = V . When this is not the case
for (c1, c2) ∈ CL1, no subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
In all equilibria of proposition 2, supplier 1 successfully excludes supplier 2 and forces
or entices the buyer to single source in the first period. Depending on the difference
of marginal costs, supplier 1 then often enjoys a monopoly in period 2. Despite strong
incentives for the buyer to sustain competition, in equilibrium exclusionary underbidding
is thus the more powerful factor, leading to the exclusion of the less efficient supplier.
For (c1, c2) ∈ CL2, behavior is therefore clearly predatory. Although supplier 1 does not
price below his own cost, he prices below the cost of the competing supplier 2 and is
in all cases successful in recouping the profit foregone in period 1 from pricing below c2
by monopolizing the market in period 2. For costs in CH, successful recoupment requires
according to proposition 2 costs to be sufficiently different, c2−c1 ≥ pi/D. Then, it suffices
for supplier 1 to price at the cost of the less efficient supplier to gain exclusivity.
The equilibria for (c1, c2) ∈ CH are closely related to those of the associated one period
model. In both cases, supplier 1 prices just so low that supplier 2 cannot underbid further
without making losses. This yields the same equilibrium prices in a strategic and myopic
setting. For costs in CL2 however, supplier 2 prices as high as possible. This minimizes the
quantity the buyer has to source to sustain supplier 2 and therefore maximizes the range
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Figure 2.3: Sets of marginal cost combinations. Thereby D = 1.0, V = 1.0.
of prices of supplier 1 for which supplier 2 realizes a positive profit. Meanwhile, supplier 1
prices so low that the buyer sources exclusively from him. When R2(V ) binds in p1
for (c1, c2) ∈ CL2R, this follows because it yields higher total surplus, while when P2(V )
binds for costs in CL2P, the demand of the buyer is insufficient to keep both suppliers active.
Exclusive sourcing is thus guaranteed for all prices p11 < p1 and supplier 1 maximizes his
profit by pricing as close as possible to p
1
. We express this optimization on an open set
as p1∗1 = p1 − , similar to the one period situation with an equal-sharing tie-breaking
rule11. The robustness of this approach is demonstrated by the numerical results with a
discretized price space in section 2.4, where we find basically the same equilibrium types
as in the continuous case for (c1, c2) ∈ CH ∪ CL2.
For exemplary parameter values, figure 2.3 depicts the sets of marginal costs of propo-
sition 2. An identical inverted structure would arise for c1 > c2, which is not shown how-
ever. The cost combinations for high values of c2 are excluded by assumptions 1 and 4
on C = CH ∪ CL1 ∪ CL2 (cf. equation 2.11). For (c1, c2) ∈ CH, supplier 1 prices at p1∗1 = c2
in equilibrium. As discussed above (cf. lemma 3), this case arises when c1 values are
high for a given c2 and therefore the cost difference between suppliers is small. However,
for large c2 values, CH can also encompass comparably large cost differences. The lower
bound on CH values is given by c1 and therefore with ∂pic1 < 0, the range of costs in CH
decreases with a decrease in the profit threshold as evidenced by figure 2.3. Then it is
more often possible to sustain competition and p
1
decreases, requiring prices below c2 to
exclude supplier 2. A lower discount factor leaves CH unchanged as c1 is independent of δ,
except for the impact of the smaller range of costs compatible with the assumptions.
The set of costs CL2 for which a pure strategy equilibrium with p1∗1 < c2 arises cor-
responds for a given c2 to medium costs of supplier 1, while CL1 encompasses the lowest
costs. The range of costs in CL2 then never increases with a reduction in the profit thresh-
old. With p
1
being lower for decreased values of pi, at p12 = V it becomes less attractive
11When R2(V ) binds, changing assumption 3 to the buyer sourcing myopically in the case of indiffer-
ence resolves marginal underbidding in equilibrium. When P2(V ) binds, requiring a profit strictly higher
than pi for survival can address the issue. Then however, to sustain supplier i with p1i > p
1
−i, the buyer
has to optimize Qi on an open set.
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for supplier 1 to exclude supplier 2. Instead the best response is to match the price and be
sustained in a duopoly (cf. lemma 6). Costs are then in CL1 as in figure 2.3. When however
the discount factor decreases, enjoying a monopoly in period 2 becomes less valuable for
supplier 1 while now also p
1
can increase, leading to no unambiguous change in the relative
sizes of CL1 and CL2.
In all pure strategy equilibria of the model, no strategic sourcing occurs in equilibrium
according to proposition 2. However, for (c1, c2) ∈ CL2 the price in period 1 is reduced
compared to the price in a one period interaction. This result is similar to that in the model
of Clark and Polborn (2006), where also no strategic sourcing might occur in equilibrium
but prices of suppliers can be altered from the one period equilibrium. Furthermore, the
equilibria for costs in CL2 are also related to those of Berge`s and Chambolle (2009) where
the more efficient supplier prices below the cost of the less efficient supplier and excludes
him. However, then the less efficient supplier prices always at his cost, while in our case
the equilibrium price p1∗2 = V can be interpreted consistently as a result of accommodating
behavior, due to survival of suppliers depending on the profit. Furthermore, in Berge`s and
Chambolle (2009) the equilibrium arises only when the discount factor of the suppliers is
low, while we find that exclusion can occur under very general circumstances.
With the unique subgame equilibria of proposition 2, also surplus of all market par-
ticipants is uniquely determined. The buyer realizes a surplus of BS = D
(
V − p1∗1
)
.
Meanwhile, the profit of supplier 1 is pi11 = D
(
p1∗1 − c1
)
in period 1, while an additional
profit of pi2M1 = D (V − c1) follows in period 2 if the supplier is sustained in a monopoly.
For supplier 2 the profit is always pi2 = 0.
We now compare these surplus distributions to those from a procurement process where
the buyer commits to always single source myopically from the supplier with the lower
price only12. Then, for all prices a myopic sourcing equilibrium as in proposition 1 is
implemented in the buyer subgame and the equilibrium of part B) of proposition 2 with
p1∗1 = c2 arises for all costs (c1, c2) ∈ C.
Hence, for small cost differences in CH, the buyer realizes the same surplus when
committing to myopic sourcing as when keeping open the option to source strategically.
However, when for (c1, c2) ∈ CL2 the cost difference is of medium values, in period 1 the
price of supplier 1 is lower at p1∗1 < p1 ≤ c2 when not committing to myopic sourcing.
Accordingly, with myopic sourcing the surplus of the buyer is decreased by more than
D
(
c2 − p1
)
, while the surplus of supplier 1 increases by the same amount. The threat of
sourcing strategically from both suppliers forces the more efficient supplier to post a lower
price in period 1 than he would have done had the buyer committed to myopic sourcing
ex-ante. For both regimes of costs, the buyer thus never looses power by retaining the
option to source strategically.
This finding contrasts with some of the related analyses. In the two period Hotelling
model of Clark and Polborn (2006) there exist cases in which buyers would benefit from
12A myopic procurement process can be implemented, e.g., by publishing explicit rules (Biglaiser and
Vettas 2005) or through the rotation of purchasing managers (Lewis and Yildrim 2002).
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committing to source myopically only. This is also the case for those equilibria in Berge`s
and Chambolle (2009) where suppliers set prices so high in the first period that they can
extract all surplus. Also, in the model with intertemporal capacity constraints of Biglaiser
and Vettas (2005), often buyers would receive a higher surplus if they announced and
followed a myopic purchasing policy. In line with our finding, for the exclusion equilibria
of Berge`s and Chambolle (2009) it would be to the detriment of the buyer to commit
to purchase only myopically. Hence, it depends on the structure of the equilibrium and
thus on the exact situation and parameter values whether retaining the option to source
strategically can increase the surplus of the buyer.
2.3.4 Multiple Buyers
While results in the previous sections were deducted for a single buyer, we now analyze
how these change when there are n ≥ 2 identical buyers j ∈ {1, . . . , n} in the market.
Each buyer has a demand of d = D/n for the homogeneous good and decides how to
source this from suppliers, d = qt1,j + q
t
2,j . All buyers together thus purchase the aggregate
quantity Qti =
∑
j q
t
i,j from supplier i.
In a duopoly in period 2, each of the j buyers sources only from the supplier with the
lower price for unequal prices and only from supplier 1 for equal prices. With aggregate
demand and therefore also supplier behavior unchanged, the same equilibrium prices as
for a single buyer in lemma 1 arise and all buyers now purchase their complete demand d
from supplier 1. The same holds for a monopoly where all buyers source from supplier i.
Accordingly, each buyer realizes additional surplus of BS2Dj = δ d (V − c2) in the second
period from sustaining competition.
In period 1, the price at which a buyer j can sustain supplier i alone is now given by
µdi = ci + pi/d . (2.23)
Furthermore, it is optimal for buyer j to sustain the higher-priced supplier alone if and
only if the lower price p1−i is at least as high as
ri(p
1
i ) = p
1
i −
δ d (V − c2)
pi
(
p1i − ci
)
. (2.24)
While for a single buyer only either strategic or myopic sourcing equilibria exist for
given prices (except for cases of indifference), now both equilibrium types can exist si-
multaneously. We define the range of unequal prices for which a profitable deviation of a
buyer j from myopic sourcing at the lower-priced supplier −i is possible,
MC,iU =
{ (
p11, p
1
2
) | p1−i ∈ [max{Pi(p1i ), ri(p1i )} , p1i ) , p1i ∈ [µdi , V ] ∩ (η, V ]} . (2.25)
With MCU = MC1U ∪MC2U and PU =
{(
p11, p
1
2
) | (p11, p12) ∈ P, p11 6= p12}, a myopic sourcing
equilibrium then exists for all unequal prices in MU = PU \MCU. Here we have limited
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analysis to prices in P by the same arguments as in section 2.3.2. The range of equal
prices for which a myopic sourcing equilibrium exists is given directly by
ME =
{ (
p11, p
1
2
) | p11 = p12, p12 ∈ [0, µd2)} . (2.26)
We defineM =MU ∪ME analogously to S and can thus state the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The following equilibria of the buyer subgame with n ≥ 2 identical buyers
exist in period 1.
A) A strategic sourcing equilibrium exists for prices (p11, p
1
2) if and only if a strategic
sourcing equilibrium exists for a single buyer. For prices p11 6= p12, the aggregate
demand allocation is uniquely determined as (Q11, Q
1
2) = (Q
1S
1 , Q
1S
2 ). For prices
p11 = p
1
2, there exist strategic sourcing equilibria with an aggregate demand allocation
of
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
=
(
D −Q
2
, Q
2
)
.
B) A myopic sourcing equilibrium exists if and only if (p11, p
1
2) ∈M. For prices p11 6=p12,
the aggregate demand allocation is uniquely determined as
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
=
(
Q1M1 , Q
1M
2
)
.
For prices p11 = p
1
2, there exists a myopic sourcing equilibrium with an aggregate
demand allocation of
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
= (D, 0).
Proof of proposition 3. The proof is included in the appendix.
In a strategic sourcing equilibrium for unequal prices, the aggregate quantity Q
i
then
keeps the higher-priced supplier i in the market with exactly pi profits. Then, all other
aggregate demand allocations either do not sustain competition or allow a single buyer
to increase surplus by purchasing less from supplier i. Also for equal prices, the same
aggregate demand allocation as for a single buyer can be implemented as an equilibrium.
We assume in the following that this is done. The proposition thus assures that the
aggregate quantities sourced in equilibria of the buyer subgame are identical for multiple
and a single buyer. Hence, strategic sourcing equilibria exist for the same prices and the
same aggregate quantities are sourced for n ≥ 2 buyers as for a single buyer.
With multiple buyers, a myopic sourcing equilibrium can exist also for prices where a
strategic sourcing equilibrium exists, i.e., S ∩M can be non-empty. Even then however,
for unequal prices the aggregate demand allocation in equilibrium is identical to that in a
myopic sourcing equilibrium of a single buyer. Also for equal prices, the same aggregate
demand allocation can be implemented as an equilibrium. With µd2 > c2 we observe
that ME and thus M are always non-empty, i.e., there are always some prices for which
myopic sourcing is equilibrium behavior. Furthermore, for all price combinations in P for
which there is no strategic sourcing equilibrium, a myopic equilibrium exists.
For use in the next corollary we define
RiU =
{(
p11, p
1
2
) | p1−i = Ri(p1i ), p1i > p1−i} , (2.27)
the set of prices where a single buyer n = 1 is indifferent between purchasing strategically
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and myopically. Defining also RU = R1U ∪R2U, we can detail which demand allocations of
individual buyers can support a strategic sourcing equilibrium.
Corollary 1. For n ≥ 2 identical buyers a symmetric strategic sourcing equilibrium ex-
ists for all (p11, p
1
2) ∈ S. In addition, infinitely many non-symmetric strategic sourcing
equilibria exist for (p11, p
1
2) ∈ S \ RU.
Proof of corollary 1. The proof is included in the appendix.
Thus, for every price combination in S a symmetric strategic sourcing equilibrium
exists where each of the n buyers decides on exactly the same demand allocation. In addi-
tion, except for prices in RU, infinitely many quantity allocations which are not identical
for all buyers can be equilibria, although by proposition 3 all yield the same aggregate
demand allocation. These equilibria exist because every arbitrarily small additional quan-
tity purchased by a buyer j from the supplier with the higher price allows all other buyers
to purchase less from this supplier. As long as it is not more profitable for buyer j to
source from the lower-priced supplier only, this is then a strategic sourcing equilibrium. It
may thus be challenging to implement a strategic sourcing equilibrium as buyers have to
coordinate on specific quantities to be sourced from suppliers. The next corollary offers
additional insight on this.
Corollary 2. For n ≥ 2 identical buyers, strategic and myopic sourcing equilibria always
exist simultaneously for some price combinations. Then, all strategic sourcing equilibria
are at least weakly pareto-superior for buyers to the myopic sourcing equilibria. There are
prices for which only strategic sourcing equilibria exist if and only if µd1 ≤ V and η < V .
Proof of corollary 2. The proof is included in the appendix.
The prices for which only strategic sourcing equilibria exist are thereby exactly those
prices for which a buyer j can profitably sustain the higher-priced supplier alone, since
this defines a profitable deviation from a myopic sourcing demand allocation. This is also
evident from the condition µd1 ≤ V , which states that it is possible for a buyer j to sustain
the more efficient supplier at V alone. The existence of prices p12 < V for which this is
also rational is assured by η < V as then SU is non-empty. For small numbers of buyers n
and thus comparably large values of d the first condition will generally be fulfilled, while
the second is a slightly more restrictive version of assumption 4. This is also discernible
from figure 2.4, where the range of prices which are in S but not in M decrease with an
increase in the number of buyers n at constant market demand D. This is not unlike the
finding of Fumagalli and Motta (2008) that the probability of buyers failing to coordi-
nate on sourcing such that entry of a more efficient supplier is possible increases in the
number of buyers.
By corollary 2 both equilibrium types always exist for some prices. The weak pareto
superiority of strategic sourcing equilibria for buyers follows directly from the fact that
it is not profitable for any buyer j to deviate to myopic purchasing and thus realize the
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Figure 2.4: Buyer equilibrium types in period 1. Thereby δ = 1.0, pi = 0.1, D = 1.0,
c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.3 and V = 1.0.
same surplus as in the myopic sourcing equilibrium. Accordingly, we find that strategic
sourcing is either weakly preferred by all buyers or the only equilibrium outcome.
Implementing one of the strategic sourcing equilibria requires buyers in any case to
coordinate. Strategic sourcing is then for unequal prices structurally similar to a discrete
public good game. Sustained competition allows all buyers j to realize an additional
surplus of BS2Dj in the second period if the contributions of quantities sourced from the
supplier i with the higher price q1i,j attain the quantity Qi required for survival, while the
remaining demand ensures that also supplier −i attains the profit threshold. Free riding in
equilibrium is somewhat mitigated as any deviation by a buyer to purchasing less from the
higher-priced supplier results in competition not being sustained. However, in contrast to
many public good games, there are also often prices where it may be rational for a single
buyer to sustain competition, thereby reducing the coordination problem.
With D = nd, both the range of prices S for which a strategic sourcing equilibrium
exists as well as the quantity sourced from supplier i with the higher price, Q
i
depend
on the number of buyers with demand d in the same way as on the market demand D.
Using the results from section 2.3.2, we thus have for n′ < n that S(n′) ⊂ S(n), while Q
i
does not change. When however overall demand D is constant, then according to propo-
sition 3 both measures are unchanged, which can also be observed from figure 2.4. The
first finding is again in contrast to the corresponding result in the Hotelling model of Clark
and Polborn (2006), where the quantity sourced from the myopically inferior supplier can
increase or decrease with a lower number of buyers, due to the random positions of buyers
on the Hotelling line.
To be able to deduct behavior of suppliers in period 1 in the presence of n ≥ 2 buyers,
we make the following assumption13.
Assumption 5. Buyers purchase only according to pareto-optimal equilibria.
In combination with assumption 3 in the case of weak pareto optimality, we thus assume
that when for a posted price combination at least one strategic sourcing equilibrium exists,
13Cf., e.g., Romano (1991) for a similar approach in a related model.
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then buyers purchase according to it. The next corollary then details the resulting overall
equilibrium outcome.
Corollary 3. For n ≥ 2 identical buyers, the existence of subgame-perfect pure strat-
egy equilibria as well as equilibrium prices, aggregate quantities and the ensuing period 2
market structure are identical to those for a single buyer.
Proof of corollary 3. The proof is included in the appendix.
With the additional assumption 5, the aggregate behavior of the n ≥ 2 buyers is iden-
tical to that of a single buyer and therefore pricing in period 1 is unchanged. Accordingly,
also the equilibria arising for different cost combinations as given by proposition 2 are the
same, except that now individual equilibrium quantities are given by
(
q1∗1,j , q
1∗
2,j
)
= (d, 0).
2.4 Numerical Analysis
2.4.1 Implementation
We implement the model numerically by discretizing the strategic variables. Continuous
prices in P are approximated by a price grid with a step size of ∆p, pti ∈ {ci, ci + ∆p, . . . , V }.
Accordingly, possible quantities are given by Qti ∈ {0,∆Q, . . . , D} with a step size of ∆Q.
Both discrete prices and quantities are also observed in reality. While currencies generally
have a smallest unit of account ∆p, some goods are traded in fixed units ∆Q only or cannot
be split up further physically.
The discretized model is analyzed for a single buyer n = 1. We choose V = 1.0 and
D = 1.0 as points of reference for the numerical implementation, yielding quantities as frac-
tions of the overall demand. To test the robustness of the analytical results of section 2.3
when possible quantities are coarse, we set ∆Q = 0.1. Approximating continuous prices
while limiting numerical effort is achieved by ∆p = 0.01. We analyze three combinations
of the discount factor and the profit threshold, (δ, pi) ∈ {(1, 0.1), (1, 0.05), (0.5, 0.1)}. For
each of the (δ, pi) values, the model is solved by backward induction for all costs compatible
with the assumptions of the analytical model14, (c1, c2) ∈ C in steps of ∆ci = 0.05.
In period 2, for a single and no active supplier, results in the discretized model are
identical to those of lemma 1. In the case of a duopoly, now two equilibria exist with
p2D1 = c2 and p
2D
1 = c2 + ∆p (cf. section 2.3.1). Since the price of the first equilibrium is
identical to the price in the continuous model and since for ∆p → 0 the price of the second
equilibrium converges to this value as well, we assume that the first equilibrium arises.
In the first period, the optimal demand allocation of the buyer is identified for all
possible price combinations. Implementing assumption 3, strategic sourcing equilibria are
thereby preferred over myopic sourcing equilibria in the case of indifference. When prices
are equal, demand is split according to the tie-breaking of proposition 1. With buyer
behavior given, best responses of the suppliers are calculated and pure strategy equilibria
14Only costs which fulfill assumption 4 with the respective ∆p and ∆Q are included in the analysis.
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Figure 2.5: Deviation of the expected transaction price in period 1 from the cost of
supplier 2. The grid depicts the numerical solution, analytical reference prices are included
in gray color. Thereby D = 1.0, V = 1.0.
identified as mutual best responses. When multiple equilibria exist, the following selection
is made to yield a unique result. If p1∗1 = p1∗2 = c2 is among the equilibria, in accordance
with the approach in period 2, this equilibrium is selected. When instead p1∗1 = p1∗2 = V is
an equilibrium (as might occur for the alternative procurement process in section 2.4.3),
then this is selected. Finally, when all p1∗1 < c2 are equal, the maximum price p2∗2 is used
to reproduce equilibria of proposition 2.
If no pure strategy equilibrium exists, we employ the linear complementarity algorithm
of Lemke and Howson (1964) as implemented in Gambit (McKelvey, McLennan, and
Turocy 2007) to identify mixed strategy equilibria, which is however not guaranteed to
return all equilibria (Shapley 1974). When the algorithm yields more than one equilibrium,
selecting the pareto-optimal one for suppliers always ensures uniqueness.
For each of the three parameter sets, the model is solved for 120-171 marginal cost
combinations. Calculations then require less than 1h for the model described above but
11h for the alternative procurement process on a PC with an Intel P8700 processor.
2.4.2 Initial Procurement Process
The expected transaction prices p1∗T paid by the buyer to source her demand D in period 1
are depicted in figure 2.5 for the equilibria of the numerical solution. Thereby, the de-
viation from the price of the one period solution, p1∗T − c2, is shown with calculated
values corresponding to intersections of the grid lines. Furthermore, prices of the ana-
lytical solution of proposition 2 are included in gray color for costs in CH and CL2, while
for (c1, c2) ∈ CL1 also p1 is included as a reference. The respective sets of marginal costs
are shown in figure 2.3 for the three parameter sets.
We find that for small cost differences (c1, c2) ∈ CH, the analytical transaction price
p1∗T = c2 is exactly reproduced even with coarse quantities. This is discernible from
figure 2.5. Also the mean absolute deviations of numerical from analytical prices are
|∆p1∗T | = |p1∗T − p1∗T | = 0.0 for all sets of (δ, pi) values. This holds also for even coarser
quantities ∆Q = 0.2 and ∆Q = 0.5, since costs are multiples of ∆p and the buyer single
sources in equilibrium.
For costs in CL2 the analytical transaction price p1∗T = p1−  is smaller than c2. Again,
the numerically calculated values with coarse quantities of ∆Q = 0.1 reproduce the an-
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alytical solution quite well in figure 2.5, yielding only small mean absolute deviations
for all parameter sets of |∆p1∗T | ≤ 0.009. For even coarser quantities these increase up
to |∆p1∗T | ≤ 0.046 for ∆Q = 0.5. Accordingly, reducing the coarseness to ∆Q = 0.005
decreases mean absolute deviations, albeit only slightly so, to |∆p1∗T | ≤ 0.008. Em-
ploying instead a finer price grid with ∆p = 0.005 also reduces deviations, but only to
|∆p1∗T | ≤ 0.006, indicating that the price space is sufficiently fine.
These deviations of p1∗T from the continuous price p
1∗
T are an effect of the discretization.
Coarse quantities do not allow the buyer to purchase exactly the quantity Q
i
from the
higher-priced supplier to sustain him but instead require to source the next highest multiple
of ∆Q. This results in a stepwise structure of P2(p
1
2) and R2(p
1
2) (cf. figure 2.2 for the
continuous case). Also, ∆p needs to be sufficiently small to capture this structure. Then p1
is shifted to higher values in the discrete model pN
1
> p
1
, altering the equilibrium price for
costs in CL2. Furthermore, the equilibrium price of supplier 2 may no longer be uniquely
determined but instead be a range of prices, which however always includes V .
As in the continuous case for (c1, c2) ∈ CH∪CL2, the buyer sources only from supplier 1
in the numerical subgame-perfect equilibria and competition is never sustained as depicted
in figure 2.6. Hence, both the structure as well as the prices of the equilibria in the
continuous model are closely reproduced by the numerical solution even for very coarse
quantities. We can therefore state the first result.
Numerical Result 1. In a discretized version of the model with coarse quantities, for
(c1, c2) ∈ CH ∪ CL2 the equilibrium differs only marginally from the continuous case.
From proposition 2 we know that for (c1, c2) ∈ CL1, no pure strategy equilibria exist
in the continuous model. However, pure strategy equilibria can exist in the discretized
model even then. As noted above, for a given cost combination, the coarse quantity
shifts pN
1
> p
1
. Then, also for some costs in CL1, setting pN1 − ∆p is a best response to
p12 = V and therefore defines an equilibrium (cf. lemma 6). Furthermore, although the
best response to p12 = V may not be to set p
N
1
−∆p, due to the stepwise structure of P2
and R2 this can still be the case for a price p
1
2 ≤ V , which then forms an equilibrium as
supplier 2 is indifferent between all his prices. Furthermore, even when no pure strategy
equilibria exist, the discrete price space guarantees the existence of a mixed strategy
equilibrium (Nash 1950).
Expected transaction prices of the numerical solution for costs in CL1 are included in
figure 2.5. With pi = 0.05 and with δ = 0.5, there are transaction prices which exceed c2 for
low values of c1 and medium values of c2. Both suppliers then mix over prices and there is a
positive probability that the buyer sources strategically from both suppliers. Accordingly,
competition is sustained with a probability of fD ≥ 0.5 as shown in figure 2.6. There
are thus cost combinations for which equilibria exist which often sustain competition.
Comparing to figure 2.3 we observe however that these do not arise for all costs in CL1 but
at most for 0.26 of cost combinations and indeed for none in the case of δ = 1.0 and pi = 0.1.
With coarser quantities of ∆Q = 0.2 the fraction is reduced further to at most 0.16 of
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Figure 2.6: Probability of sustained competition for the numerical solution. Thereby
D = 1.0, V = 1.0.
prices. Also, when ∆Q = 0.5, then there are no equilibria where both suppliers mix. Even
for less coarse quantities of ∆Q = 0.05, the fraction rises only to maximally 0.29.
In all other equilibria for (c1, c2) ∈ CL1, supplier 1 sets a unique price p1∗1 = pN1 −∆p
which is very close to p
1
of the continuous model as is seen from figure 2.5. The buyer then
purchases exclusively from supplier 1, and supplier 2 is not sustained. Hence, supplier 2
is indifferent between all his prices and thus in some equilibria mixes over prices while in
others he sets a unique price. The equilibrium structure of proposition 2 and approximately
even the prices of supplier 1 are thus also often found in equilibria for costs in CL1 in a
discrete model. We can thus formulate the second numerical result.
Numerical Result 2. In a discretized version of the model with coarse quantities, for
(c1, c2) ∈ CL1 there often exist exclusionary equilibria where competition is never sustained.
There can however also exist equilibria where the buyer often dual sources and competition
is sustained with a positive probability.
2.4.3 Alternative Procurement Process
We investigate how an alternative procurement process alters the results of the initial
process analyzed in the rest of this article. In each period the buyer now announces first
the quantities to be sourced from the supplier posting the higher and the lower price,
D = Qtlow +Q
t
high. Adapting the tie-breaking rule of proposition 1, at equal prices Q
t
low is
sourced from supplier 1. Next, the active suppliers post their prices pti and depending on
the relative prices are awarded the respective quantities. All other model specifications
are identical to the initial process described in section 2.2. While the alternative process
thus allows to guarantee a non-zero quantity to the supplier with the higher price, it also
encompasses the option to implement a myopic sourcing process by setting Qtlow = D.
The outcome in the second period is then given by the following lemma.
Lemma 7. For the alternative procurement process, equilibria in period 2 are unchanged
from the initial process.
Proof of lemma 7. The proof is included in the appendix.
In the case of no active supplier and a monopoly the equivalence to the initial process
is straightforward. When both suppliers are active, the buyer sets Q2Dlow = D, which yields
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Figure 2.7: Probability of sustained competition for the numerical solution of the alterna-
tive procurement process. Thereby D = 1.0, V = 1.0.
purchasing behavior identical to the initial model. Any Q2Dhigh > 0 entails purchases at
prices above c2 and is thus inferior. In addition, a qualification regarding transaction
prices in the first period can be made.
Lemma 8. For the alternative procurement process, the expected transaction price in
period 1, p1T is never lower than the marginal cost of supplier 2.
Proof of lemma 8. The proof is included in the appendix.
Supplier 2 will not price below his cost as these prices are weakly dominated. Then
there is no need for supplier 1 to set a price below c2 as any p
1
1 ≤ p12 ensures that he
sells Q1low. Hence, at least for (c1, c2) ∈ CL2, equilibrium prices in period 1 will differ from
the initial process where p1∗T < c2 according to proposition 2.
We implement the alternative procurement process numerically using the approach
described in section 2.4.1. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium, for δ = 1.0 the buyer
then always dual sources by splitting demand in the first period. Accordingly, except for
the highest values of c2, both suppliers mix over prices in equilibrium and as depicted in
figure 2.7, competition is sustained with a probability fD ≥ 0.5, which is often close to
one. However, when c2 is high, supplier 2 requires more than half of the demand to be
sustained even at the highest price p12 = V . It is then optimal for the buyer to either
set Q1low = D, realizing BS = D(V − c2) in period 1 or to post Q1high ≥ D/2 such that
both suppliers price at p1i = V , thereby realizing the same surplus in period 2. The latter
approach is selected due to assumption 3 as it sustains competition.
For δ = 0.5 meanwhile, the value of sustained competition for the buyer is markedly
reduced and thus cannot increase surplus above BS = D(V −c2). Since now current surplus
is valued higher, this leads the buyer to implement myopic purchasing by setting Qlow = D.
Accordingly, both suppliers price at c2, with the buyer sourcing only from supplier 1 and
competition is never sustained (cf. figure 2.7).
We therefore find that compared to the initial process, the character of competition is
changed away from the predominance of exclusion towards more accommodating outcomes
when the buyer values sustained competition sufficiently high.
In addition, in figure 2.8 the difference of the expected buyer surplus for the alterna-
tive and initial procurement processes, BS
A − BSI is depicted. When the buyer values
sustained competition highly for discount factors δ = 1.0, the alternative process can
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Figure 2.8: Difference of expected buyer surplus between alternative and initial procure-
ment processes for the numerical solution. Thereby D = 1.0, V = 1.0.
increase the surplus of the buyer for small differences of marginal costs and especially
for (c1, c2) ∈ CH ∪ CL2. While then in the initial process exclusion dominates, for the
alternative process there exist equilibria where competition is nearly always sustained and
the additional surplus from period 2 overcompensates foregone surplus in period 1. For
higher cost differences however, there are equilibria such that exclusionary prices are so
low or competition is sustained at prices which are so low that the initial process can be
superior to the alternative process.
Also, when δ = 0.5, we found that there is an equilibrium in the alternative process
which implements myopic buying by setting Q1low = D. Accordingly then, in accordance
with the finding in section 2.3.3, buyer surplus is never higher than with the initial process
for costs in CH ∪ CL2. For the equilibria arising from the calculation this often also holds
for (c1, c2) ∈ CL1. However, there also exist equilibria where competition is sustained and
surplus is slightly increased by myopic purchasing as implemented in the equilibrium of the
alternative process (cf. figure 2.8). Thus, the overall impact of the alternative procurement
process can be described by the next result.
Numerical Result 3. For the alternative procurement process in a discretized version
of the model, there often exist equilibria where the buyer dual sources and competition is
sustained with positive probability when the value of sustained competition for the buyer
is sufficiently high, including for (c1, c2) ∈ CH ∪ CL2. Buyer surplus can, but need not,
increase compared to the initial process, especially for small cost differences.
These results are robust for ∆Q = 0.2 as well as ∆Q = 0.05. With ∆Q = 0.5 however,
splitting demand in the alternative process guarantees a quantity of D/2 to the higher-
priced supplier. Accordingly, for δ = 1.0 both suppliers price at V and competition is
always sustained but surplus is then never higher than in the initial process.
Hence, even though the alternative procurement process always yields the same out-
come as the initial process in a myopic situation, equilibrium outcomes in a strategic
context can be quite different. Thus, the choice of the procurement process can substan-
tially influence surplus values for the buyer as well as the structure of the future supplier
market. Furthermore, the optimality of the process might critically depend on the exact
situation as demonstrated by the results for different marginal cost combinations.
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2.5 Conclusion
Within this work we analyze a situation where two suppliers with different costs com-
pete over time and have to exit the market when their profit is insufficient. A single
buyer decides strategically from which supplier to source. This is modeled as a two pe-
riod asymmetric cost Bertrand duopoly with a profit threshold for suppliers and a buyer
with inelastic demand. Using backward induction, we solve this model analytically and
numerically for subgame-perfect equilibria.
While the buyer benefits from sustained competition in the future, suppliers can in-
crease their surplus by monopolizing the market. Therefore, for high prices in the first
period, the buyer strategically dual sources and sustains competition. However, for lower
prices myopic single sourcing is optimal and at least one supplier exits. Overall, we find
that exclusionary tendencies are strong while exact results depend critically on the costs
of suppliers. For small cost differences, the more efficient supplier excludes the other
supplier in a unique pure strategy equilibrium, with the buyer purchasing only from the
more efficient supplier. The introduction of multiple identical buyers adds coordination
challenges but does not change the equilibrium prediction. Also, coarse quantities in a
numerical implementation do not yield qualitatively different results. For large cost dif-
ferences in contrast, there can also exist equilibria where suppliers price accommodatingly
and competition is sustained with positive probability.
For the buyer, modifying the procurement process by committing to myopic sourcing
never increases surplus when the cost difference between suppliers is small. However,
an alternative process which has the buyer announcing the quantities to be sourced first
can then lead to a higher probability of sustained competition and an increase in buyer
surplus. However, there are also situations where equilibria exist such that expected
surplus is reduced.
For firms our results highlight that the choice of the procurement process is of crit-
ical importance to optimize sourcing. Not only can a different process change expected
surplus but whether this results in an increase or a decrease can also depend on spe-
cific details of the market. Conversely, we find that when supplier characteristics are
well known, the choice of the process not only allows to optimize surplus but also to
impact the future supplier market structure. Generally, committing to myopic sourcing
can have a detrimental effect on surplus as the threat to split demand between suppliers
and sustain competition forces the more efficient supplier to offer better terms of trade.
However, while procurement auctions as modeled by the initial process often induce fierce
competition and thus yield lower current prices, they often also reduce future competi-
tion. In contrast, committing to a split of a contract often allows to sustain competition.
From a supplier perspective, our findings imply that strategic buyers will sustain competi-
tion when this is beneficial even if it requires foregoing current surplus. Furthermore, the
choice of the procurement process can be instructive regarding the aim of buyers to sustain
competition or not.
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In the context of antitrust policy, the result of predominant exclusionary pricing for
most cost combinations highlights how predatory actions can arise in a procurement auc-
tion context and need not require pricing below own costs. However, we also find that
indeed, strategic buyers will counter these tendencies by sustaining competition when this
is profitable. Also, procurement processes can be employed strategically by powerful buy-
ers to influence expected outcomes, not only with regard to prices but also with regard
to the market structure. However, there may well exist contexts where this can also have
detrimental effects on competition.
Finally, regarding the analysis of static models in the industrial organization literature
our finding that an alternative procurement process which yields identical results in a
myopic setting can lead to quite different results in a two period model highlights the
importance to account for strategic effects arising from dynamic situations, especially as
firm interactions in reality are often dynamic in nature.
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Chapter 3
Coordination of Strategic Sourcing
to Sustain Supplier Competition
in an Experiment
In a situation where strategic buyers source from competing suppliers over time, buyers of-
ten have an incentive to sustain competition while suppliers benefit from excluding rival
suppliers. We investigate this situation experimentally in a two period duopoly, where in
the second period only those suppliers are active whose profitability is sufficient in the
first period. Exclusion of competing suppliers is dominant for two independent buyers but
pricing becomes more accommodating with improved coordination of buyers. Since sourc-
ing decisions are similar, competition is thus sustained more often when the coordination
of buyers improves. There is weak evidence that also buyer surplus increases. Complete
rationality of buyers however is not observed to change results substantially. Contrary
to the subgame-perfect prediction of no difference, we thus find that coordination confers
power to buyers and can be an effective counterweight to exclusionary supplier behavior.
3.1 Introduction
When suppliers who sell to powerful strategic buyers over time are threatened in their
survival, both suppliers and buyers have to take into consideration how their decisions
influence the future market structure on the supplier side. An example of such a situation
is offered by the automotive industry, where only a few relevant car manufacturers1 source
from parts suppliers and thus may account for a large share of the sales of individual
suppliers2. Meanwhile, numerous car parts firms are in a vulnerable position3. Thus, car
1In 2008, the top ten car manufacturers produced more than 35% of all cars worldwide (OICA 2009).
2For example the former divisions of car manufacturers (e.g., Delphi and Visteon) still make a substantial
share of their sales to their previous owners (Babich 2010; Wadecki, Babich, and Wu 2010).
3E.g., a third of North American automotive suppliers declared bankruptcy in the downturn of 2008
according to Wadecki, Babich, and Wu (2010).
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manufacturers may exercise substantial power vis-a`-vis their suppliers. Aspects of this
situation are also observed in other markets however, with e.g., only a few powerful retail
chains sourcing from food manufacturers and suppliers in the defense industry often selling
to a single governmental buyer.
Buyers then face a tradeoff between sourcing from the supplier making the best current
offer and sourcing strategically from multiple suppliers to ensure that the future supply
situation does not deteriorate. In practice we observe that while in some situations buyers
favor single sourcing4 in other situations multiple sourcing is prevalent5. Accordingly, sup-
pliers have to decide whether to engage in aggressive actions to try to exclude competing
firms or whether to accommodate to the fact that buyers will sustain competition. The
decision to exclude other suppliers is not readily observed since it generally falls foul of
antitrust rules6. On the other hand there exist markets where suppliers are accused of not
competing too fiercely without colluding outright7.
What is more, decisions can be dependent on how market demand is structured. Buyers
may not take sourcing decisions without consulting with other firms purchasing in the same
market or may form joint purchasing agencies8. This in turn might induce suppliers to
compete differently, which may also happen when only a single buyer is active in the
market or buyers are especially sophisticated.
This interplay between suppliers and buyers is also acknowledged in antitrust policy.
As laid out in the EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (EU 2010), “single branding” by
suppliers encompasses those tacit agreements which “induce [a buyer] to concentrate its
orders... with one supplier”. The possible competition risk is “foreclosure of the market
to competing suppliers”. Nevertheless, the guidelines also state that “powerful buyers will
not easily allow themselves to be cut off from the supply of competing goods”. However,
this leaves open which buyer market structures are especially suited to confer power to
buyers in such situations, which we investigate experimentally in this article.
Only a few theoretical works have analyzed strategic buyers and suppliers who are
threatened in their survival explicitly. An analytical investigation of the model used in
the present article (Wilken 2011b) finds exclusionary outcomes to be often dominant.
Also, in a Hotelling model strategic sourcing to sustain supplier competition occurs for
exogenously given prices but may not be part of an equilibrium (Clark and Polborn 2006).
In the model of Berge`s and Chambolle (2009) meanwhile, for sufficiently different discount
4The Department of Defense uses single sourcing to procure drugs (Gong, Li, and McAfee 2010), while
Beker and Hernando-Vecianaz (2009) provide other public sector examples, e.g., military supplies and
waste collection services. Also firms like Sun Microsystems award some contracts to a single supplier as
reported by Tunca and Wu (2009).
5Multiple sourcing is employed in defense procurement (Anton and Yao 1992) and by, e.g., General
Motors, IBM (Anton, Brusco, and Lopomo 2010) and Sun Microsystems (Tunca and Wu 2009).
6In recent cases, e.g., France Telecom was found guilty of pricing below cost to eliminate competition
for internet access (ECJ C-202/07 P 2009) in the EU, while in the US a subsidiary of AT&T was acquitted
in a similar case (SC 555 U.S. 2009).
7E.g., Airbus and Boeing are sometimes accused of forming a “cosy duopoly” (The Economist 2010).
8Pooled purchasing is widespread in the healthcare sector (Marvel and Yang 2008). Also in the auto-
motive industry, e.g., BMW and Daimler purchase selected car parts jointly (Reuters 2010).
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factors of the suppliers and the single buyer, the buyer sources strategically in equilibrium
but suppliers set prices above the valuation and can thus extract all surplus.
In a broader context, this article adds to the body of work analyzing the power of
buyers vis-a`-vis suppliers. Overviews are provided by, e.g., Chen (2007) and Inderst and
Mazzarotto (2008), while Ruﬄe (2005) includes also experimental investigations.
Research on the origins of buyer power has focused on the effect of individual buyers’
size of demand as in, e.g., Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Inderst and Wey (2003), finding
that often a larger size increases the power of buyers. The potential loss of a substantial
share of sales when the buyer switches to other suppliers, encourages entry by alternative
suppliers or withholds demand can then discipline suppliers. Furthermore, in addition to
various other sources, the sophistication of buyers may add power through more profes-
sional procurement processes or better information about alternatives (cf. Inderst and
Mazzarotto 2008, and references therein).
Sourcing decisions can then be a lever to exercise buyer power. This adds an additional
perspective to the literature on the optimality of single vs. multiple sourcing, an overview
of which is provided by Elmaghraby (2000). Generally, whether multiple sourcing is opti-
mal or not depends critically on the specific context as demonstrated by, e.g., results for
the identical model in Anton and Yao (1989) and Inderst (2008) differing with the number
of buyers. More closely related to our model, a commitment to multiple sourcing can
increase participation and intensify supplier competition (Klotz and Chatterjee 1995a).
Buyer power can result in better terms of trade. While for a single supplier, buyer
size discounts often occur only when the supplier has increasing marginal costs (Chipty
and Snyder 1999; Inderst and Wey 2003), for competing suppliers discounts arise, e.g., in
the sequential purchasing model of Snyder (1998) and through a commitment to single
sourcing in Inderst and Shaffer (2007). Sorensen (2003) and Ellison and Snyder (2010)
confirm the existence of buyer size discounts empirically, although the effect is found only
for competing suppliers. Groups of buyers who form purchasing agencies can then often
be treated as a single buyer commanding the demand of all group members (cf., e.g.,
Chen 2007, and references therein.). As another consequence of buyer power, foreclosure
may occur on the supplier market side. This has been analyzed primarily in the context of
“naked exclusion” as discussed below. Also, a single buyer may effectively exclude suppliers
by single sourcing from competitors in a learning-by-doing environment as described in
Lewis and Yildrim (2002). Conversely, Romano (1991) shows that buyers may consume
excessively to avoid foreclosure of a monopolist supplier.
A small number of experiments investigate buyer power explicitly. Ruﬄe (2000) finds
that demand withholding vis-a`-vis two suppliers occurs more often and leads to better
terms of trade both when buyers are more concentrated and when the share of surplus
earned by buyers is lower. Also for a single supplier in Engle-Warnick and Ruﬄe (2005)
prices are lower when the buyer concentration is higher. This is due to the monopolist
fearing the loss of more surplus from demand withholding in the presence of fewer buyers.
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For a monopolist in a posted-bid market, Normann, Ruﬄe, and Snyder (2007) find
support for the prediction that buyer size discounts arise only for increasing marginal
costs. Buyer size discounts are also observed when suppliers compete to supply buyers
of different size sequentially in Ruﬄe (2009). The case of merging suppliers who realize
efficiency gains is investigated in Davis and Wilson (2008). Human buyers induce (through
demand withholding) lower price levels than automated buyers, both before and after the
merger, but lead to large variations of results between individual markets.
Turning to the supplier side of the market, exclusion of suppliers who are threatened in
their survival can be achieved through predatory pricing. An overview is offered by, e.g.,
Bolton, Riordan, and Brodley (2000). In an experimental environment predatory pric-
ing often proves hard to pin down. Nevertheless, Jung, Kagel, and Levin (1994) detect
predatory behavior in an abstract framework, while Goeree and Gomez (1998) find clear
indications of predatory pricing in a multi-market setup.
Instead of pricing to secure a monopoly, suppliers can also try to “nakedly” exclude a
more efficient entrant by offering payments to buyers in exchange for exclusivity contracts.
Due to coordination problems between buyers, the monopolist can succeed as the entrant
has to cover entry costs. This logic was first formalized by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and
Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) and subsequently modified and extended.
In experiments, exclusive dealing arrangements are found to be used frequently (Boone,
Mu¨ller, and Suetens 2009; Landeo and Spier 2009; Smith 2011). Apart from the impact of
discrimination, the rate of exclusion is found to decrease with an increase in the fraction
of buyers required (Smith 2011), for a non-human incumbent (Landeo and Spier 2009)
and also when buyers can communicate (Landeo and Spier 2009; Smith 2011).
Adding to this literature, we report the first experimental investigation of the interplay
of powerful buyers aiming to sustain competition through strategic sourcing and suppliers
who have an incentive to engage in exclusionary behavior. Furthermore, we analyze for
the first time how buyer coordination and sophistication add power to buyers which is
then exercised through sourcing decisions.
Our experiment implements the two period model described in Wilken (2011b). Two
buyers source from two suppliers by deciding on the quantity to procure from each sup-
plier. Suppliers have different marginal costs and compete in prices. They are threatened
in their survival as they are only active in period 2 when their profit in period 1 is suffi-
ciently high. For the experimental parameters, suppliers then have an incentive to exclude
the other supplier, while buyers have an incentive to sustain competition. However, in the
subgame-perfect equilibrium, the more efficient supplier excludes the other supplier and
enjoys a monopoly in period 2. Although this prediction holds for all experimental treat-
ments, we observe substantial differences in outcomes. While in the baseline, pricing is
indeed dominated by exclusionary tendencies as predicted, improving buyer coordination
by allowing communication, replacing the two buyers by a single buyer or using rational
automated buyers makes pricing more accommodating to the survival of both suppliers.
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The impact of complete buyer rationality is by comparison limited. When supplier compe-
tition can be sustained and dual sourcing is thus rational, buyers purchase nearly rationally
and often sustain competition. No significant change is then observed for improved buyer
coordination. When however dual sourcing is not rational, sourcing from both suppliers
persists across treatments. While this is found to be partially due to fairness considera-
tions of buyers, the major cause are errors of single buyers. Overall, we find that with
improved buyer coordination competition is sustained more often, while rationality of buy-
ers does not induce a significant change. With behavior in period 2 close to the prediction
in all treatments, surplus of the more efficient supplier decreases with improved buyer
coordination, while there exists weak evidence that buyer surplus increases.
We thus find that the ability to source strategically from one or the other supplier
allows buyers to exercise power. The power increases the better buyers can coordinate,
which may, but need not be the result of larger buyers. This result is driven primarily by
the induced differences in pricing behavior of suppliers.
The present article is organized as follows. We model the situation described above in
section 3.2 and deduct predictions for the experimental outcomes from the numerical
solution. Treatments are detailed in section 3.3 along with the experimental procedures.
Results are presented in section 3.4 while section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model and Predictions
3.2.1 Model
The situation described in the introduction is modeled in a two period setting, as visualized
in figure 3.1. While period 1 represents the current supply situation, period 2 models the
future market. In the first period two suppliers i compete in prices pi to supply two
buyers j with a homogeneous good9. Suppliers have different marginal unit costs, c1 < c2,
with supplier 1 being the more efficient supplier throughout this article. Each of the
identical buyers has an inelastic demand of d for the good in both periods up to the
valuation V , i.e., buyers are assumed not to purchase for prices above their valuation10.
After prices are posted, each buyer j decides how to source her demand from the two
suppliers, d = q1,j + q2,j , thereby realizing a surplus of BSj =
∑
i qi,j (V − pi). Together,
buyers purchase an aggregate quantity Qi = qi,1 + qi,2 from supplier i.
To model that suppliers have to exit a market (in the long term) when they are not
sufficiently profitable and are thus threatened in their survival, a profit threshold pi is intro-
duced in period 111. Hence, supplier i is only active in period 2 when his profit in period 1
9Period 2 variables are indicated by an index throughout this article while period 1 indices are dropped.
10This is equivalent to buyers not making losses on individual purchases (cf. also Wilken 2011b). In the
experiment this is implemented by restricting prices to pi ≤ V since this allows to exclude the option to
withhold demand, thereby placing the focus on strategic sourcing.
11Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001) use a similar approach, while Clark and Polborn (2006) employ a profit
threshold in a closely related model. Also, Wadecki, Babich, and Wu (2010) model firm exit based on the
difference between earnings and liabilities while Babich (2010) uses the ratio of assets to liabilities.
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Figure 3.1: Model timing and strategic variables.
attains the threshold, pii = Qi(pi− ci) ≥ pi. In the second period only the active suppliers
compete in a situation otherwise identical to the first period.
In the experiment, a price grid with a smallest unit of account ∆p = 1 is used. Setting
the buyer valuation to V = 1000 then ensures a sufficiently fine price space. Accordingly,
demand can only be split in single units of ∆q = 1. Overall demand of each buyer is
then set to d = 4, large enough not to render the allocation trivial but small enough
to be easily comprehensible. The remaining parameters are fixed so as to ensure that
an exclusion equilibrium in pure strategies is implemented with a price of supplier 1 in
the first period markedly below the cost of the less efficient supplier (cf. section 3.2.2).
Simultaneously the range of prices for which a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists is
required to be large and expected payoffs for buyers and suppliers to be similar. These
conditions are fulfilled by a profit threshold of pi = 700 in combination with marginal
costs c1 = 200 and c2 = 400.
3.2.2 Theoretical Solution and Predictions
Experimental parameters are used in a numerical implementation of the model to solve for
subgame-perfect equilibria through backward induction. This allows to derive predictions
for experimental results. Accordingly, the second period is not discounted.
When both suppliers are active in period 2, the equilibria of the discrete one period
asymmetric cost Bertrand model with an equal sharing tie-breaking rule arise. We assume
that the equilibrium with p2D1 = 400 and p
2D
2 = 401 is implemented
12. This choice is
uncritical as it translates into a negligible surplus difference in period 2. Both buyers j
then purchase only from supplier 1,
(
q2D1,j , q
2D
2,j
)
= (4, 0). When a single supplier i is active,
he maximizes surplus by pricing at the buyer valuation p2Mi = 1000 and buyers have to
purchase from this supplier, q2Mi,j = 4. When no supplier is active, no transactions take
place and all market participants realize zero surplus.
Hence, in period 1 buyers have an incentive to sustain competition as each buyer gains
additional surplus of ∆BS2j = 2400 in period 2 from a duopoly compared to a monopoly or
12Similar to Deneckere and Kovenock (1996) we include only prices which are weakly undominated
as well as their continuous limits, p2Di ≥ ci. Then two equilibria exist:
(
p2D1 , p
2D
2
)
= (399, 400) and(
p2D1 , p
2D
2
)
= (400, 401). We choose the latter as for ∆p → 0 transaction prices converge to p2D1 = 400. In
the treatment with automated suppliers the other equilibrium is implemented in the experiment.
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no active supplier. Conversely, each supplier has an incentive to exclude the other supplier
as this increases surplus by the same amount.
With buyers sourcing in period 1 as described below, supplier 1 always best responds
by pricing to exclude the less efficient supplier. Supplier 2 does the same, except for low
prices of supplier 1. Then, supplier 2 either accommodates by setting his price equal to the
buyer valuation or is indifferent between all prices when competition cannot be sustained.
In the subgame-perfect equilibrium, we find that supplier 1 prices at p∗1 = 316, so low as to
gain exclusivity regardless of the price of the other supplier. This price is thus below the
one period equilibrium price of p1 = c2. Meanwhile, supplier 2 is indifferent between prices
p∗2 ∈ [750, . . . , 1000]. Then, buyers purchase exclusively from supplier 1,
(
q∗1,j , q
∗
2,j
)
= (4, 0)
since they cannot sustain competition and supplier 1 enjoys a monopoly in period 2. As
aggregate sourcing behavior is not predicted to change with improved coordination or
complete buyer rationality, we have the following prediction.
Prediction 1. The more efficient supplier always prices below the marginal cost of the
less efficient supplier and exclusionary pricing prevails.
While in the subgame-perfect equilibrium buyers source only from supplier 1, for other
prices two types of equilibria of the buyer subgame in period 1 can arise. In a strategic
sourcing equilibrium buyers purchase such that both suppliers are active in period 2,
whereas in a myopic sourcing equilibrium only one or no supplier is sustained.
For a strategic sourcing equilibrium to arise, it is necessary for aggregate dual sourc-
ing13 to occur, i.e., Qi > 0 for both suppliers i. Then, for unequal prices the aggregate
quantity purchased from the supplier with the higher price is positive, Qhigh > 0 and
chosen as low as possible. Experimental parameters are such that it is always rational
for buyers to sustain competition when this is possible, i.e., whenever aggregate demand
is sufficient for both suppliers to attain the profit threshold pi, then a strategic sourcing
equilibrium exists. Meanwhile, in a myopic sourcing equilibrium for unequal prices, buyers
purchase only from the supplier with the lower price.
If for a price combination multiple buyer equilibria exist, the numerical solution selects
only pareto-optimal ones14, which is equivalent to always implementing a strategic sourcing
equilibrium when one exists. Among these equilibria, buyers minimize the difference of the
quantities sold by suppliers. This is relevant only for equal prices and generalizes the equal-
sharing tie-breaking rule of period 2. Finally, as buyers are identical they are assumed to
purchase as equal as possible a quantity from each supplier. Supplier behavior however is
unaffected by the last selection as it depends only on aggregate quantities. Implementing
alternative selection rules does not change the overall equilibrium prediction.
There are in turn two types of price combinations. Those for which buyers can sustain
competition and thus a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists and those for which sustaining
13Throughout this article we refer to dual sourcing when aggregate demand is split between suppliers.
This includes instances of both buyers single sourcing their complete demand from different suppliers.
14This is a commonly made assumption, cf., e.g., Romano (1991) for this approach in a similar situation.
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competition is not possible and therefore only a myopic sourcing equilibrium exists. As
depicted in figure 3.4 below, competition can be sustained when both suppliers set high
prices. As dual sourcing always occurs in a strategic sourcing equilibrium, we thus have
the following prediction regarding aggregate buyer behavior. It is independent of buyer
coordination, while rationality is naturally assumed.
Prediction 2. When competition can be sustained, buyers always dual source and
sustain competition.
When two buyers implement a strategic sourcing equilibrium for unequal prices, sus-
taining competition is similar to a discrete public good, as it increases the expected buyer
surplus15. However, for the experimental parameters it is in most cases possible and
rational even for a single buyer to sustain competition when the other buyer purchases
myopically. Only for a small number of price combinations are both buyers required to
source from the higher-priced supplier as Q
high
> d is necessary to sustain competition
and in turn both strategic and myopic sourcing equilibria exist. Thereby, Q
high
is the
minimum quantity required for survival by the supplier with the higher price.
However, when suppliers post prices which allow to sustain competition, buyers still
have to coordinate on one of the possibly many strategic sourcing equilibria. As de-
scribed in section 3.3, we include a treatment with structured one-way communication
where buyer 1 can send her (non-binding) intended demand split to buyer 2 prior to the
sourcing decision. We use the solution concept of “sensible equilibria” introduced by
Farrell (1988), assuming that if buyer 1 prefers to follow her announcement when buyer 2
best responds, then the announcement is believed by buyer 2 (cf. also Cooper et al. 1989).
When competition can be sustained16 and prices are not equal, the only sensible outcome
is announcing (and subsequently purchasing) qhigh,1 = max{0, Qhigh − d} from the sup-
plier with the higher price17. Communication thus allows buyer 1 to select the strategic
sourcing equilibria most beneficial for her, leading often to only buyer 2 sourcing from
both suppliers. In contrast, by assumption maximally symmetric buyer behavior is imple-
mented when no communication is possible. Defining buyer cooperation as both buyers
dual sourcing when this is rational, the next prediction follows.
Prediction 3. Without communication, buyer cooperation in dual sourcing is perfect.
When buyers can communicate, cooperation is decreased.
Now, when suppliers post a price combination which does not allow to sustain com-
petition, buyers are predicted to implement a myopic sourcing equilibrium and therefore
not to split demand between suppliers for unequal prices.
Prediction 4. When competition cannot be sustained, buyers do not dual source.
15The contributions are the quantities Qhigh, while Q
high
is the provision point.
16When competition cannot be sustained, sensible outcomes and Nash equilibria are identical.
17For equal prices the sensible outcomes are q2,1 ∈ [max{0, Q
2
− d}, d].
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The subgame-perfect prediction is that exclusion is always successful and supplier 1
enjoys a monopoly in period 2. Then, the surplus of supplier 2 is zero as nothing is sold.
For buyers all surplus originates from period 1 leading to BS = 5472 while for supplier 1,
pi1 = 7328. Hence, for the overall outcome we have the following prediction.
Prediction 5. Competition is never sustained and the more efficient supplier monopolizes
the market in period 2. Surplus of the more efficient supplier is higher than the surplus of
the buyers while the less efficient supplier realizes no surplus.
3.3 Experimental Implementation
3.3.1 Treatments
Five different treatments are analyzed experimentally as laid out in figure 3.1. The base-
line treatment REF implements the model with two human suppliers and buyers. Buyers
cannot coordinate explicitly and are by nature not completely rational. In COM, hu-
man buyers can communicate with each other. Experimental analyses of the structurally
similar “battle-of-the-sexes” game18 find the most pronounced increase in coordination
for structured one-way communication (Cooper et al. 1989; Crawford 1998). Accordingly,
buyer 1 can decide whether to communicate and then send her (non-binding) intended
demand split to buyer 2 before actual sourcing decisions are taken simultaneously. Co-
ordination is enhanced compared to the baseline as communication allows to coordinate
on a specific strategic sourcing equilibrium (cf. section 3.2.2). This treatment models a
situation where buyers “talk” about intended sourcing decisions without making binding
agreements and this is known to suppliers.
In SIN, suppliers supply a single human buyer. This buyer has a demand of d = 8,
equal to the aggregate demand of the two buyers in the baseline. This situation can be
interpreted either as a single powerful buyer in a specific market or as a buyer group of
two buyers with demand of d = 4 each. In the latter case sourcing decisions are likely
to be implemented among the individual buyers as evenly as possible. As now a single
subject takes sourcing decisions, coordination is perfect by definition. The same holds for
the two automated buyers in AUB, who follow the optimal behavior as implemented in
the numerical solution of section 3.2.2 and are thus completely rational19. Hence, they
offer a benchmark when both coordination issues are absent and buyers are sophisticated
in acting rational20. In order to change only the “nature” of buyers from treatment REF,
two buyers are kept although clearly a single automated buyer would behave identically
from the viewpoint of suppliers.
18When competition can be sustained, for most price combinations only strategic sourcing equilibria
exist and buyers essentially face an extended “battle-of-the-sexes” game.
19In the experiment, for equal prices which allow to sustain competition buyers split “excess demand”
not required to sustain competition equally between suppliers.
20This stems from the intuition that sophisticated buyers will source more rationally as they have access
to more information and sourcing decisions will come under more, and more informed scrutiny.
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Buyer Buyer coordination
rationality No Enhanced Perfect
Human
REF
(Reference)
COM
(Communication)
SIN
(Single Buyer)
AUS
(Automated Suppliers)
Complete
AUB
(Automated Buyers)
Table 3.1: Classification of treatments.
In the additional treatment AUS, automated suppliers post a series of prices in period 1
which is randomly generated before the experiment. In period 2, suppliers post rational
prices depending on the market structure. With the situation of buyers regarding coordi-
nation and rationality being identical to the baseline, this treatment allows to isolate any
motivation for dual sourcing in REF stemming from fairness towards the suppliers.
Apart from AUS all treatments yield the same equilibrium prediction (cf. section 3.2.2).
Hence, they allow to investigate how improving buyer coordination from REF over COM to
SIN and AUB and also complete buyer rationality in AUB impact experimental outcomes.
3.3.2 Procedures
In the experiment, the two period model is repeated for 20 rounds to allow convergence of
behavior. Each human subject is assigned either the role of a buyer or a supplier. A group
of two suppliers and two buyers forms a market and stays fixed throughout the experiment,
except in AUB, where two suppliers form a market and in AUS, where two buyers do so.
For each treatment N = 6 independent markets are conducted. Before each round, costs
are randomly assigned to the supplier subjects. This avoids large differences in payoffs
and mitigates fairness considerations of buyer subjects towards the supplier with higher
costs (cf. also section 3.4.4). In the communication treatment, also each round one of the
buyer subjects is randomly assigned the ability to communicate. The different treatments
are implemented in z-tree (Fischbacher 2007), providing subjects with a profit calculator.
After each round, profits of all participants in the market are displayed.
Experiments were conducted in the Mannheim experimental laboratory in May 2009
and March 2010. Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2003) and were mostly
students. Overall 90 subjects participated and no one participated twice. After being
randomly seated in the laboratory, subjects were provided with the instructions (cf. ap-
pendix), making all parameters common knowledge. To participate, between five and
seven test questions had to be answered, depending on the treatment. Before the first
round commenced, subjects were informed about their role on the computer screen. Ses-
sions lasted between 1h10 and 2h00, with the shorter sessions due to the treatments with
one automated market side. Firm profits were converted to monetary payouts with a
factor of 1/3000, yielding an average payout of EUR 19.85.
46
3.4 Experimental Results
The analysis of experimental data is limited to rounds 5-19 to allow for learning in the
first rounds and to exclude endgame effects in the last. All results are however also
valid for rounds 10-19 with exceptions explicitly noted. The mean values of the analysis
variables are calculated for the relevant rounds in each market and tested statistically for
differences between treatments (Mann-Whitney-U-Test) or within treatments (Wilcoxon-
Signed-Ranks-Test). The reported p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted and
frequencies as well as mean values always refer to the mean of market means. Histograms
meanwhile depict the distribution of values from the respective rounds in all markets.
Results for the treatment with automated suppliers are included for buyers only.
3.4.1 Incentives for Dual Sourcing and Exclusion
In the theoretical solution, the differences in expected surplus for the possible market
structures in period 2 provide an incentive for buyers to sustain competition and for each
supplier to exclude the other supplier (cf. section 3.2.2). We first confirm that these
incentives are present in the experiment.
For a supplier enjoying a monopoly, the predicted price is p2Mi = 1000. Indeed, we
observe from figure 3.2 prices p2Mi ≥ 900 in f = 0.94 of monopolies in all treatments,
with the distribution showing a pronounced peak at the highest prices. For two active
buyers, the lowest posted price is predicted to be p2Dlow = 400. Again, in f = 0.82 of
duopolies the lowest price is p2Dlow ≤ 500, with f = 0.38 of prices being lower or equal
to the predicted value. Hence, the price level is only slightly elevated compared to the
prediction. Pairwise comparisons between treatments yield no significant differences of
the lowest price in either monopolies (p ≥ 0.214) or duopolies (p ≥ 0.177). In the latter
case only the difference between the single and automated buyer treatments comes close
to significance (cf. section 3.4.2). We thus conclude that pricing in period 2 is close to the
prediction and does not differ significantly between treatments.
When only one supplier is active, buyers have to source their demand from this mo-
nopolist. In a duopoly, it is optimal to purchase only from the supplier with the low-
est price for unequal prices and not to dual source. Nevertheless, dual sourcing is fre-
quently observed as aggregate demand is split in f
2D
Dual = 0.28 of all duopolies in treat-
ments with human buyers (cf. also section 3.4.4). No significant differences are observed
between these treatments though with p ≥ 0.206 pairwise. An additional measure is
provided in figure 3.2 by the aggregate quantity purchased from the supplier with the
higher price, Q2Dhigh. While we find that in f = 0.67 of duopolies both buyers purchase at
the lowest price only as predicted, residual purchases from the supplier with the higher
price are observed across treatments with Q
2D
high = 1.08. Thereby, mean quantities do not
differ significantly between treatments with human buyers (p ≥ 0.373 pairwise). Behavior
of buyers is thus close to, but clearly not identical to, rational purchasing.
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Figure 3.2: Lowest price and aggregate quantity purchased from the supplier with the
higher price in duopolies in period 2. Price intervals are ( p− 50 , p ].
Our findings in the second period are therefore in line with those of Boone, Mu¨ller, and
Chaudhuri (2008), who observe convergence to the theoretical prediction in an asymmet-
ric cost Bertrand duopoly. They are in contrast however to the experiment of Dugar and
Mitra (2009), where for a cost difference similar to ours (c2 = 2 c1), prices are substan-
tially elevated, and also to experiments with symmetric Bertrand duopolies which often
find prices above the competitive level (cf., e.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000)21. An
important factor in our results is that sustaining collusion is complicated by interruptive
and structurally different period 1 interactions as well as the fact that there is generally
not always a duopoly in the second period.
Across treatments, in markets where both duopolies and monopolies occur in period 2,
we find mean buyer surplus to be higher when competition is sustained and supplier profits
to be higher when the market is monopolized. Pooling the relevant treatments these
differences are significant with p = 0.000 one-tailed for buyers and supplier 1 (N ≥ 16)
and p = 0.008 one-tailed for supplier 2 (N = 7). Mean buyer surplus is BS
2D
= 4473 in
duopolies but only BS
2M
= 306 in monopolies. Conversely, for supplier 1, pi2M1 = 6024
when exclusion is successful as opposed to pi2D1 = 1454 when competition is sustained.
The difference between mean values is similar for supplier 2. With suppliers and buyers
behaving close to the prediction, the surplus gains are not quite as large as in theory but
sufficient for opposing incentives of suppliers and buyers to be intact in the experiment.
3.4.2 Pricing
We now analyze how the opposing incentives regarding the market structure in the second
period change behavior in the first period. Time series of the market mean of posted prices
are depicted in figure 3.3, showing that across treatments, pricing behavior is relatively
stable in the rounds 5-19 used for analysis.
We find that prices of supplier 1 are significantly higher in the experiment than the
common prediction of p∗1 = 316 with p = 0.031 in a Wilcoxon test for all treatments. In the
21Also in Cournot markets, suppliers in duopolies often collude, while a larger number of suppliers do
not (Huck, Normann, and Oechssler 2004).
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Figure 3.3: Mean prices in period 1.
baseline, prices are close to the marginal cost of the less efficient supplier with p1 = 394.
Meanwhile, mean prices are elevated to p1 ≥ 477 in all treatments with improved buyer
coordination (cf. figure 3.3). However, as reported in table 3.2, only for a single buyer is
the increase clearly significant, while when buyers are automated, this is only the case in
rounds 5-19. With no significant pairwise differences (p ≥ 0.394), we pool treatments with
improved coordination COM, SIN and AUB as CSA and with perfect coordination SIN and
AUB as SA. In both cases clear evidence of significantly increased prices compared to the
baseline is found (p = 0.104 only just fails to be significant for CSA in rounds 10-19).
For the less efficient supplier 2, we find that prices in the baseline and communications
treatment are lower than the prediction of p∗2 ≥ 750 in equilibrium (p = 0.031), although
in the latter case not significantly so for the second segment of rounds. In contrast,
for a single and automated buyers, observed mean prices are compatible with the lower
bound of the equilibrium price interval with p ≥ 0.219. Accordingly, comparing between
treatments, mean prices with communication are only slightly higher than p2 = 511 in
the baseline (cf. table 3.2). However, in both treatments with perfect coordination prices
increase significantly in the first segment of rounds, while only coming close to significance
with p ≤ 0.180 in rounds 10-19. Pairwise comparison (p ≥ 0.240) again allows us to pool
treatments as CSA and SA. While in the former case, the difference to the baseline just
fails to be significant, when pooling only treatments with perfect coordination the price
increase for supplier 2 is easily significant.
Hence, although predicted prices are the same in all four treatments and although buyer
behavior is found to be similar in sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, experimentally we find that prices
of both suppliers increase when coordination is improved. Meanwhile, rational automated
buyers are not observed to induce a change compared to the perfectly coordinated single
human buyer.
We now investigate how these differences affect whether competition can be sustained
by analyzing the combination of simultaneously posted prices of both suppliers. These are
depicted in figure 3.4, with the differences in price levels easily discernible. For buyers to
be able to sustain competition, price combinations need to allow both suppliers to attain
the profit threshold. In the baseline treatment price combinations are concentrated for
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Treatment H0 N p1 MW p p2 MW p
REF 6 394 511
COM E(REF) = E(COM) 6 477 0.310 576 0.818
SIN E(REF) = E(SIN) 6 537 0.065 702 0.093+
AUB E(REF) = E(AUB) 6 500 0.041+ 663 0.093+
CSA E(REF) = E(CSA) 18 504 0.033+ 647 0.119
SA E(REF) = E(SA) 12 518 0.018 683 0.041
Table 3.2: Prices in period 1. Mann-Whitney test, p-values two-tailed. (+) not significant
for rounds 10-19.
both suppliers at prices close to the marginal cost of supplier 2. Accordingly it is possible
to sustain competition in less than a third of rounds (cf. table 3.3). With the introduction
of communication, a single and automated buyers, the concentration of price combinations
close to the marginal cost of supplier 2 becomes less pronounced while more instances of
both suppliers posting high prices are observed. The frequency of price combinations
which allow to sustain competition thus increases from the baseline to around a half with
communication and more than fC ≥ 0.61 for a single and automated buyers. However,
this increase is found not to be significant with communication, in line with the finding
for the underlying changes in prices. Also, only for rounds 5-19 in AUB is the increase
significant, while coming close for the other segment and a single buyer (p ≤ 0.171).
Overall, we observe a high variation between individual markets. While in the baseline for
all markets the frequency is fC ≤ 0.67, with communication and a single buyer there are
markets where it is never possible to sustain competition but also ones where it is always
possible. Testing for pairwise differences, we can again pool treatments according to their
level of coordination as CSA and SA (p ≥ 0.426). Competition can then be sustained
significantly more frequently for both pooled treatments than for REF, except for CSA in
rounds 10-19, where with p = 0.154 it comes close however.
For those prices where competition cannot be sustained, at least one supplier has to
exit the market. Hence, the frequency fC offers a direct measure of whether pricing is
exclusionary or accommodating by allowing survival of both suppliers. While thus in
the baseline exclusionary pricing is prevalent, we find that improved buyer coordination
decreases the aggressiveness of pricing and suppliers become more accommodating to
sustained competition. The additional introduction of sophisticated, completely rational
buyers does not increase this tendency significantly further compared to a single human
buyer. Combined with the results for the price levels we can thus state the first finding.
Finding 1. With independent buyers the more efficient supplier prices close to the marginal
cost of the less efficient supplier and exclusionary pricing is dominant. Improved buyer co-
ordination leads to an increase in the price level of both suppliers. Thereby pricing becomes
more accommodating to the survival of both suppliers. Complete rationality of buyers is
not observed to substantially change pricing.
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Figure 3.4: Posted price combinations in period 1, ensuing buyer behavior and market
structure in period 2. Area of symbols is proportional to the observed frequency.
Since non-exclusionary prices in period 1 benefit buyers by allowing to sustain compe-
tition (cf. section 3.4.5), we thus find that buyer power increases with an improved ability
to coordinate sourcing decisions. Although not predicted by theory, this is compatible
with intuition, as the more efficient supplier will refrain from trying to exclude supplier 2
when he perceives the coordinated buyers to be able to source to sustain competition and
to be able to respond to exclusionary pricing by sourcing from the other supplier only.
Pricing in duopolies in period 2 as analyzed in section 3.4.1 does not differ between
treatments, except for the weakest evidence that rational non-human buyers might induce
slightly higher prices (cf. also below). Hence, we can conclude that indeed the improved
coordination of sourcing decisions induces the observed differences in pricing, as other
potential sources like the size of the buyer (for a single buyer) or non-human buyers (for
automated buyers) are unchangedly present in the second period as well. Accordingly,
improved coordination increases the power of buyers only in situations where the conse-
quences of better coordination can be relevant as in period 1 but not in period 2.
Various experiments find that prices with human buyers are lower than with auto-
mated buyers (Brown-Kruse 1991; Davis and Williams 1991; Davis and Wilson 2008).
In our experiment we do not detect such a change when excluding the influence of im-
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Treatment H0 N fC MW p
REF 6 0.28
COM E(REF) = E(COM) 6 0.51 0.457
SIN E(REF) = E(SIN) 6 0.61 0.171
AUB E(REF) = E(AUB) 6 0.71 0.076+
CSA E(REF) = E(CSA) 18 0.61 0.088+
SA E(REF) = E(SA) 12 0.66 0.051
Table 3.3: Frequency of price combinations which allow to sustain competition. Mann-
Whitney test, p-values two-tailed. (+) not significant for rounds 10-19.
proved coordination and comparing the treatments with perfect coordination SIN and
AUB (p = 0.937 for both supplier 1 and 2 prices). Also, prices in the myopic situation
of period 2 do not differ significantly (p = 0.177 for the lowest price in duopolies and
p = 0.524 in monopolies), although they come close to exhibit the reported change in
duopolies. This absence of a substantial impact is most likely due to strategic sourcing
being inherent in our model. Thus, also automated buyers source strategically. Accord-
ingly, the reported differences in the literature have more to do with the fact that human
buyers can strategically withhold demand in a repeated game while automated buyers are
implemented to purchase myopically, than with the nature of buyers.
Another finding in the existing experimental literature is that an increased concentra-
tion of strategic buyers yields lower prices (Ruﬄe 2000; Engle-Warnick and Ruﬄe 2005).
This is attributed to the increased power wielded by more concentrated individual human
buyers through their ability to more drastically reduce supplier profits by withholding
demand. This bears some similarity to the situation in the first period in our model,
where we find that more “concentrated” decision making in the form of improved coordi-
nation of buyers leads to more favorable conditions for buyers. However, the mechanism
of exercising power through sourcing decisions is quite different here. Also, we find that
the ability to extract better terms of trade in our setting stems not from the mere size
of individual buyers but from the additional power conferred by improved coordination of
sourcing decisions.
3.4.3 Rational Dual Sourcing
When suppliers post prices in period 1 which allow to sustain competition, it is always
rational for buyers to dual source and keep both suppliers active (cf. section 3.2.2). To
investigate this situation, all analyses in this section are based on only those rounds where
competition can be sustained (cf. section 3.4.2). This limits analysis to those markets
where such rounds exist. This is the case in N = 6 markets in AUB and AUS but only in
N = 5 (REF, SIN) or N = 4 (COM) markets with human suppliers and buyers.
To sustain both suppliers it is necessary for dual sourcing to occur in aggregate. While
the automated buyers dual source always by construction when competition can be sus-
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Figure 3.5: Frequency of dual sourcing in period 1 when competition can be sustained.
tained, we find that also across the other treatments, with fDual ≥ 0.83 dual sourcing
occurs nearly always when it is rational as depicted in figures 3.4 and 3.5. For the treat-
ments with human suppliers and buyers, we find no significant differences in pairwise
comparisons with p ≥ 0.524. Thus, improved coordination is not observed to change the
frequency of dual sourcing and we therefore pool treatments REF, COM and SIN as RCS
in table 3.4. Then, no significant difference arises when suppliers are automated and also
mean values are nearly identical. Hence, the absence of potential fairness considerations
due to the automation of suppliers does not impact the frequency of dual sourcing here.
However, the frequency with human buyers is found to be significantly lower than the
rational benchmark implemented by the automated buyers, but only in rounds 5-19. Al-
though dual sourcing thus occurs slightly less often than for completely rational buyers,
we find that when it is rational to dual source, nearly always human buyers do so and
accordingly behavior is rather close to rational behavior.
To complement this analysis we investigate next the aggregate quantities which are
sourced from the supplier with the higher price22 in period 1, Qhigh. This quantity offers
a measure of the amount of strategic sourcing as a positive value implies that buyers
forego surplus in period 1. For the treatments with human suppliers and buyers mean
values 2.38 ≤ Qhigh ≤ 3.04 are close together and no significant difference exists for any
treatment compared to the baseline (cf. table 3.4). We again pool these treatments as
RCS, although some caution is due as the pairwise difference between the single buyer
and communications treatment comes close to being significant (p = 0.190). Then, for the
pooled treatments we do not observe a significant difference to either the treatment with
automated suppliers or with automated buyers.
As for different prices different values of Qhigh are optimal to ensure both suppliers
make a profit of at least pi, we analyze also the deviation of experimentally observed from
optimal quantities23 ∆Qhigh = Q
Exp
high − QTheohigh . Thereby, the optimal quantities are cal-
culated numerically using the algorithm of section 3.2.2. The distributions in figure 3.6
show central peaks at zero deviations for all treatments. For automated buyers the distri-
bution consists of a single peak at a deviation of zero and is thus not included. Optimal
aggregate quantities are sourced often, ranging from f = 0.51 (REF) to f = 0.70 (COM).
22Tied rounds are not included in Qhigh. However, in all treatments only f ≤ 0.14 of rounds are tied.
23Experimental quantities are indicated by a superscript to distinguish them from theoretical quantities.
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Treatment H0 N fDual MW p Qhigh MW p
REF 5 0.89 3.04
COM E(REF) = E(COM) 4 0.83 0.524 2.38 0.452
SIN E(REF) = E(SIN) 5 0.91 1.000 2.92 0.841
RCS 14 0.88 2.81
AUS E(RCS) = E(AUS) 6 0.90 0.687 2.13 0.231
AUB E(RCS) = E(AUB) 6 1.00 0.037+ 3.08 0.585
Table 3.4: Frequency of dual sourcing and quantity sourced from the supplier with the
higher price in period 1 when competition can be sustained. Mann-Whitney test, p-values
two-tailed. (+) not significant for rounds 10-19.
As expected the treatments with improved coordination exhibit higher peaks and only
minor deviations, while distributions for REF and AUS are rather similar. The frequency
of no deviation is nearly identical with communication and a single buyer. Results are
thus in line with those from one-way communication in the related but simpler “battle-
of-the-sexes” game, where Cooper et al. (1989) find coordination on one of the equilibria
in f = 0.95 of cases. Comparing experimental and optimal quantities for each treat-
ment, we find only small mean deviations |∆Qhigh| ≤ 0.56. Accordingly, with p ≥ 0.250
sourced quantities are compatible with the quantities from optimal rational behavior in
all treatments.
From figure 3.6 we find that for automated suppliers the experimental quantity tends
to deviate to positive values, while for REF the opposite holds. Although not significant,
this difference is opposed to what would be observed if human buyers purchased more
from the higher-priced supplier out of fairness motivations in the baseline. We thus find
again that buyers in aggregate source close to the optimal quantities, with fairness playing
no discernible role. The evidence that improved coordination leads to better sourcing
decisions is only very weak, while complete rationality is not found to substantially impact
results. We can thus state the following finding.
Finding 2.1. When competition can be sustained, buyers nearly always dual source. Buyer
behavior is close to rational behavior and not influenced by fairness motivations. It does
not change substantially with improved coordination or complete buyer rationality.
The finding that human buyers frequently act strategically mirrors results from those
experiments in posted-offer markets which are most closely related to ours (Ruﬄe 2000;
Engle-Warnick and Ruﬄe 2005; Davis and Wilson 2008). In these articles buyers frequently
use strategic demand withholding while in our experiment buyers employ strategic sourcing
as a lever to exercise buyer power.
The success of dual sourcing is given by the frequency with which both suppliers are
actually active in a duopoly in period 2 when competition can be sustained, fDC. This
value is included in figure 3.4 as the share of price combinations where competition can be
and actually is sustained. An alternative perspective is offered by figure 3.6, where non-
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Figure 3.6: Quantity sourced from the supplier with the higher price: Deviation of exper-
imental from optimal quantities in period 1 when competition can be sustained.
negative deviations of the experimental quantity from the optimal quantity purchased at
the higher-priced supplier generally imply that competition is sustained24.
As reported in table 3.3, we find that in the baseline treatment buyers are only in
about two thirds of cases successful in sustaining supplier competition in rounds 5-19. In
the three other treatments with human buyers, mean frequencies of dual sourcing success
are nearly identical with 0.81 ≤ fDC ≤ 0.84. These values are significantly higher (or just
fail to be) than in the baseline in rounds 5-19. However, for rounds 10-19 the mean value
in the baseline also rises to fDC = 0.79 and is thus no longer significantly different from
any of the other three treatments with p ≥ 0.524. Due to the differences, we cannot pool
treatments as RCS as above. Instead, we pool the other three treatments with human
buyers (p ≥ 0.623 pairwise) and find a persistent significant increase compared to REF
for rounds 5-19 but none for rounds 10-19 (p = 0.710).
These inconsistent results are caused by differences for the baseline treatment between
the two segments of rounds. Due to the low frequency of rounds where competition can be
sustained of only fC = 0.28 (cf. section 3.4.2), the low value of fDC originates from failure
to keep both suppliers active in only a single round for three of the five relevant markets
in rounds 5-19. The low frequency of success is thus in all likelihood the result of single
buyer errors in dual sourcing which are “amplified” by the low number of rounds where
competition can be sustained. This is corroborated by the treatment with automated
suppliers. Then, the buyer side of the market is identical to the baseline and we found
compelling evidence above that when competition can be sustained, fairness motivations
do not change buying behavior. Since by construction competition can now be sustained
24This does not include tied prices and cases where in turn the quantity sourced from the lower-priced
supplier is so low that this supplier exits, which happens in one round in REF and in three rounds in SIN.
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Treatment H0 N fDC MW p
REF 5 0.64
COM E(REF) = E(COM) 4 0.82 0.119
SIN E(REF) = E(SIN) 5 0.84 0.056+
AUS E(REF) = E(AUS) 6 0.81 0.093+
AUB E(REF) = E(AUB) 6 1.00 0.002+
Table 3.5: Frequency of a duopoly in period 2 when competition can be sustained. Mann-
Whitney test, p-values two-tailed. (+) not significant for rounds 10-19.
in fC = 0.53 of rounds, results are more robust and thus a better guide to dual sourcing
success than values in the baseline treatment. Since frequencies for AUS do not differ
significantly from those for COM and SIN, we conclude that improved coordination does
not necessarily improve the frequency of success in sustaining competition.
Automated buyers are completely rational and therefore always succeed in sustaining
competition. Although they are thus significantly more successful than in the baseline
in rounds 5-19, they just fail to be so in rounds 10-19 with p = 0.167. Also, when
pooling treatments with human buyers as either COM, SIN and AUS or RCS (in the
latter case ignoring the differences in rounds 5-19), the frequency of dual sourcing success
is significantly lower than with the perfectly rational buyers (p ≤ 0.001). We can thus
state the following addition to the previous finding.
Finding 2.2. Human buyers succeed often but not always in sustaining competition when
this is rational. Weak evidence implies that improved coordination does not change the
frequency of success, while complete buyer rationality increases it.
Sustaining competition is a slightly untypical discrete public good game because for
nearly all price combinations which allow to sustain competition it is rational for even
a single buyer to do so alone25 (cf. section 3.2.2). Nevertheless a “free riding” problem
in sharing the costs of purchases from the higher-priced supplier continues to exist. The
rates of sustained supplier competition of around fDC ≈ 0.8 are compatible with the upper
bound of observed provision rates in public good experiments with similar characteristics
as reported in the meta analysis of Croson and Marks (2000). Furthermore, they report
that communication significantly increases the rate of provision. The negligible effect in
our case meanwhile can be attributed to the fact that buyers do not necessarily need to
cooperate for successful provision.
The situation of buyers in the experiments on “naked exclusion” described in section 3.1
is most closely related to that in our model in rounds where competition can be sustained.
Both free-form (Smith 2011) as well as structured two-way communication (Landeo and
Spier 2009) are found to increase the frequency of entry of a second supplier. Again, the
lack of a substantial impact of communication in our experiment is most likely due to the
25In all treatments both buyers are required to source non-myopically to sustain competition in only
f ≤ 0.13 of rounds where this is possible.
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rationality for a single buyer to sustain competition. This is consistent with the finding
of Smith (2011) that the rate of ensuing competition decreases with a higher proportion
of buyers required to cooperate. Landeo and Spier (2009) find that rates of competitive
entry significantly increase due to the absence of fairness considerations of buyers when the
incumbent supplier is automated. In contrast, in our experiment fairness motivations do
not to have a substantial influence on buyer behavior when competition can be sustained.
This arises because of a less drastic reduction in supplier profits with future competition
and the fact that in our case both suppliers are human. We find however that fairness
does play a role when competition cannot be sustained in section 3.4.4.
So far we have focused on aggregate buyer behavior. Now we analyze if and how
buyers cooperate when competition can be sustained, therefore decomposing the frequency
of aggregate dual sourcing as fDual = fCo + fNoCo: Either both buyers dual source and
thus cooperate or only a single buyer purchases strategically.
The frequency of both buyers dual sourcing is shown in figure 3.5. In the baseline and
automated supplier treatments, buyers cannot explicitly coordinate and we find fCo = 0.46
and fCo = 0.48 respectively. These frequencies do not differ significantly (p = 0.833),
allowing us to pool both treatments as RA. Thus, without explicit coordination, only in
about half of the rounds do both buyers cooperate. When buyers can communicate, the
mean value increases to fCo = 0.61 although this increase is not significant (p = 0.829).
Automated buyers are implemented to split demand as evenly as possible among each
other and thus offer an upper reference point for cooperation26 with fCo = 0.97, which
is significantly higher than for the pooled treatments without coordination (p = 0.010).
Interpreting the single buyer in SIN as a purchasing group of two buyers (cf. section 3.3.1),
aggregate demand can be assumed to be split as evenly as possible between buyers, yielding
fCo = 0.89 which is significantly higher than in RA (p = 0.091).
We focus now on how evenly buyers share the cost of strategic sourcing as indicated
by the quantity sourced from the higher-priced supplier. In both treatments without
explicit coordination there are numerous instances where quantities differ quite substan-
tially, which is borne out by differences of ∆qhigh = |qhigh,2 − qhigh,1| = 1.66 in REF and
∆qhigh = 0.96 in AUS. These values do not differ significantly with p = 0.355 and accord-
ingly we again pool both treatments as RA. The perfectly coordinated automated buyers
yield a significantly lower mean difference of only ∆qhigh = 0.13 (p = 0.002). The non-
zero value originates from situations where the optimal Qhigh is uneven and thus cannot be
split evenly between buyers. Interpreting SIN again as a purchasing agency of two buyers
results in ∆qhigh = 0.21, which is also significantly lower than in RA with p = 0.010.
In the treatment with communication, buyer 1 always announces her intended demand
split and in f = 0.93 of situations follows her announcement. This is quite close to the
predicted value of one. Nevertheless, contrary to the prediction of maximum asymmetry,
in f = 0.63 of cases both buyers source the same quantity from the supplier with the
26The remaining rounds require Qhigh = 1 and therefore only a single buyer dual sources.
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Figure 3.7: Frequency of dual sourcing in period 1 when competition cannot be sustained.
higher price, while qhigh,1 is lower in less than one third of cases. Hence there is at most a
weak tendency for buyer 1 to purchase less from the higher-priced supplier than buyer 2.
This yields a high degree of cooperation with ∆qhigh = 0.86, which does however not differ
significantly from the value in the treatments without coordination (p = 0.829).
Therefore, corroborating the finding from the frequency of both buyers dual sourcing, a
clear increase in buyer cooperation is found (by construction) when coordination is perfect,
while the increase when buyers can communicate is not significant.
Finding 3. Without communication, human buyers cooperate in dual sourcing in only
around half of the cases. When buyers can communicate, there is only the weakest evidence
that this increases buyer cooperation.
3.4.4 Non-Rational Dual Sourcing
Now we analyze those situations where for non-tied prices it is not rational to dual
source, fDual = 0. Accordingly, all demand is purchased from the supplier with the lower
price and therefore also Qhigh = 0. This is the case in the first period in those rounds
where competition cannot be sustained and also in period 2 duopolies. Non-rational dual
sourcing can then arise due to inadvertent random errors by human buyers. Furthermore,
when human buyers face human suppliers, they might be motivated to dual source by
fairness considerations since the less efficient supplier cannot compete on the same terms
as the efficient supplier27.
Figure 3.4 includes the frequency of aggregate dual sourcing in rounds where compe-
tition cannot be sustained in period 1 while mean values28 are shown in figure 3.7. In the
baseline, communication and single buyer treatments, dual sourcing occurs in slightly less
than half of the rounds as reported in table 3.6 and values are not significantly different
pairwise (p ≥ 0.762). Accordingly, as in section 3.4.3 we pool the treatments with human
buyers and suppliers as RCS with fDual = 0.44. Compared to the rational automated
buyers who never split demand, the frequency is found to be significantly higher. The
27To minimize fairness motivations, as described in section 3.3.2 costs are randomly allocated to subjects
in each round and subject identifiers of the suppliers are not disclosed to buyers.
28Rounds with tied prices are included in fDual to complement the analysis in section 3.4.3. In all
treatments, they account however for only f ≤ 0.13 of rounds in both period 1 and 2.
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Treatment H0 N fDual MW p Qhigh MW p
REF 6 0.46 1.62
COM E(REF) = E(COM) 4 0.49 0.967 1.49 1.000
SIN E(REF) = E(SIN) 4 0.37 0.762 1.36 0.610
RCS 14 0.44 1.51
AUS E(RCS) = E(AUS) 6 0.29 0.433x 0.62 0.108x
AUB E(RCS) = E(AUB) 3 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.003
Table 3.6: Frequency of dual sourcing and quantity sourced from the supplier with the
higher price in period 1 when competition cannot be sustained. Mann-Whitney test,
p-values two-tailed. (x) significant for rounds 10-19.
respective mean value with automated suppliers is lower than in RCS at less than one
third of rounds, although the difference is significant only for rounds 10-19 (p = 0.058).
We now focus on the volume of dual sourcing as given by the aggregate quantity
purchased from the supplier with the higher price, Qhigh. When competition cannot be
sustained, quantities in the three treatments with human buyers and suppliers are between
1.36 ≤ Qhigh ≤ 1.62 and do not differ significantly pairwise (p ≥ 0.610). Pooling these as
RCS, the quantity is significantly higher than with automated buyers (cf. table 3.6). When
in turn suppliers are automated and fairness motivations are absent, the mean quantity is
markedly lower with Qhigh = 0.62. The difference just fails to be significant with p = 0.108
in rounds 5-19, while being easily so in rounds 10-19 (p = 0.008).
Complementing the analysis with the duopoly rounds in period 2, RCS treatments
can again be pooled, yielding f
2D
Dual = 0.28 and Q
2D
high = 0.84 (cf. also figure 3.2). Both
values are somewhat lower than in period 1, but not significantly so with p ≥ 0.322 in the
N = 14 markets available for analysis. No significant difference in either the dual sourcing
frequency or the quantity purchased from the supplier with the higher price (p ≥ 0.637)
is found compared to the automated suppliers, where f
2D
Dual = 0.29 and Q
2D
high = 1.66.
This result contrasts with the finding for period 1. The likely reason is that automated
suppliers post equilibrium prices in period 2, reducing the surplus foregone by buyers when
purchasing from the higher-priced supplier to only ∆BS ≤ 8, which translates into a payoff
difference of less than EUR 0.01, leading many subjects to be (nearly) indifferent.
Thus the observed differences in strategic sourcing between the treatments with human
and automated suppliers in period 1 provide weak evidence that fairness partially moti-
vates non-rational dual sourcing, although it appears to be of only minor importance com-
pared to the impact of errors made by human buyers. This interpretation is backed up by
the finding that sourcing behavior in the first period is roughly in line with behavior in the
second period29. Furthermore, the frequency that both buyers cooperate in dual sourcing
is now fCo ≤ 0.07 in period 1 (cf. figure 3.7) and even identical to zero in treatments REF
29This is also confirmed by an additional treatment with pi = 0, where dual sourcing is never rational
for unequal prices. Then fDual and Qhigh do not differ significantly from RCS in both periods, although
mean values are slightly lower in period 1.
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Treatment H0 N fD MW p
REF 6 0.19
COM E(REF) = E(COM) 6 0.43 0.461
SIN E(REF) = E(SIN) 6 0.53 0.128
AUB E(REF) = E(AUB) 6 0.71 0.022+
CSA E(REF) = E(CSA) 18 0.56 0.052+
SA E(REF) = E(SA) 12 0.62 0.024
Table 3.7: Frequency of a duopoly in period 2. Mann-Whitney test, p-values two-tailed.
(+) not significant for rounds 10-19.
and COM, while in period 2 also fCo ≤ 0.10. Hence, dual sourcing in cases where it is not
rational stems more from individual errors than from a strategy shared by buyers. This is
especially evident when comparing to the frequency of cooperation when competition can
be sustained, which is close to one half (cf. section 3.4.3). Overall, we can thus draw the
following conclusion.
Finding 4. Even when competition cannot be sustained, human buyers dual source fre-
quently. There is weak evidence that fairness motivations are responsible for a small part
of this, while the rest can be attributed to buyer errors.
The relevance of fairness motivations marks a notable difference to situations where
competition can be sustained in section 3.4.3 and rational dual sourcing dominates.
3.4.5 Overall Results
As discussed in sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, both supplier and buyer behavior in period 1 have
an impact on how often competition is sustained. The frequency of a duopoly in period 2
is then given by the product of the frequency of prices which allow to sustain competition
and successful dual sourcing by buyers, fD = fC × fDC.
Figure 3.4 depicts the frequency of sustained competition as the share of price combina-
tions which are colored in black. While in the baseline treatment competition is sustained
in only one fifth of cases as reported in table 3.7, the mean value is doubled when buyers
can communicate. A further increase is observed with a single buyer and for automated
buyers competition is sustained in more than two-thirds of cases.
The statistical analysis reflects the high variation of prices between individual markets
as discussed in section 3.4.2. As a result, the frequency of sustained competition varies
between fD = 0 and fD ≥ 0.53 in individual markets for all treatments with human buyers.
Accordingly, the increase in the frequency of sustained competition with communication is
not significant (cf. table 3.7), while for a single buyer it only just fails to be so for both seg-
ments of rounds (p ≤ 0.128). In the case of automated buyers, the increase is significant in
the first segment of rounds but in the second it falls just short with p = 0.134. We find no
pairwise differences between the treatments with improved coordination (p ≥ 0.180) and
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Figure 3.8: Surplus distribution.
with perfect coordination (p = 0.290). This allows us to again pool the treatments as CSA
and SA respectively, although the low p value for CSA advises some caution. Thereby, the
result for SA implies that complete rationality of buyers does not increase the frequency
significantly further when coordination is perfect. We find that the frequency of sustained
competition is significantly higher than in the baseline treatment both for perfect coor-
dination (SA) and also for improved coordination (CSA) in rounds 5-19, while only just
failing to be significant with p = 0.160 in rounds 10-19.
For the rational automated buyers in AUB, the frequency of sustained competition is
determined only by the frequency of suppliers setting prices which allow to sustain com-
petition as then buyers are programmed to purchase accordingly. However, also for the
treatments with human buyers, pricing in period 1 is the decisive factor in determining
whether competition is sustained. In section 3.4.3 we found that the frequency of suc-
cessful dual sourcing does not differ significantly between treatments with human buyers
regardless of the level of coordination30 and is always close to fDC ≈ 0.80. In contrast,
in section 3.4.2 the frequency of price combinations which allow to sustain competition
was found to differ substantially. Accordingly, for the frequency of sustained competition
we observe the same significance of differences between treatments as for the frequency
of prices which allow to sustain competition. Furthermore, estimating fD from fC by
using a fixed value fDC = 0.8 in all treatments with human buyers and fDC = 1.0 in
AUB yields mean frequencies which differ by less than ∆fD ≤ 0.05 from the observed
frequencies and exhibit the same significance of differences. Therefore we can draw the
following conclusion.
Finding 5.1. With independent buyers, competition is only rarely sustained. With im-
proved coordination the frequency of sustained competition increases, mainly due to more
accommodating pricing. No additional increase is observed for completely rational buyers.
While for buyers the frequency of sustained competition is decisive, for suppliers the
frequency of a monopoly in period 2 offers a measure of the success of exclusion. We
find that the order of mean frequencies of exclusion is roughly reversed compared to
the frequency of sustained competition. Improved coordination significantly decreases
the frequency of fM = 0.70 in REF with p = 0.015 for CSA and p = 0.022 for SA.
30Regarding the low value of fDC = 0.64 for REF in rounds 5-19 see the discussion in section 3.4.3.
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Treatment H0 N BS MW p pi1 MW p pi2 MW p
REF 6 5614 5436 387
COM E(REF) = E(COM) 6 6320 0.240 3894 0.009+ 569 0.699
SIN E(REF) = E(SIN) 6 5956 0.310 4139 0.065+ 1358 0.041+
AUB E(REF) = E(AUB) 6 6720 0.240 4214 0.240 890 0.065+
CSA E(REF) = E(CSA) 18 6332 0.137 4421 0.015 939 0.066+
SA E(REF) = E(SA) 12 6338 0.180 4177 0.067+ 1124 0.018+
Table 3.8: Surplus of buyers, supplier 1 and supplier 2. Mann-Whitney test, p-values
two-tailed. (+) not significant for rounds 10-19.
The differences between treatments in the frequency of period 2 market structures
and the preceding behavior in period 1 induce differences in the surplus distribution. As
depicted in figure 3.8, due to the inelastic demand the total surplus is similar in all treat-
ments. However, since purchases at the supplier with the higher cost are made and in
some cases no supplier is active in period 2, the surplus is slightly lower than the predic-
tion of 12, 800. Pooling all treatments, we find that buyer surplus is significantly higher
in rounds where competition is sustained than when a monopoly follows. Accordingly,
supplier 1 surplus is higher when exclusion is successful than when it is not, while the
profit of supplier 2 increases when he is sustained (p = 0.000 in all cases, N ≥ 16).
In line with the prevalence of exclusionary pricing, the baseline treatment yields surplus
values not significantly different from the prediction of BS = 5472 (p = 0.688). Although
mean values of buyer surplus in the treatments with improved coordination are higher than
in the baseline, none of these increases is significant as reported in table 3.8. The absence
of pairwise differences (p ≥ 0.240) allows us to again pool treatments with improved and
perfect buyer coordination. Then, the increase of buyer surplus compared to the baseline
only just fails to be significant for CSA and SA (p ≤ 0.180 for both segments of rounds).
However, surplus is clearly higher than predicted in both cases (p ≥ 0.009). The variation
between individual markets continues to be pronounced.
In the baseline, surplus of supplier 1 is found to be pi1 = 5436, which is significantly
lower (p = 0.031) than the predicted value of BS = 7328 and comparable to buyer sur-
plus (p = 0.844). This is mostly due to the (few) cases where competition is sustained or
both suppliers exit. For the treatments with improved coordination, mean surplus is lower
still with pi1 ≤ 4214 as evidenced by figure 3.8. The decrease compared to the baseline is
significant in rounds 5-19 for both SIN and COM as reported in table 3.8, while just failing
to be so in the second segment of rounds (p ≤ 0.180) and in both segments for automated
buyers (p = 0.240). However, due to the lack of pairwise differences (p ≥ 0.699) we can
again pool treatments as CSA and SA. Then the decrease in supplier 1 profit is easily
significant except for SA in rounds 10-19 where however it comes close with p = 0.125.
Accordingly, the profit is lower than predicted (p ≤ 0.005) and thus also significantly lower
than the surplus of buyers (p = 0.000).
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Although the less efficient supplier 2 is not predicted to realize any surplus, in all
experimental treatments the mean profit of supplier 2 is positive. In the baseline treatment
we find pi2 = 387, a value which increases with improved coordination as the frequency
of sustained competition is higher. However, the difference is significant only for a single
buyer and automated buyers and then only in the first segment of rounds. Pooling is
not unproblematic as for both CSA (p = 0.132) and SA (p = 0.180) pairwise differences
are close to significance. Also, while in rounds 5-19 an increase compared to the baseline
is observed in both cases, this fails to be significant for the second segment of rounds,
providing only weak evidence that profits increase with improved coordination.
With no significant difference between SIN and AUB in surplus for both buyers and
supplier 1, we can conclude that the complete rationality of buyers has only a limited
impact on the surplus distribution. Hence, we can state the following addition to the
previous finding.
Finding 5.2. With independent buyers, no difference in the surplus of the more efficient
supplier and buyers is observed, while the less efficient supplier realizes positive surplus.
With improved coordination, the surplus of the more efficient supplier decreases. Con-
versely, there is weak evidence that the surplus of buyers and the less efficient supplier
increases. Complete rationality of buyers is not observed to change results substantially.
3.5 Conclusion
We experimentally investigate the dynamic sourcing decisions of powerful buyers vis-a`-vis
suppliers which are threatened in their survival. A two period asymmetric cost Bertrand
duopoly with two buyers is implemented, where suppliers are only active in the second
period when their profit in period 1 is sufficiently high. Buyers then have an incentive to
sustain competition while suppliers have an incentive to exclude the other supplier. For
all experimental treatments the subgame-perfect prediction is that the more efficient sup-
plier successfully excludes the other supplier and enjoys a monopoly in the second period.
This is roughly observed in the baseline treatment. When however buyer coordination
is improved through communication and especially when it is perfect with a single or
two automated buyers, pricing becomes more accommodating and often competition is
sustained. The surplus of supplier 1 is depressed while there are weak indications that
buyer surplus increases. Sophisticated, completely rational buyers are not found to im-
prove significantly upon this. Notably, sourcing decisions do not change substantially with
improved coordination. Strategic dual sourcing is regularly used and very often succeeds
in sustaining competition when this is rational. Dual sourcing persists however even when
competition cannot be sustained, mainly due to errors but to a small degree also due to
fairness motivations. Overall, the observed changes are mainly caused by suppliers pricing
less aggressively when facing better coordinated buyers. Thus, coordination improves the
power of buyers.
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Regarding firm interactions in situations similar to the one modeled here, our results
have noticeable implications. Buyers who communicate with other buyers, who form
a purchasing agency or who act as a monopsonist are perceived to be more powerful
by suppliers since their sourcing decisions can have a decisive impact on the survival of
suppliers. Hence suppliers behave accordingly, increasing the surplus of buyers through less
exclusionary pricing and allowing competition to be sustained. Our results thus indicate
that aside from any effects caused by buyer size alone, improved buyer coordination adds
power to buyers. On the supplier side, results are more subtle. Notably, in our model we
do not find evidence that sourcing decisions change substantially with better coordination,
cautioning about the danger to suppliers of facing buyers who command a large part of
market demand.
In the realm of antitrust policy, our findings add an important insight. The formation
of better coordinated buyers adds power to these buyers, especially vis-a`-vis suppliers who
are threatened in their survival. This undermines exclusionary tendencies of suppliers
as buyers will often benefit from sustained competition. Hence, our experiment adds
further credence to the finding that powerful buyers will not allow their supply to be
monopolized, thereby limiting exclusionary tendencies as included in the EU Guidelines
on Vertical Restraints. Indeed, we not only find that strategic sourcing to sustain upstream
competition is pervasive, we also find that the more powerful buyers, the more successful
this becomes as suppliers are coerced into pricing more accommodatingly. Nevertheless it
is important to take into account that in other settings the additional power arising from
being able to “single-handedly” decide on the survival of a supplier through the sourcing
decision can also have effects which are detrimental to competition. Finally, our findings
are also a reminder of the importance of validating theoretical results in experimental
settings as they are not predicted by game theory.
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Chapter 4
The Role of the Procurement
Process in Sustaining Supplier
Competition - An Experiment
Strategic buyers who source from competing suppliers over time often aim to sustain
competition among the suppliers. We investigate experimentally the role the procurement
process plays in achieving this, by implementing different processes in a two period posted-
offer duopoly with two buyers. Suppliers exit when profitability in the first period is
insufficient. In the second period, all processes yield comparable outcomes which are
close to the rational prediction. In the first period exclusionary pricing dominates for the
baseline procurement auction process and effectively also for split-award auctions, leading
often to a monopolistic supply situation in the second period. However, in line with the
subgame-perfect prediction, allowing subsidies or announcing sourcing before suppliers bid
induces more accommodating pricing and increases the probability of competition being
sustained. We thus find that the procurement process can have a major impact on supplier
behavior and thereby also on the future structure of the supplier market.
4.1 Introduction
When a firm is a large buyer in a market and needs to procure a good now and in the
future from competing suppliers, it faces a strategic decision between sourcing from a
single or multiple suppliers.
In reality, evidence is found for both approaches. Retail chains often use “winner-
takes-all” auctions to procure goods from suppliers, awarding the contract only to the
bidder making the best offer. The same holds for procurement processes by public bodies
requiring explicitly that the lowest offer be accepted1. In contrast, many airlines operate
1This is how the Department of Defense procures drugs (Gong, Li, and McAfee 2010). Also, defense
projects like the Joint Strike Fighter (after competing prototypes were built) are often awarded to a single
supplier. Beker and Hernando-Vecianaz (2009) provide further examples from the public and private sector.
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fleets of large commercial aircraft from both Airbus and Boeing, the sole providers, despite
operational benefits of sourcing from only one company2.
Understanding future consequences of current sourcing decisions becomes especially
important when buyers are large and suppliers are at risk of survival3. When a buyer
commands a large share of the overall demand, her sourcing decision will have a profound
impact on the sales of a single supplier. Thus, if the supplier is threatened in survival, it
may be decisive for staying active or not. Accordingly, with the exit of individual suppliers,
the upstream market structure is changed and competitiveness may decrease in the future.
This prospect in turn may induce superior suppliers to engage in predatory behavior and
try to exclude weaker rivals by inducing buyers to single source, thus monopolizing the
market in the future. With predatory conduct generally violating antitrust laws4 but
powerful buyers recognized to exercise a countervailing influence (EU 2010), such situations
are also of interest to antitrust policy.
Buyers can thereby generally determine the timing and format in which the procure-
ment competition takes place and the sourcing decision is being made by implementing a
specific procurement process. Increasingly, various auction formats are employed5. Char-
acterizing and understanding the impact of basic differences in these formats is thus im-
portant to allow the selection of procurement processes which optimally support sourcing
decisions and thus also further strategic procurement goals such as sustaining competition
among suppliers6.
To investigate the impact of different procurement processes, a two period model is
employed, representing the current and future sourcing situations. Two suppliers with
different efficiencies compete in prices to supply two buyers. Exit is modeled by requiring
a minimum profit in the first period for suppliers to be active in the second period. We
implement the model experimentally for four different procurement processes.
In the second period, we find pricing and purchasing decisions not to differ for any
procurement process from the baseline Bertrand competition which corresponds to a pro-
curement auction. Accordingly, for all procurement processes buyers benefit from sustain-
ing both suppliers. However, in the first period exclusionary pricing is predominant in
the baseline process, resulting often in the more efficient supplier enjoying a monopoly
in the second period. Exclusion also dominates when suppliers can post nonlinear prices
2Among the largest 25 customers of all delivered Airbus and Boeing aircraft in the years 1974-2009,
just two purchased from a single company only (Airbus 2009; Boeing 2009). Multiple sourcing is also used
in defense procurement (Anton and Yao 1992) and, e.g., by Motorola (Metty et al. 2005), General Motors
and IBM (Anton, Brusco, and Lopomo 2010).
3Car manufacturers and their suppliers offer an example of such a situation. Single manufacturers often
account for a large share of the sales of car parts suppliers (cf. examples in Babich 2010; Wadecki, Babich,
and Wu 2010), many of which are in a weak position. E.g., in the economic downturn of 2008 a third of
suppliers in North America declared bankruptcy according to Wadecki, Babich, and Wu (2010).
4Examples are thus taken mainly from actual cases. Recently, France Telecom (ECJ C-202/07 P 2009)
was found guilty, while a subsidiary of AT&T (SC 555 U.S. 2009) was acquitted of charges of predatory
pricing for internet access.
5Cf., e.g., Metty et al. (2005) and examples in Tunca and Wu (2009).
6E.g., Sun Microsystems is reported to use processes with different complexity depending on the pro-
curement situation (Tunca and Wu 2009).
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in split-award auctions. Both suppliers demand premia for small quantities. These often
allow to sustain competition, an option buyers however frequently do not use.
When buyers can pay subsidies to suppliers or announce their quantity split before
suppliers bid, price levels increase and pricing is more conducive to the survival of both
suppliers. Buyers then often keep both suppliers active by dual sourcing and the frequency
of sustained competition increases accordingly. Across procurement processes, the less
efficient supplier often prices more aggressively than optimal.
Behavior of buyers is relatively close to rational behavior for all procurement processes,
although the success of sustaining both suppliers when this is optimal is often lower than
predicted. Hence, contrary to the prediction, no significant increase in total buyer surplus
is observed for processes with subsidies and pre-announced sourcing, although surplus is
shifted from the more to the less efficient supplier. Nevertheless, the marked impact of
the procurement processes on the behavior of suppliers in a strategic situation and thus
on the future structure of the supplier market is close to the subgame-perfect prediction.
This article is organized as follows. An overview of related work is given in section 4.2.
Then, in section 4.3 the model as well as the procurement processes are specified. Numer-
ical solutions for subgame-perfect equilibria are provided in section 4.4 and predictions
are deducted. Experimental procedures are summarized in section 4.5, while results are
discussed in section 4.6. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
Since we investigate the strategic interplay of suppliers and buyers, our work is related
to different strands of literature. The first is the literature on buyer power. Although
the concept of countervailing power dates back to Galbraith (1952), only recently has the
strategic behavior of buyers received considerable attention. Overviews of the theoretical
work are provided, e.g., by Inderst and Mazzarotto (2008) in the context of retailing and
Inderst and Shaffer (2008) with a focus on mergers, while Ruﬄe (2005) encompasses the
related experimental literature.
Buyer power is found to arise from a large size of demand of a buyer (cf., e.g., Chipty
and Snyder 1999), a threat to integrate backwards into the supplier market (Katz 1987)
but also, e.g., from the control of access to downstream markets (Mazzarotto 2004). Ac-
cordingly, in the model employed in this article, buyers are powerful since each buyer
controls a sizable share of aggregate demand.
Powerful buyers can extract better terms of trade, as formalized for a single supplier
by, e.g., Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Inderst and Wey (2003), in a dynamic model with
competing suppliers in Snyder (1998) and as a consequence of single-sourcing in Inderst
and Shaffer (2007). In experiments, lower prices are observed in posted-offer markets when
buyer concentration increases for both a single supplier (Engle-Warnick and Ruﬄe 2005)
and multiple suppliers (Ruﬄe 2000). The work of Normann, Ruﬄe, and Snyder (2007) finds
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buyer-size discounts for a single supplier to arise only for increasing marginal costs as
predicted, while for competing suppliers large buyer discounts are pervasive (Ruﬄe 2009).
Finally, Davis and Wilson (2008) investigate the impact of supplier mergers in the presence
of powerful buyers and find human buyers to generally induce lower prices.
In addition to other consequences, buyer power may however also lead to foreclosure
of suppliers as addressed in our investigation. Discussion has focused on exclusive supply
contracts with compensation payments, employed by an incumbent monopolist to exclude
a more efficient entrant. Due to coordination problems among buyers, exclusion can be
profitable as demonstrated in the “naked exclusion” literature originating from Rasmusen,
Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000). Exclusive dealing is also
found to occur frequently in experimental markets in Landeo and Spier (2009), Boone,
Mu¨ller, and Suetens (2009) and Smith (2011). Increasing the fraction of buyers required
for exclusion and allowing communication generally decreases the rate of exclusion (Lan-
deo and Spier 2009; Smith 2011). Meanwhile, price discrimination can lead to increased
exclusion as reported in Boone, Mu¨ller, and Suetens (2009).
When suppliers cannot exclude rivals explicitly through contracts as in our model,
predatory pricing might arise to induce exit of competing suppliers and recoup foregone
profits through monopoly prices in the future. An overview of the related literature is
given by, e.g., Bolton, Riordan, and Brodley (2000). In experiments, predatory pricing has
proven challenging to detect (Isaac and Smith 1985; Harrison 1988). While in an abstract
setting Jung, Kagel, and Levin (1994) find indications for predatory behavior, it is also
observed reliably in the multi-market setup of Goeree and Gomez (1998).
As buyer power is exercised through sourcing in our work, this article is also related to
the literature on optimal sourcing decisions of firms, an overview of which is provided
by, e.g., Elmaghraby (2000). Generally, the optimality of single vs. multiple sourcing
is found to depend critically on details of the situation, e.g., the number and size of
buyers (cf. Anton and Yao 1989; Inderst 2008). Also, with split-award auctions in equi-
librium the contract is often split (Anton and Yao 1992), which however need no longer
hold with scale economies (Anton, Brusco, and Lopomo 2010). Committing to multiple
sourcing by guaranteeing a share of the contract to each bidder is found to be able to
increase participation and reduce procurement costs (Klotz and Chatterjee 1995a; Klotz
and Chatterjee 1995b). In addition, the works of Clark and Polborn (2006) and Berge`s and
Chambolle (2009) investigate explicitly how sourcing decisions of strategic buyers impact
supplier foreclosure. In Clark and Polborn (2006), buyers may not source strategically
in equilibrium but prices can be altered by the threat to do so. Meanwhile, Berge`s and
Chambolle (2009) find that there can exist equilibria where suppliers price so high that
they extract all surplus, exploiting the buyer who sustains them.
The present work follows our analytical investigation of the model employed here,
finding exclusionary behavior to be dominant in a procurement auction, while also showing
how guaranteeing a quantity to suppliers by announcing the sourcing decision first can
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Figure 4.1: Model timing and strategic variables.
lead to more accommodating outcomes (Wilken 2011b). Meanwhile, in a closely related
experiment with this model, we find improved coordination of buyers to increase both the
probability of competition being sustained and the buyer surplus (Wilken 2011a).
The present work thus adds to the investigation of buyer sourcing decisions as a source
of countervailing power by analyzing the role the procurement process plays in determining
supplier pricing and the future structure of the supplier market. To the best of our
knowledge, this work is the first to experimentally investigate the impact of different
procurement processes and after the preceding article (Wilken 2011a) only the second to
address explicitly strategic sourcing decisions of buyers in an experiment.
4.3 Model and Procurement Processes
4.3.1 Model
To investigate the impact of different procurement processes in a situation as described in
the introduction, we employ an asymmetric cost Bertrand model. This is repeated in two
periods as depicted in figure 4.1, with period 1 representing the current and period 2 the
future market situation. In the first period, two suppliers i set prices pi for a homogeneous
good7. Suppliers are identical except for their different constant marginal costs, with
supplier 1 being the more efficient supplier throughout this work, c1 < c2.
Two buyers j purchase the good from the suppliers. Each demands a quantity of
exactly d in every period and decides how to source this demand from the suppliers,
d = q1,j + q2,j . Using an inelastic demand thereby allows us to exclude the option to
withhold demand in the experiment. The good is valued at V by buyers, who are assumed
not to purchase for prices above their valuation, i.e., they do not make losses on individual
purchases (cf. also Wilken 2011b). The surplus of a buyer is then BSj =
∑
i qi,j (V − pi).
Together, buyers purchase an aggregate quantity Qi = qi,1 + qi,2 from supplier i.
In order to be active in period 2, the profit of a supplier in period 1 has to be at least
as high as pi, i.e., pii = Qi (pi − ci) ≥ pi. This profit threshold models in a straightfor-
ward way that suppliers are threatened in their survival and that to remain active in a
7Period 1 indices are dropped throughout this work while period 2 indices are carried.
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Process Change to REF
REF - Baseline -
SPA - Split-award auctions Suppliers set prices for small and large quantity
SUB - Subsidies Buyers can pay subsidies to suppliers
PRE - Pre-announced sourcing Buyers announce demand split first
Table 4.1: Procurement processes.
market, firms in the long run have to be profitable8. In period 2 then, only the active
suppliers compete to supply buyers.
In the experiment, prices can be chosen in steps of ∆p = 1 and are limited to pi ≤ V
to implement that buyers do not purchase above their valuation and to avoid buyer losses.
Allowing for a large range of possible prices, we set V = 1000. To facilitate understand-
ing without rendering the sourcing decision trivial, d = 4 and an increment ∆q = 1 are
chosen, i.e., quantities can be split in integer values between suppliers. The remaining pa-
rameters are set to allow survival of both suppliers for a large range of price combinations,
to yield a pure strategy equilibrium prediction with a price of supplier 1 in period 1 below
the price of the one period model and to implement similar expected payoffs of suppliers
and buyers. This is achieved by choosing c1 = 200, c2 = 400 and pi = 700.
4.3.2 Procurement Processes
In addition to the baseline procurement process REF which corresponds to the model
in section 4.3.1, we analyze three modifications as experimental treatments, with the
respective process being used in both periods. An overview is provided in table 4.1.
In REF, buyers essentially put up their demand for tender in a procurement auction.
Suppliers bid to supply the buyers, who however keep the discretion to award the contract
to a single supplier or split it between suppliers.
The first modification is the use of split-award auctions in SPA. Suppliers now post
two prices. One holds when an individual buyer sources at most half the demand from the
supplier, pi(q ≤ d/2). The other, pi(q > d/2), holds when the supplier is awarded more
than half of the contract. Buyers then decide how to split the award between suppliers as
in the baseline. This is a simplified version of step ladder bids as modeled in Anton and
Yao (1992), where suppliers post prices for specific contract splits9. The process is thus
equivalent to suppliers setting nonlinear prices.
Subsidies can be paid to suppliers by buyers in SUB. In both periods, each buyer j can
thus make direct transfer payments to each supplier i, si,j ≥ 0, in addition to or instead
of sourcing a positive quantity from this supplier. Using subsidies to sustain suppliers at
8Using measures of performance to model firm exit is not uncommon. Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001) as
well as Clark and Polborn (2006) use similar profit thresholds, while Babich (2010) and Wadecki, Babich,
and Wu (2010) model firm exit dependent on the ratio of assets to liabilities in the former and the difference
between earnings and liabilities in the latter case.
9This process is employed, e.g., in defense procurement (cf. Anton, Brusco, and Lopomo 2010).
70
risk of exit is not uncommon as evidenced by the examples from the automotive industry
in Babich (2010) and Wadecki, Babich, and Wu (2010)10.
Buyers decide ahead of the actual procurement competition how to source demand from
the supplier with the lower and the higher price in PRE, d = qlow,j + qhigh,j . At identical
prices demand is split equally. Suppliers then post prices and are awarded the respective
quantity depending on the relative price. This allows buyers to commit to dual sourcing by
guaranteeing a positive quantity to the higher-priced supplier. The procurement process
is thus similar to the model used by Klotz and Chatterjee (1995b)11.
4.4 Theoretical Solution and Predictions
For each of the different procurement processes, we solve the model numerically for
subgame-perfect equilibria using backward induction. These then serve as predictions
for experimental outcomes. In the calculations, experimental parameters are used and the
second period is not discounted. While the experimental step size ∆p = 1 of the price grid
can be implemented for calculations of REF and SUB, for split-award auctions the size of
the price grid limits the numerically feasible analysis to ∆p = 20. Also, as discussed below
with pre-announced sourcing mixed strategy equilibria arise, requiring ∆p = 10. In both
cases however, calculations with even coarser grids yield structurally similar outcomes,
pointing to the robustness of results to changes in ∆p.
Three different market structures can arise in period 2 with two, one or no active
supplier. As it is the last period, suppliers as well as buyers behave myopically. Thus,
the situation in a duopoly for REF and SUB corresponds to a standard asymmetric cost
Bertrand market, since it is not rational to pay any subsidies,
(
s2D1,j , s
2D
2,j
)
= (0, 0). Us-
ing equal-sharing tie-breaking, the subgame has two equilibria12,
(
p2D1 , p
2D
2
)
= (399, 400)
and
(
p2D1 , p
2D
2
)
= (400, 401) with
(
q2D1,j , q
2D
2,j
)
= (4, 0) for each buyer. Since both equi-
libria converge to the unique transaction price p2D1 = 400 for ∆p → 0, we assume the
second equilibrium to arise. Similarly, we find two equilibrium types in split-award auc-
tions, one with p2D1 (q > 2) = 390 and the other with p
2D
1 (q > 2) = 400, while buy-
ers again purchase only from supplier 1. For consistency, one of the latter equilibria
is selected. With pre-announced sourcing, buyers maximize period 2 surplus by set-
ting
(
q2Dlow,j , q
2D
high,j
)
= (4, 0). Then, suppliers price as in an asymmetric cost Bertrand
duopoly, with again
(
p2D1 , p
2D
2
)
= (400, 410) being chosen for further calculations.
When only a single supplier i is active, buyers have to source their complete demand
from this supplier for all procurement processes, q2Mi,j = 4 and the supplier maximizes his
profit by setting p2Mi = 1000 and p
2M
i (q > 2) = 1000 for split-award auctions. With trans-
10Also, e.g., Daimler supported suppliers financially in the downturn of 2008 (Fischer 2010).
11There, as in Klotz and Chatterjee (1995a), this mechanism is used to allow suppliers to cover entry costs
and thus increase participation, whereas in our model always both suppliers bid in period 1. As pointed
out in Elmaghraby (2000), guaranteeing a production quantity is observed, e.g., in defense procurement.
12We assume suppliers to post only weakly undominated prices (cf. Deneckere and Kovenock 1996) as
well as their limits for ∆p → 0: p2Di ∈ [ci, V ].
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action prices and sourced quantities being identical for the respective market structures
in period 2 for all procurement processes, the following prediction can be made.
Prediction 1. In the second period, outcomes are not changed by any modified procure-
ment process compared to the baseline process.
When competition is sustained, each buyer thus gains surplus of BS2Dj = 2400 compared to
the zero surplus with a single or no active supplier. Accordingly, buyers have an incentive
to sustain competition, while conversely each supplier has an incentive to monopolize the
market and realize the corresponding additional profit of pi2Mi − pi2Di = 2400.
For given prices in period 1, two types of equilibria of the buyer subgame exist. In a
strategic sourcing equilibrium, buyers source such that competition is sustained and thus
in the second period two suppliers are active. Meanwhile, in a myopic sourcing equilibrium
only a single or no supplier is active in period 2. For competition to be sustained, aggregate
demand has to be dual sourced13 in period 1, i.e., Qi > 0 for both suppliers. Since positive
subsidies Si > 0 increase supplier surplus accordingly, they are treated as equivalent to dual
sourcing throughout this work. In a strategic sourcing equilibrium buyers then generally
(e.g., at unequal linear prices) forego surplus in period 1 compared to myopically optimal
sourcing, ∆BS > 0. Accordingly, buyers source such that ∆BS is as low as possible.
Meanwhile, in a myopic sourcing equilibrium, buyers maximize period 1 surplus only and
with linear prices they then single source from the supplier with the lower price14.
Experimental parameters are chosen such that when it is possible to sustain competi-
tion, it is also rational for buyers to do so. Therefore, whenever suppliers post prices which
allow to sustain competition, a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists. This is the case for
high prices in REF and SPA but for all prices in SUB with the respective ranges being
depicted in figure 4.6 alongside experimental results, although for SPA this applies only to
effective prices weighted by sourced quantities. The situation for PRE is discussed below.
Accordingly, when suppliers post prices for which competition cannot be sustained, a my-
opic sourcing equilibrium exists. This is the case for low prices in REF and SPA but for
none with subsidies. A myopic sourcing equilibrium can exist alongside strategic sourcing
equilibria for a small range of prices but it can be shown that even then the latter are
weakly pareto-superior for buyers. Thus, when only strategic sourcing equilibria exist, a
single buyer can sustain competition by profitably deviating from myopic sourcing.
When a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists and when positive surplus has to be
foregone to sustain competition, the buyer situation is similar to a discrete public good
game. Increased expected surplus from sustained competition is provided in period 2 if the
contributions of quantities sourced from the myopically non-optimal supplier are sufficient
for his survival. The situation is somewhat untypical though, because for the experimental
13We refer to dual sourcing throughout this article as aggregate demand being sourced from both sup-
pliers. This can include both buyers single sourcing their complete demand from different suppliers.
14In split-award auctions, myopic sourcing can entail dual sourcing. However, for the prices in the
experiment this plays a negligible role.
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Process ∆p p
∗
1 p
∗
2
(
q∗1,j , q
∗
2,j
) Period 2
market
REF 1 316 {750, . . . , 1000} (4, 0) M1
SPA 20 p∗1(q≤2)∈{200, . . . , 340} p∗2(q≤2)∈{760, . . . , 1000} (4, 0) M1
p∗1(q>2) = 300 p
∗
2(q>2)∈{400, . . . , 1000}
SUB 1 399 {400, . . . , 598} (q∗1,j , q∗2,j) = (4, 0) D(
s∗1,j , s
∗
2,j
)
= (0, 350)
PRE 10 p∗1 = 729 p
∗
2 = 895 (q
∗
low,j , q
∗
high,j) = (3, 1) D/M1
Table 4.2: Subgame-perfect equilibria. M1 indicates a monopoly of supplier 1, D a duopoly.
parameters it is for many price combinations rational and possible for a single buyer to
sustain competition alone.
In the numerical implementation, we select a single equilibrium of the buyer subgame to
allow calculation of equilibrium prices. Thereby, only equilibria which are pareto-optimal
for the buyers are considered. Assuming buyers to also prefer sustaining competition in
cases of indifference, a strategic sourcing equilibrium is thus selected whenever one exists.
Then, the equilibria minimizing the difference of aggregate quantities being sourced from
each supplier are chosen, generalizing the equal-sharing tie-breaking rule. Finally, due to
the identical nature of buyers, we assume equilibria to arise where buyer behavior is as
symmetric as possible, although this does not impact supplier behavior.
With the behavior of buyers thus given, equilibrium prices are calculated as mutual best
responses of suppliers, yielding the subgame-perfect equilibria of the model in table 4.2.
For the baseline process, supplier 1 prices at p∗1 = 316, so low that buyers just cannot
keep both suppliers active. Similarly, in split-award auctions supplier 1 sets prices at
p∗1(q ≤ 2) ∈ {200, . . . , 340} and p∗1(q > 2) = 300, ensuring that no option exists for the
buyers to sustain competition15. For both processes, supplier 2 is then indifferent between
a range of (high) prices. Buyers single source from supplier 1, who thus enjoys a monopoly
in the second period. With subsidies, supplier 1 prices at p∗1 = 399 in order to secure all
demand in period 1. Supplier 2 is then again indifferent between a range of prices but
kept in the market by buyers through subsidies.
For pre-announced sourcing, first equilibrium prices of the supplier subgames are cal-
culated for each aggregate demand split (Qlow, Qhigh) of the buyers. Then, pure strategy
equilibria exist when Qhigh = 0 and Qhigh ≥ 4, while in the other cases only mixed strat-
egy equilibria exist. These are calculated using the linear-complementarity algorithm16
Lcp (Lemke and Howson 1964) as implemented in Gambit (McKelvey, McLennan, and
Turocy 2007). The buyer equilibrium is then found from the different demand splits with
buyers again assumed to purchase as symmetrically as possible. In the subgame-perfect
15Applying this for ∆p = 1 yields p1(q ≤ 2) ≤ 317 and p1(q > 2) = 316 as in REF, while for ∆p → 0
the upper limit for p1(q ≤ 2) converges to the respective p1(q > 2).
16This algorithm is not guaranteed to yield all equilibria (Shapley 1974). For ∆p = 40 however, the
Enummixed algorithm (Mangasarian 1964) which has this property, identifies only the equilibria found by
Lcp, which are also structurally similar to those for ∆p = 10.
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equilibrium, each buyer then sources a quantity of one from the higher-priced supplier,
(q∗low,j , q
∗
high,j) = (3, 1). Supplier 1 mixes over p1 ∈ [600, 990], while supplier 2 mixes
over p2 ∈ [610, 1000] with a probability f∗ ≥ 0.4 of setting p2 = 1000. The resulting mean
prices of p∗1 = 729 and p∗2 = 895 are listed in table 4.2. Competition is thus sustained with
a probability of f∗D = 0.96, while in the remaining cases supplier 1 enjoys a monopoly in
period 2. From the calculated equilibria we can directly deduct predictions of pricing in
the experiment.
Prediction 2. For the baseline and split-award processes, the more efficient supplier prices
below the marginal cost of the less efficient supplier and exclusionary pricing is predom-
inant. For subsidies and pre-announced sourcing, prices of the more efficient supplier
increase. Prices are thus more accommodating to the survival of both suppliers.
The last prediction for SUB follows from the observation that for some equilibrium prices
competition can even be sustained by dual sourcing alone.
As discussed above, when suppliers post prices which allow competition to be sustained
or when in SUB and PRE this is in principle always possible, buyers purchase according to
a strategic sourcing equilibrium. This is summed up by the following prediction. Thereby,
buyer cooperation is defined as both buyers dual sourcing whenever this is rational as in
the numerical implementation.
Prediction 3. When competition can be sustained, buyers always dual source and sustain
competition. Buyer cooperation in dual sourcing is perfect.
The subgame-perfect equilibria allow us to predict the overall surplus distribution.
For REF this yields BS∗ = 5472 for buyers and pi∗1 = 7328 for supplier 1 but pi∗2 = 0 for
supplier 2. Values for SPA are only slightly different due to the numerical implementation
with a larger ∆p. However, buyer surplus is markedly higher for SUB (BS = 8908) and
PRE (BS = 6490). It is decreased in the first period due to strategic sourcing and ac-
cordingly increased in the second period. Also, surplus of supplier 1 is set to decrease
to pi∗1 ≤ 4585, while supplier 2 surplus increases to pi∗2 ≥ 700. Combined with the equi-
librium market structure in period 2, we can state the following prediction describing the
overall impact of the different procurement processes.
Prediction 4. Competition is never sustained for the baseline and split-award processes,
while it is (nearly) always sustained for subsidies and pre-announced sourcing. Then, also
total buyer surplus increases compared to the baseline and split-award processes.
4.5 Experimental Procedures
In the experiment, the two period model is repeated for 20 rounds to allow convergence
of market outcomes. Groups of four subjects, two suppliers and two buyers, form a
market. These groups stay fixed throughout the experiment, as do supplier and buyer
74
roles. However, each round the two supplier subjects are randomly assigned to be the
low- or high-cost supplier. This limits expected payout differences and mitigates fair-
ness considerations of buyers, which might motivate sourcing from the supplier with the
higher cost. The model and all its parameters are common knowledge for subjects. We
conduct N = 6 markets for each procurement process. The model is implemented in
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and provides a profit calculator. After each period the earnings
of all market participants in the respective group are displayed.
The markets were conducted in the experimental laboratory in Mannheim in May 2009
and March 2010. Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2003). Overall 96 subjects
participated, most of them students and no one participated twice. Upon arrival, subjects
were seated randomly and provided with written instructions (cf. appendix) and five or
six test questions (depending on the procurement process) had to be answered. Before the
experiment commenced, subjects were randomly assigned to their role of either supplier
or buyer. Sessions lasted between 1h30 and 2h00. Converting total firm profits at a rate
of 1/3000 then yielded an average payout to subjects of EUR 19.27.
4.6 Experimental Results
Results of the experiment are analyzed for rounds 5-19. This allows for learning by sub-
jects in the first rounds and excludes any endgame behavior in the last round. However,
all results are also valid for rounds 10-19 unless otherwise noted. For the respective
rounds, mean values of the analysis variables are calculated for each experimental mar-
ket. Accordingly, reported frequencies and mean values are always means of market means.
Histograms however depict the distribution of values from the respective rounds in all mar-
kets17. To test for differences between procurement processes, we use a Mann-Whitney-
U-Test and for differences within a procurement process a Wilcoxon-Signed-Ranks-Test.
Thereby p-values are generally two-tailed with exceptions explicitly noted.
4.6.1 A Non-Strategic Situation
The incentive for buyers to sustain competition and for suppliers to monopolize the market
is given by the difference in expected surplus between a duopoly and a single active supplier
in period 2. For this difference to be present in the experiment, the behavior of both
suppliers and buyers has to be close to rational behavior in this non-strategic situation. We
analyze this in turn.
Figure 4.2 shows the posted prices for all procurement processes when a single supplier i
enjoys a monopoly, with p2Mi (q > 2) included for SPA as buyers have to purchase at this
price. We find that posted prices are close to the rational price of p2Mi = 1000 across
procurement processes, with p2Mi ≥ 900 in f = 0.91 of monopoly rounds. Accordingly,
no significant difference in mean prices p2Mi ≥ 938 is introduced by any of the modified
17In histograms of prices the k-th interval is
(
pk, pk+1
]
, while for forgone surplus it is
[
∆BSk,∆BSk+1
)
.
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Figure 4.2: Lowest price and surplus foregone by buyers in duopolies in period 2.
procurement processes compared to the baseline with p ≥ 0.177, although values for
both SPA and PRE come relatively close to significance, though only in rounds 5-19.
Since buyers have to purchase all demand from the single active supplier, with split-
award auctions we find prices for the purchase of a small and a large quantity not to be
significantly different (p = 0.625).
For duopolies, figure 4.2 again depicts the lowest price at which buyers can source
their demand. We find that prices are close to the theoretical prediction of p2Dlow = 400
with f = 0.90 of duopoly rounds yielding p2Dlow ≤ 600 and the price being equal to or lower
than the prediction in f = 0.44 of cases. Again, we observe no significant difference of
the lowest mean price p2Dlow ≤ 503 for any procurement process compared to REF with
p ≥ 0.190, and only the difference in SPA is close to significance. Suppliers are not found
to set significantly different prices for small and large quantities (p ≥ 0.250), although
only N = 4 markets yield duopolies and are thus available for analysis. Overall, we thus
find pricing in period 2 to be close to the prediction.
When a single supplier is active in period 2, buyers have to source all demand from
this supplier. For two active suppliers it is rational to purchase the complete demand
from the supplier with the lower price in non-tied rounds for all procurement processes18,
thereby foregoing no surplus ∆BS2D = 0. However, we find that although ties occur
in only f ≤ 0.13 of duopoly rounds, aggregate dual sourcing is observed quite often
with f
2D
Dual ≥ 0.35, except for pre-announced sourcing where f2DDual = 0.07. Nevertheless,
compared to REF none of the procurement processes induces a significant change in the
frequency (p ≥ 0.452). The corresponding foregone surplus is depicted in figure 4.2, where
for PRE the difference between the hypothetical surplus from sourcing only at the lowest
posted price and actual surplus is shown. We find that across processes, in f = 0.90 of
duopoly rounds the foregone surplus is small with ∆BS2D < 200. Indeed, in more than
two-thirds of rounds it is exactly zero, i.e., buyers realize all available surplus. Comparing
the foregone surplus for the modified processes to the baseline (∆BS
2D ≤ 132), we observe
no significant changes with p ≥ 0.238. The low values of foregone surplus therefore indicate
18With split-award auctions, splitting demand maximizes surplus in only f = 0.03 of duopolies and is
thus not explicitly considered.
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that buyers split demand primarily when the price difference is small. Hence, buyers source
relatively close to the prediction, although some deviations remain.
Our finding of prices in duopolies being close to equilibrium behavior is in contrast to
that of Dugar and Mitra (2009) in an asymmetric cost Bertrand setting. They find the
lowest price to be substantially higher than predicted for a relative cost difference corre-
sponding to our model. Similar results are also obtained for symmetric Bertrand competi-
tion (cf., e.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000). With the analysis from Wilken (2011a), we
can conclude however that our deviating findings are not an effect of the presence of human
buyers but originate from the interruption of supplier interaction by pricing in period 1
and by rounds without a duopoly in period 2, making collusion harder to sustain19.
Turning to the predicted differences in surplus values, we find that for all procurement
processes mean buyer surplus in rounds with duopolies BS
2D ≥ 3909 is significantly higher
than BS
2M ≤ 564 in monopoly rounds (p ≤ 0.063). The difference is slightly smaller than
predicted since supplier and buyer behavior is close to but does not always match rational
behavior. Accordingly, for supplier 1 the profit when competing in a duopoly of pi2D1 ≤ 1519
is significantly smaller than pi2M1 ≥ 5691 in a monopoly with p ≤ 0.063. Meanwhile, the
profit of supplier 2 is higher in all markets where monopolies occur than in the correspond-
ing duopolies. Incentives for buyers to sustain competition and for suppliers to exclude
the other supplier are thus intact in the experiment for all procurement processes. Also,
with no significant differences detected in supplier and buyer behavior between processes
in this non-strategic situation, we find broad support for the first prediction.
Finding 1. In the second period, behavior of suppliers and buyers is close to the rational
prediction and no changes in outcomes compared to the baseline process are observed for
any of the modified procurement processes.
4.6.2 Pricing
With none of the modified procurement processes inducing a significant change in the non-
strategic situation of the second period, we now analyze how pricing in period 1 is affected.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 depict the evolution of the posted mean prices over all rounds for the
different procurement processes. Pricing stabilizes after the first rounds and remains so
for the analyzed rounds 5-19, with pre-announced sourcing inducing a higher variability
compared to the other processes.
For the baseline process REF, the mean posted price of supplier 1 is close to the
marginal cost of supplier 2 with p1 = 394. As depicted in figure 4.3, in split-award auctions
supplier 1 sets prices for the purchase of a large quantity which are not significantly
different from the prices in the baseline (cf. table 4.3). However, the mean price for a small
quantity, p1(q ≤ 2) = 532 is significantly increased compared to REF. Therefore, contrary
to the prediction, prices are consistently higher for the purchase of a small than for a large
19In line with our findings, Boone, Mu¨ller, and Chaudhuri (2008) observe asymmetric cost Bertrand
markets converging to the marginal cost of the less efficient supplier.
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Figure 4.3: Mean prices in period 1 for processes REF and SPA.
quantity (p = 0.063), which in effect constitutes quantity discounts. With prices for a
large quantity not being different from the baseline however, we interpret them as small
quantity premia instead. These aim to deter buyers from dual sourcing by making a split
of demand unattractive through higher prices. This interpretation is substantiated by the
absence of small quantity premia in period 2 where in general it is rational for buyers to
source only from a single supplier (cf. section 4.6.1). When however subsidies are allowed
or sourcing is pre-announced, in line with the prediction the mean price of supplier 1 is
significantly higher than in REF with p1 ≥ 533, as also evidenced by figure 4.4.
For the less efficient supplier, no significant change in mean prices compared to the
baseline value of p2 = 511 is observed for SPA and SUB, although in the latter case the
mean is p2 = 609. However, also supplier 2 demands small quantity premia in split-award
auctions by setting a higher price for a smaller quantity (p = 0.031). Meanwhile, with
pre-announced sourcing the mean price of supplier 2 increases significantly to p2 = 828.
While we thus find relatively aggressive pricing in REF and SPA as predicted, for
SUB and PRE supplier behavior is more accommodating without being outright collusive.
Nevertheless, in one market in SUB suppliers collude nearly perfectly at p1 = p2 ≈ 1000
in the last ten rounds. Meanwhile, with pre-announced sourcing, instances of perfect
collusion are observed in five markets, which however always break down after a single
round. This points to potential detrimental effects for buyers of procurement processes
which induce more passive pricing.
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Figure 4.4: Mean prices in period 1 for processes REF, SUB and PRE.
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Process H0 N p1 MW p H0 N p2 MW p
REF 6 394 6 511
SPA (q ≤ 2) E(REF) = E(SPA) 6 532 0.002 E(REF) = E(SPA) 6 582 0.240
SPA (q > 2) E(REF) = E(SPA) 6 437 0.310 E(REF) = E(SPA) 6 522 0.589
SUB E(REF) ≥ E(SUB) 6 533 0.066 E(REF) = E(SUB) 6 609 0.240
PRE E(REF) ≥ E(PRE) 6 697 0.001 E(REF) = E(PRE) 6 828 0.002
Table 4.3: Prices in period 1. Mann-Whitney test, p-values two-tailed for H0 an equality,
one-tailed for H0 an inequality.
Observed prices of supplier 1 are thus significantly higher than predicted with p = 0.031
for all processes except for PRE, where they are compatible with the predicted mean
price (p = 0.563). For supplier 2, compatibility with the predicted price levels is meanwhile
found for all treatments (p ≥ 0.219) except for significantly lower prices in REF and
p2(q ≤ 2) in SPA (p = 0.031).
We now analyze how these differences to the predicted values arise by deducting the
deviations of posted prices20 pExpi from rational best responses to the price of the other sup-
plier pBRi . The best responses are calculated using the numerical approach of section 4.4,
with ∆p = 1 for SPA and PRE now being feasible. Accordingly, this assumes buyers pur-
chase rationally, which is however a good approximation given the results of section 4.6.3
below except for SPA. Also, although suppliers do not know the price of the other supplier
in the experiment, due to relatively stable prices (cf. above) they can be assumed to be
able to infer it to a good degree. Figure 4.5 displays the deviations for all procurement
processes, with the best response yielding the minimum absolute deviation chosen in cases
of supplier indifference between prices.
In the baseline process we find that prices of supplier 1 deviate only slightly from the
best responses and accordingly no significant difference is observed in table 4.4. Mean-
while, for supplier 2 the majority of posted prices are substantially lower than optimal,
with the difference between pExp2 = 511 and p
BR
2 = 893 being easily significant. This is due
to supplier 2 pricing too aggressively in response to low prices, when the best response
of pBR2 = 1000 would often allow buyers to sustain him. Supplier 1 can then exclude
supplier 2 with prices close to c2 and not substantially below it as predicted.
In the case of split-award auctions, best responses consist of prices for purchase of a
small and a large quantity. Supplier 1 then sets prices which are significantly skewed to too
high values for small quantities but compatible with best responses for large quantities.
This deviation is caused by the small quantity premia in the experiment, since optimal
behavior has supplier 1 often posting prices which are so low as to make sustaining both
suppliers impossible. Our analysis is based on buyers always sustaining competition when
this is equilibrium behavior. Since buyers however often do not use this option in the
experiment (cf. section 4.6.3), exclusion frequently prevails despite the premia for small
20Experimentally observed values are indicated by “Exp” whenever this makes it easier to distinguish
from theoretical values.
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Figure 4.5: Deviation of posted prices from best responses to the price of the other supplier
in period 1.
quantities of supplier 1. The less efficient supplier meanwhile is found to set prices which
are lower than optimal for high quantities, while small quantity prices are compatible with
rational behavior. The best response would then often force at least one buyer to purchase
a quantity higher than two from the less efficient supplier to sustain him as this is not
possible at the low prices by splitting contracts.
When buyers can pay subsidies to suppliers in SUB, we find that pricing in the exper-
iment is compatible with best responses for both suppliers in table 4.4 and accordingly
the distributions exhibit pronounced peaks at small deviations. Also for pre-announced
sourcing, small deviations from the best responses dominate for both suppliers. For sup-
plier 2, no significant deviation from the best response is observed. Now, in contrast to the
baseline process, in many cases supplier 2 does set a price of p2 = 1000 when this is opti-
mal, as a consequence of being guaranteed a non-zero quantity even when posting a very
high price. For the more efficient supplier, the distribution is slightly skewed to the left,
leading to prices which are significantly lower than the best response. Analyzing different
values of Qhigh separately where this is feasible
21, for supplier 1 the deviation to lower
prices remains significant (p = 0.063) for Qhigh = 2 but not for Qhigh = 1. Conversely,
for supplier 2, no significant difference is observed when Qhigh = 2, but when Qhigh = 1,
deviations to lower prices come close with p = 0.125. In this case, the less efficient supplier
cannot guarantee his survival by setting p2 = 1000 and thus tries to underbid instead of
pocketing the period 1 profit at a high price and exiting. In contrast, for Qhigh = 2,
supplier 2 sets high prices and the more efficient supplier underbids too aggressively.
We thus find that often supplier 2 prices more aggressively than optimal, namely for
the baseline process, for large quantities in split-award auctions and when Qhigh = 1 is
21This is possible only for Qhigh = 1 and Qhigh = 2 as other quantities do not occur sufficiently often in
the experiment.
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Process H0 N p
Exp
1 p
BR
1 WC p p
Exp
2 p
BR
2 WC p
REF E(Exp) = E(BR) 6 394 414 0.438 511 893 0.031
SPA (q ≤ 2) E(Exp) = E(BR) 6 532 397 0.031 582 541 0.313
SPA (q > 2) E(Exp) = E(BR) 6 437 394 0.563 522 815 0.031
SUB E(Exp) = E(BR) 6 533 555 0.688 609 625 0.438
PRE E(Exp) = E(BR) 6 697 837 0.063 828 878 0.438
Table 4.4: Posted prices and best responses to the price of the other supplier in period 1.
Wilcoxon test, p-values two-tailed.
pre-announced. Behavior of supplier 1 is in comparison closer to best responses, although
some deviations persist. The following finding then summarizes the above results regarding
pricing in the first period.
Finding 2.1. For the baseline process, the more efficient supplier prices close to the
marginal cost of the less efficient supplier. This is also observed for large quantities in
split-award auctions, while premia are demanded for small quantities. For subsidies and
pre-announced sourcing, prices of the more efficient supplier increase. Across processes,
the less efficient supplier often prices more aggressively than optimal.
The persistent premia for small quantities in split-award auctions are in line with
the experimental finding of widespread large buyer discounts of Ruﬄe (2009) in a model
where two suppliers supply differently sized buyers sequentially. However, as discussed
above, we attribute premia mainly to suppliers trying to deter strategic dual sourcing and
accordingly no premia are observed in the non-strategic setting of period 2.
As discussed in section 4.4, buyers can sustain competition only for certain combi-
nations of prices in period 1, as depicted in figure 4.6. For the baseline process, price
combinations in the experiment are concentrated close to the marginal cost of supplier 2
for both suppliers, making sustaining competition possible in only fC = 0.28 of cases
as reported in table 4.5. Exclusionary pricing is thus predominant as predicted by the
subgame-perfect equilibrium. This outcome is also predicted for split-award auctions.
Now however, we find that it is possible to sustain competition in fC = 0.62 of rounds
and thus significantly more often than in the baseline process, although for rounds 10-19
this relation just fails to be significant with p = 0.102. This increase is a direct conse-
quence of the premia for small quantities demanded by both suppliers. Instead of making
dual sourcing unattractive, the higher prices often allow buyers to keep both suppliers
active by splitting the contract. This is only partially reflected in figure 4.6 since the
displayed prices are weighted by the purchased quantities and buyers often do not sustain
competition although this is possible as discussed in section 4.6.3 below.
In SUB it is always possible to sustain competition by paying subsidies and thus
fC = 1.00, which marks a significant increase compared to the baseline process REF.
In addition, with prices of supplier 1 increasing, the level of posted prices is shifted to
higher values in figure 4.6. Therefore, even without using subsidies buyers can sustain a
81
200 400 600 800 1000
400
600
800
1000
p1
p 2
REF
200 400 600 800 1000
400
600
800
1000
p1
p 2
SPA
200 400 600 800 1000
400
600
800
1000
p1
p 2
SUB
200 400 600 800 1000
400
600
800
1000
p1
p 2
PRE
Competition can be sustained
Posted price combination
Dual sourcing - Duopoly
Dual sourcing - No duopoly
No dual sourcing - No duopoly
Figure 4.6: Posted price combinations in period 1, ensuing buyer behavior and market
structure in period 2. Area of symbols is proportional to the observed frequency.
duopoly in fC = 0.56 of rounds by dual sourcing alone. This only just fails to be signifi-
cantly higher than in REF with p = 0.102.
For pre-announced sourcing the situation is not directly comparable since prices now
immediately determine the market structure in the second period as the quantity split
has already been set. Accordingly, in figure 4.6 competition is shown as being possible
to sustain for all prices for which there exists a quantity split implementing this. In a
strict sense, it is always possible for suppliers to ensure joint survival by coordinating on
a high price as this leads to equal sharing of the contract. It is found in section 4.6.3 below
however that buyers set quantities such that even at different prices competition can be
Process H0 N fC MW p
REF 6 0.28
SPA E(REF) = E(SPA) 6 0.62 0.061+
SUB E(REF) ≥ E(SUB) 6 1.00 0.001
Table 4.5: Frequency of price combinations which allow to sustain competition. Mann-
Whitney test, p-values two-tailed for H0 an equality, one-tailed for H0 an inequality.
(+) not significant for rounds 10-19.
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sustained in fDC = 0.99 of cases. Then suppliers price such that both survive in fC = 0.74
of cases, which is significantly higher than fC = 0.28 in REF with p = 0.005 one-tailed.
Limiting the analysis to Qhigh ≥ 2, which allows supplier 2 to be sustained by posting a
price higher than supplier 1, we even attain fC = 0.93 (p = 0.001 one-tailed). This is then
also close to the corresponding subgame-perfect prediction of f∗C = 0.96. Pricing in PRE
is thus in any case more conducive to the survival of both suppliers than in the baseline
process. We summarize these results as an addition to the previous finding.
Finding 2.2. For the baseline process exclusionary pricing is predominant, while prices
are more accommodating to the survival of both suppliers for all modified processes.
4.6.3 Dual Sourcing
Given the posted prices both buyers decide how to source their demand from the suppliers
in period 1, except in PRE where they move first. To sustain competition, it is necessary
that in aggregate buyers dual source from both suppliers. Thereby, we treat positive
subsidies as equivalent to dual sourcing unless otherwise noted (cf. section 4.4).
Figure 4.7 depicts the frequency of dual sourcing across all rounds, with posted quan-
tities for unequal prices being analyzed for PRE. The high value of fDual = 0.51 for the
baseline process REF is notable, given that in section 4.6.2 we found that it is possible
to sustain competition in only fC = 0.28 of rounds. Also ties occur in only f = 0.04
of rounds, which render dual sourcing rational as well. Meanwhile, for split-award auc-
tions no significant change compared to the baseline process is detected in table 4.6 and
even the mean value fDual = 0.53 is very close to the one for the baseline process. Since
we found above that both suppliers can be sustained in fC = 0.62 of rounds, this is a
first indication that buyers often do not act upon the option to sustain competition. For
subsidies and pre-announced sourcing, significant increases in the frequency of dual sourc-
ing compared to the baseline process are observed. Demand is being split (or subsidies
are being paid) nearly always with fDual ≥ 0.97, in line with the predicted equilibrium
behavior from section 4.4. Even when subsidies are excluded, fDual = 0.80 in SUB is
still significantly higher than the value in REF for rounds 5-19 (p = 0.067), though not
for rounds 10-19.
The overall picture changes however when we restrict the analysis to those rounds
where it is possible to sustain competition and thus dual sourcing is always rational. For
SUB and PRE, it is always possible to sustain competition in the former case and buyers
move first in the latter case, leaving the frequencies unchanged. Figure 4.7 highlights
that in REF however the frequency of dual sourcing then increases to fDual = 0.89 for
the N = 5 markets where rounds exist which allow to sustain competition. Accordingly,
differences to the processes SUB and PRE are no longer significant with p ≥ 0.303. Thus,
in all procurement processes with linear prices the frequency of dual sourcing is close to
the rational prediction of fDual = 1 when competition can be sustained and therefore
the overall differences arise mainly from the exclusionary prices in REF. Meanwhile, for
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Figure 4.7: Frequency of dual sourcing in period 1.
split-award auctions the mean frequency increases only slightly to fDual = 0.59 when
competition can be sustained. This is now significantly lower than in REF with p = 0.087
for rounds 5-19 while just failing to be so in the second segment of rounds (p = 0.157).
In SUB, buyers can either dual source or pay subsidies to ensure survival. We find that
in about half of all rounds, buyers both split demand and pay subsidies to suppliers, while
in f = 0.17 of rounds only subsidies are paid and in f = 0.28 of rounds only purchases
are split. When buyers pay only subsidies, these are often tailored to allow to reach the
profit threshold and are therefore close to pi. Positive subsidies are thus observed in more
than two-thirds of rounds and often splitting demand and subsidies are combined, as is
rational for many price combinations.
An additional measure of strategic sourcing is provided by the surplus foregone by
buyers in the first period, i.e., the difference between maximum possible and realized
surplus in period 1. To sustain competition at unequal linear prices22 some surplus has to
be foregone. In the case of pre-announced sourcing, buyers cannot actively forego surplus
as prices are unknown when deciding on the demand split. However, setting Qhigh > 0
is a commitment by buyers to purchase a positive quantity at myopically non-optimal
prices and therefore in the following we analyze the difference between the surplus from
purchasing solely at the lowest posted price and the realized buyer surplus in period 1.
For the baseline procurement process, in more than half of all rounds buyers forego
exactly zero surplus and also the mean aggregate value is rather small with ∆BS = 196
as reported in table 4.6. Since competition can be sustained in only about a third of
rounds, this points again to rather rational buyer behavior. For split-award auctions, no
significant change in foregone surplus compared to REF is found although the mean value
is somewhat higher. Again, in about half of all rounds no surplus is foregone at all by
buyers, which contrasts with the finding that competition can be sustained in fC = 0.62
of rounds. When subsidies are possible, the surplus foregone by buyers is significantly
higher than in the baseline process with BS = 480, since now buyers can always sustain
competition. Also for pre-announced sourcing, the equilibrium solution of section 4.4
predicts positive values of foregone surplus and indeed in f = 0.94 of rounds foregone
surplus is positive, increasing the mean value significantly from the baseline process in
rounds 5-19, while p = 0.197 one-tailed for rounds 10-19. The foregone surplus stems from
22Ties occur in only f ≤ 0.14 of rounds in all procurement processes and are thus not explicitly analyzed.
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Process H0 N fDual MW p ∆BS MW p
REF 6 0.51 196
SPA E(REF) = E(SPA) 6 0.53 0.985 291 0.589
SUB E(REF) ≥ E(SUB) 6 0.97 0.001 480 0.008
PRE E(REF) ≥ E(PRE) 6 0.99 0.001 411 0.032+
Table 4.6: Frequency of dual sourcing and surplus foregone by buyers in period 1. Mann-
Whitney test, p-values two-tailed for H0 an equality, one-tailed for H0 an inequality.
(+) not significant for rounds 10-19.
the commitment to purchase a positive quantity from the supplier with the higher price.
This is nearly always made by buyers in aggregate with Qhigh = 2 in f = 0.62 of rounds
and Qhigh = 1 in f = 0.22 of rounds.
Again, we restrict analyses to the rounds where it is possible to sustain competition
and thus it is rational to forego surplus in non-tied rounds. For the baseline process we
then find an increased value of ∆BS = 597, which is no longer significantly different from
the foregone surplus in SUB or PRE (p ≥ 0.537) in rounds 5-19, while in the second
segment of rounds it is even higher than for PRE with p = 0.038. Now, ∆BS = 411 for
split-award auctions is not found to be significantly different from REF (p = 0.328).
Hence, we find that except for split-award auctions, buyer behavior is less influenced
by the modified procurement processes than by the differences in pricing these induce,
yielding the following finding.
Finding 3.1. When competition can be sustained, buyers nearly always dual source for all
procurement processes except for split-award auctions. Overall, the frequency of dual sourc-
ing is higher for subsidies and pre-announced sourcing than for the baseline process since
competition can be sustained more often. For split-award auctions it is close to the baseline.
To test how close buyer behavior is to rationality, equilibria of the buyer subgames for
the experimental prices are calculated numerically using the algorithms from section 4.4.
To allow a comparison between procurement processes, the resulting deviation of experi-
mentally observed foregone surplus ∆BSExp from the optimal foregone surplus ∆BSTheo
is analyzed. This assumes that buyers expect rational market outcomes in period 2, which
are approximately observed in the experiment (cf. section 4.6.1). From figure 4.8 we find
that across procurement processes the distribution of deviations has a pronounced peak
at small absolute differences.
Deviations in the baseline process are slightly skewed to positive values but the dif-
ference between observed and optimal foregone surplus is not significant (p = 0.563). For
split-award auctions meanwhile, the distribution exhibits a central peak similar to the base-
line process, while the frequency of large deviations is substantially more pronounced than
in all other processes. Accordingly, foregone surplus in the experiment of ∆BS
Exp
= 291
is found to be significantly lower than the optimal value of ∆BS
Theo
= 443 with p = 0.093
in rounds 5-19, although it just fails to be so in rounds 10-19 with p = 0.156. However,
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Figure 4.8: Foregone surplus: Deviation of experimental from optimal values in period 1.
this analysis uses numerical results for buyers implementing strategic sourcing equilib-
ria whenever they exist. The split-award process is unique though in that for f = 0.23
of posted prices both strategic and myopic sourcing equilibria of the buyer subgame ex-
ist (cf. section 4.4). When alternatively we calculate foregone surplus for buyers who
always coordinate on a myopic sourcing equilibrium when one exists, the picture is re-
versed. The distribution has an increased central peak and is skewed to too high values of
foregone surplus, in line with the finding that now experimentally foregone surplus is sig-
nificantly higher than the optimal ∆BS
Theo
= 211 with p = 0.094 (although p = 0.156 in
rounds 10-19). With experimental values of foregone surplus in between these extremes,
also buyer behavior in split-award auctions is broadly compatible with rational behavior,
although buyers often do not act upon the option to sustain suppliers, i.e., they often
do not succeed in implementing a generally pareto-superior strategic sourcing equilib-
rium (cf. section 4.6.3). This is most likely due to the more complex situation with non-
linear prices, which is further complicated by some strategic sourcing equilibria requiring
relatively intricate quantity allocations with different demand splits for each buyer.
When buyers can pay subsidies to suppliers, the peak for small deviations is lower and
the distribution visibly broader than for the baseline process. Nevertheless, as deviations
are nearly symmetric, the mean foregone surplus in the experiment does not differ signif-
icantly from the optimal value of ∆BS
Theo
= 460 (p = 0.688). The broader distribution
stems most likely from a combination of dual sourcing being always optimal since compe-
tition can always be sustained and the additional coordination challenges introduced by
a second strategic buyer variable. Too little foregone surplus thereby implies that com-
petition is not sustained and therefore buyers are in a number of cases not successful in
sustaining competition as discussed below.
For pre-announced sourcing, figure 4.8 includes the corresponding deviation from the
surplus foregone when buyers always set Qhigh = 2 according to the subgame-perfect
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equilibrium. Only few deviations are observed and accordingly we find that the surplus
foregone by buyers does not differ significantly from the value for the “optimal” solution
of ∆BS
Theo
= 397. Testing instead sourced quantities directly, we can corroborate this
result as the experimental mean value of Qhigh = 2.0 does not differ significantly from the
predicted Q∗high = 2.0 with p = 0.875.
Summarizing these results, the following qualifying finding can be stated.
Finding 3.2. For all procurement processes buyer behavior is close to rational sourcing
decisions. However, buyers often fail to implement surplus-maximizing behavior for split-
award auctions.
While so far analyses have focused on aggregate buyer behavior we now investigate
when buyers cooperate in strategic sourcing. As discussed in section 4.4, only when for
a price combination both strategic and myopic sourcing equilibria exist, is it not possible
for a single buyer to profitably sustain competition by deviating from myopic sourcing.
Accordingly, only then does sustaining competition require buyer cooperation. However,
this holds for only f = 0.02 of rounds in REF and by construction in none of the rounds
for subsidies and pre-announced sourcing. Only for split-award auctions is cooperation
required in f = 0.23 of rounds to sustain competition. Compared to fC = 0.62, this
implies that the participation of both buyers is then necessary in more than one third
of cases where competition can be sustained. This is due to the posted price structures
which often allow to sustain both suppliers only when both buyers split demand.
In the experiment, individual buyers may however still be unwilling to forego surplus
and sustain a supplier alone even when it is rational. Since buyer cooperation is only rele-
vant when competition can be sustained, we restrict analysis to these rounds, decomposing
the corresponding frequency of dual sourcing into fDual = fCo + fNoCo. Both buyers dual
source and thus cooperate in the first case, while in the second case at most a single buyer
dual sources.
For the baseline process REF then, both buyers cooperate in fCo = 0.46 of cases.
With fDual = 0.89, this implies that only in around half of the cases where aggregate
demand is dual sourced do both buyers do so. For split-award auctions, the frequency is
even lower with fCo = 0.16, which is however partly due to the lower value of fDual = 0.59.
The mean value is close to the baseline process for SUB (fCo = 0.51) but somewhat higher
for PRE with fCo = 0.70 where in both cases fDual ≥ 0.97. Accordingly, none of these
differences is observed to be significant with p ≥ 0.353.
Therefore, we observe some indications for “free riding”, which corresponds to large
differences in foregone surplus between individual buyers when competition can be sus-
tained, ∆BS1−2 = |∆BS1 −∆BS2|. We analyze the absolute value of the mean differences
in each market due to the arbitrary buyer assignment. Again, we find cooperation to be
rather low with ∆BS1−2 = 341 in the baseline process, compared to the respective value
of aggregate foregone surplus of ∆BS = 597. While the mean value decreases somewhat
for SPA to ∆BS1−2 = 189 since now often both buyers do not forego any surplus, it is
87
similar to the baseline with subsidies (∆BS1−2 = 316). Accordingly, in both cases the
difference to REF is not significant with p ≥ 0.429. The amount of foregone surplus for
pre-announced sourcing is often identical for both buyers due to both setting the same
demand split and paying identical prices. Hence, the absolute foregone surplus difference
is only ∆BS1−2 = 115, a significant decrease compared to REF with p = 0.082. This is in
line with the above (albeit non-significant) increase in the frequency of cooperation and
therefore the following addition to the previous finding can be stated.
Finding 3.3. For all procurement processes buyers cooperate only infrequently in dual
sourcing, except for weak evidence that cooperation increases for pre-announced sourcing.
We now analyze how successful buyers are in sustaining competition as given by the
frequency of a duopoly being sustained when this is possible for buyers, fDC. In turn,
this measure can be decomposed as the product of the frequency of dual sourcing when
competition can be sustained and both suppliers being sustained when buyers dual source,
fDC = fDual × fDDual. These are then measures of buyers attempting to sustain both
suppliers and actually succeeding respectively.
From table 4.7 we find that in the baseline process buyers succeed in only about two-
thirds of cases in sustaining supplier competition. However, in rounds 10-19 this increases
to fDC = 0.79. The low value in the first segment of rounds follows from the failure to
sustain competition in only a single round in three markets, due to the low frequency of
sustaining competition being possible. In our closely related work (Wilken 2011a), we find
in a comparable situation with automated suppliers fDC = 0.81 and conclude this value
to be a superior guide to buyer behavior.
In the case of split-award auctions, buyers succeed only in about one-third of cases
in sustaining competition. With p = 0.121 this only just fails to be significantly lower
than for the baseline process. This low value is a combination of buyers not attempting
to sustain competition when this is possible as evidenced by fDual = 0.59 and if they do,
in not succeeding (fDDual = 0.56). As described above, this follows because often myopic
sourcing is also equilibrium behavior. Furthermore, sustaining both suppliers also often
requires complex demand split patterns, increasing the probability of failure. In addition,
subjects in the experiment may have an aversion to split demand and purchase from a
supplier at a high price when a low price is available, as is often the case due to premia
for small quantities.
Modifying the procurement process by allowing subsidies does not lead to significantly
different values of fDC and even the mean value is close to the baseline with fDC = 0.62.
We observe that buyers dual source nearly always, fDual = 0.97 but then competition is
actually sustained in only fDDual = 0.64 of cases. This rather low rate is most likely due to
the more complex sourcing situation with the option to split demand and pay subsidies.
As discussed in section 4.4, sustaining the supplier with the higher linear price can be
regarded as a discrete public good game, with fDC corresponding to the provision rate.
The success rates of fDC ≥ 0.62 for REF and SUB are thereby well within the range
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Process H0 N fDC MW p
REF 5 0.64
SPA E(REF) = E(SPA) 6 0.36 0.121
SUB E(REF) = E(SUB) 6 0.62 0.887
Table 4.7: Frequency of a duopoly in period 2 when competition can be sustained. Mann-
Whitney test, p-values two-tailed.
of experimentally observed rates in comparable public good experiments (cf. Croson and
Marks 2000, and references therein), although as discussed above, in our experiment often
a single buyer can sustain competition.
With pre-announced sourcing, no measure exists which is directly comparable to fDC.
However, for competition to be sustained, buyers have to source aggregate demand such
that this allows suppliers to post different prices which sustain them23. This is observed
in fDC = 0.99 of rounds, which is significantly higher than fDC = 0.64 for the baseline
process with p = 0.004, and only just fails to be so in the second segment of rounds
with p = 0.133. However, this includes demand splits with Qhigh = 1, which can sustain
suppliers only for p11 > p
1
2, a situation not likely to occur given the difference in marginal
costs. Requiring Qhigh ≥ 2, both suppliers can be sustained in fDC = 0.73 of rounds with
supplier 2 setting the higher price. This is then no longer significantly different from REF
with p = 0.195. Thus, we can state the next finding regarding buyer behavior.
Finding 3.4. When competition can be sustained, buyers succeed often, but not always,
in sustaining competition for all procurement processes, except for split-award auctions
where they are only infrequently successful.
4.6.4 Overall Results
We now analyze how the frequency of a duopoly in period 2, fD differs between procure-
ment processes. Thereby, fD is the product of suppliers posting non-exclusionary prices
and buyers successfully sustaining competition, fD = fC × fDC.
For the baseline process, the low frequency of fD = 0.19 reported in table 4.8 is pri-
marily a result of suppliers posting exclusionary prices, allowing survival of both suppliers
in only fC = 0.28 of rounds. In addition, buyers are not always successful in sustaining
competition when this is possible (fDC = 0.64). Accordingly, the observed frequency is not
too far from the prediction of exclusion always occurring. No significant change compared
to the baseline process follows for split-award auctions, where only in about a quarter of
rounds competition is sustained. While this is again comparably close to the predicted
outcome, the underlying behavior is quite different. Suppliers demand premia for small
quantities and thereby often allow buyers to sustain competition (fC = 0.62) but then
buyers often do not use this option (fDC = 0.36).
23In principle, suppliers can ensure joint survival by setting the same high price as then demand is split.
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Process H0 N fD MW p
REF 6 0.19
SPA E(REF) = E(SPA) 6 0.26 0.784
SUB E(REF) ≥ E(SUB) 6 0.62 0.025
PRE E(REF) ≥ E(PRE) 6 0.73 0.003
Table 4.8: Frequency of a duopoly in period 2. Mann-Whitney test, p-values two-tailed
for H0 an equality, one-tailed for H0 an inequality.
When buyers can pay subsidies, as predicted the frequency of sustained competition
increases significantly compared to the baseline process to a mean value of fD = 0.62. This
is primarily due to subsidies always allowing buyers to sustain competition regardless of
the posted prices. The frequency of sustained competition thus corresponds to the success
of buyers in keeping both suppliers active and is therefore lower than the theoretical
prediction of one. For pre-announced sourcing, with fD = 0.73 competition is sustained
significantly more often than with the baseline process and the frequency is thus relatively
close to the prediction of f∗D = 0.96. The difference stems from buyers sourcing such
that survival of both suppliers at different prices is possible in fDC = 0.99 of rounds but
suppliers posting accommodating prices which yield a duopoly in only fC = 0.74 of all
rounds. However, as discussed in section 4.6.2, when we assume that generally prices of
supplier 2 are higher than those of supplier 1 and thus Qhigh ≥ 2 is required to sustain
competition, these values change to fDC = 0.73 and fC = 0.93. This points to buyers not
always being successful in guaranteeing a sufficiently large quantity to the supplier with
the higher price. The following finding summarizes these results.
Finding 4.1. Competition is only rarely sustained for the baseline and split-award pro-
cesses, while it is sustained often for subsidies and pre-announcing sourcing.
With the frequency of no active supplier in period 2 being fN ≤ 0.11 in all procurement
processes, the occurrence of monopolies in the second period mirrors the findings for
sustained competition. Accordingly, the frequency of a monopoly is significantly lower for
procurement processes SUB and PRE (fM ≤ 0.34, p ≤ 0.050) than for the baseline process,
where fM = 0.70. Meanwhile, no significant difference to REF is observed for split-award
auctions. Accordingly, a monopoly in period 2 is the predominant outcome in the baseline
and split-award auction procurement processes, while for subsidies and pre-announced
sourcing it is a duopoly.
We now analyze how these differences influence the distribution of surplus. We find
that aggregate surplus of all market participants in the experiment is somewhat lower than
predicted due to situations where both suppliers exit and positive quantities are sourced
from the less efficient supplier. With demand being inelastic, it is however not altered by
any procurement process compared to the baseline (p ≥ 0.485).
For all procurement processes, total surplus of buyers from both periods is significantly
higher in those rounds where competition is sustained than in those where a monopoly
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Figure 4.9: Surplus distribution.
follows (p ≤ 0.063 one-tailed), with mean values of the processes being BSD ≥ 6023 and
BS
M ≤ 4939 respectively. This finding underlines the theoretical prediction of section 4.4
that for the experimental parameters buyers are better off with procurement processes
which sustain competition. Nevertheless, we find the total surplus BS = 6130 for SUB and
BS = 5404 for PRE not to be significantly different from BS = 5614 in the baseline process
with p = 0.242 one-tailed for SUB and p = 1.000 two-tailed for PRE. However, the corre-
sponding changes of surplus for the suppliers are compatible with the prediction as the sur-
plus of supplier 1 decreases from pi1 = 5436 to pi1 ≤ 4791 (p ≤ 0.090 one-tailed), although
for PRE the difference is not significant for rounds 10-19. Accordingly, the total surplus
of supplier 2 is significantly increased from pi2 = 387 in REF to pi2 ≥ 1429 for SUB and
PRE (p ≤ 0.008 one-tailed), except for the second segment of rounds in SUB. Also, as
predicted, no significant change in the surplus compared to the baseline is observed for
any market participant for SPA (p ≥ 0.310). Furthermore, in line with the prediction and
as apparent from figure 4.9, the surplus of the buyers is shifted to the second period for
SUB and PRE through foregoing of period 1 surplus and increased surplus in period 2.
The corresponding changes compared to REF are all easily significant (p ≤ 0.013), while
for SPA no shift is detected (p ≥ 0.394).
Comparing experimental buyer surplus values to predicted ones, we find that the total
surplus in REF and SPA is compatible with the prediction (p ≥ 0.500), while it is signifi-
cantly lower for processes SUB and PRE (p ≤ 0.063). Accordingly, the failure of the latter
processes to increase buyer surplus stems mainly from a lower mean surplus in period 2,
where BS
2 ≤ 3120 is observed but BS2 ≥ 4594 predicted (p = 0.031). With both suppliers
and buyers behaving close to the rational prediction in period 2 (cf. section 4.6.1), the
low surplus is due to the frequency of sustained competition being close to two-thirds in
SUB and PRE rather than the predicted values of (close to) one. This in turn is caused
mainly by buyers not being as successful as predicted in sustaining competition in SUB
and at times failing to guarantee a sufficiently high quantity to the higher-priced supplier
in PRE (cf. section 4.6.3). Therefore, we can state an addition to the previous finding.
Finding 4.2. No change in the total surplus of buyers compared to the baseline process
is observed for any of the modified procurement processes. However, for subsidies and
pre-announced sourcing, surplus is shifted from the more to the less efficient supplier.
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4.7 Conclusion
This work analyzes the impact of different procurement processes on the future supplier
market structure in a situation where survival of suppliers is threatened and powerful
buyers source strategically. We implement a two period asymmetric cost Bertrand duopoly
in an experiment where supplier survival requires sufficient first period profits.
In the second period all procurement processes yield similar outcomes which are close
to the predicted solutions. Thus, in a non-strategic situation none of the modified processes
is observed to induce behavior different from that in the baseline procurement auction.
Accordingly, buyers benefit from sustaining competition while suppliers benefit from mo-
nopolizing the market. For the baseline process and when suppliers bid in split-award
auctions, we find supplier exclusion to be the predominant overall outcome. In line with
the subgame-perfect prediction, allowing subsidies to suppliers or announcing sourcing
before suppliers bid leads to competition among suppliers being sustained significantly
more often. Across procurement processes, buyer sourcing decisions are relatively close
to rational behavior, although buyers do not always succeed in sustaining competition
when this is possible. The differences in overall outcomes are thus primarily the result of
suppliers acting differently aggressive dependent on the procurement process and also of
the feasibility of exclusion varying between processes. Thereby, the less efficient supplier
often prices more aggressively than optimal, enabling exclusion.
We therefore find that changes in the procurement process which do not yield dis-
cernible differences in a non-strategic setting can have a profound impact on the behav-
ior of suppliers in a strategic situation. The procurement process thus plays a major
role in determining the future structure of the supplier market. These results there-
fore hold notable implications for both firms in supplier-buyer relationships as well as
antitrust policy.
For powerful buyers our findings highlight the option to strategically employ sourcing
not only through specific purchasing decisions but also by implementing different procure-
ment formats. The predicted importance of this decision with respect to the supplier mar-
ket structure is demonstrated to hold also in an experiment. When supplier competition
in the future is to be sustained, being willing to pay subsidies to suppliers or committing
to multiple sourcing by guaranteeing a fraction of the overall contract to each bidder can
increase the probability that both suppliers remain active. However, the findings also show
that some caution is due as an increase in the frequency of sustained competition is often
accompanied by a loss in current surplus through less aggressive pricing.
The frequent failure of the less efficient supplier to price passively enough and thereby
allow buyers to sustain him highlights that the willingness of buyers to sustain competition
has to be considered when bidding for a contract. A passive approach can thus at times
be rational, enticing buyers to split contracts. On the other hand superior suppliers might
adjust bidding behavior to take account of the fact that under specific procurement formats
buyers are aiming to sustain competition.
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In the realm of antitrust policy, the experiment offers additional insight into the in-
terplay between suppliers aiming to exclude rivals and buyers addressing the foreclosure
risk through strategic purchases. Results highlight that the format under which this in-
terplay takes place as defined by the procurement process, is of high importance for the
outcome. This in turn implies that powerful buyers possess an important tool of counter-
vailing power in the form of the choice of the procurement process, influencing whether
vertical restraints can be successfully implemented by suppliers or not. On the other hand,
the experiment highlights that depending on the procurement process, a supplier might
well succeed in predatorily establishing single branding without offering compensation to
buyers and without pricing below his own cost.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
A) Let p11 6= p12 and p1i > p1−i. With Q1i + Q1−i = D, the surplus of the buyer is
BS = Q1i
(
V − p1i
)
+
(
D −Q1i
) (
V − p1−i
)
+ BS2. Thereby BS2 = δ D (V − c2) if
competition is sustained and BS2 = 0 otherwise. As ∂Q1i
BS < 0 regardless of BS2, the
surplus is maximized for the minimum Q1i compatible with the respective constraints.
Sustaining competition requires pi1i ≥ pi, and therefore the minimum quantity to be
purchased at supplier i is uniquely determined as Q
i
= pi/
(
p1i − ci
)
. This also
uniquely determines Q1−i = D −Qi. Then, competition is sustained if Qi ≤ D and(
D − Q
i
) (
p1−i − c−i
) ≥ pi. Solving for p1−i and using that p1−i < p1i ≤ V , we
find that sustaining competition is possible if and only if Pi(p
1
i ) ≤ p1−i < p1i and
µi < p
1
i ≤ V . Not sustaining competition is always possible and therefore uniquely
Q1i = 0. Comparing the surplus in both cases we find that sustaining competition is
superior for Ri(p
1
i ) ≤ p1−i, where we used assumption 3.
Hence, the buyer sustains competition only if p1−i ∈
[
max
{
Pi(p
1
i ), Ri(p
1
i )
}
, p1i
)
. The
lower bound of prices p1i is the minimum p
1
i for which a price p
1
−i exists which sustains
competition. With Pi continuous as well as ∂p1i
Pi(p
1
i ) < 0 for the relevant p
1
i and
Ri(p
1
i ) < p
1
i for all p
1
i when p
1
i > µi as required above, the lower bound of p
1
i follows
from Pi(p
1
i ) = p
1
i as p
1
i > η. The negative solution of the quadratic equation is
discarded as it is lower than µi. Due to the symmetry, explicit indices are entered
in η and we find η > µi. Thus p
1
i ∈ (η, V ] has to hold, thereby yielding SiU.
Making indices explicit and generalizing S = S1U∪S2U, the buyer sustains competition
and thus implements a strategic sourcing equilibrium if and only if (p11, p
1
2) ∈ SU.
Then,
(
Q1S1 , Q
1S
2
)
is the unique equilibrium. For all other prices, competition is
not sustained and the buyer purchases
(
Q1M1 , Q
1M
2
)
in the unique myopic sourcing
equilibrium.
B) Now let p11 = p
1
2. With BS = D
(
V − p12
)
+ BS2, the surplus from different quantity
allocations differs only by the surplus from period 2. As BS2D > BS2M = BS2No = 0,
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the buyer sustains competition whenever this is possible. Apart from this she is
indifferent between all demand allocations.
The logic from A) yields that sustaining competition requires both Q12
(
p12 − c2
) ≥ pi
and
(
D −Q12
) (
p12 − c1
) ≥ pi, which in turn simplifies to p12 ≥ η, using that η > µ2.
Hence, a strategic sourcing equilibrium is implemented if and only if p12 ∈ [η, V ].
Then
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
=
(
D − Q
2
, Q
2
)
is a strategic sourcing equilibrium, as it keeps
both suppliers active. For lower equal prices, competition cannot be sustained and(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
= (D, 0) is a myopic sourcing equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
For prices p1i ≥ p1−i to lead to sustained competition, they have to be in S. This requires
p1i ∈ [η, V ], which is non-empty by assumption 4 and thus η ≤ V . We first observe that
with assumption 1, both Pi(p
1
i ) and Ri(p
1
i ) are continuous and ∂p1i
Pi(p
1
i ) < 0 as well as
∂p1i
Ri(p
1
i ) < 0 everywhere in p
1
i ∈ [η, V ].
For every p1−i ∈
[
p−i, V
)
there exists a p1i such that competition is sustained. p
1
i = V
always implements this, as then
(
p1−i, V
) ∈ SiU. Also for p1−i = V , by proposition 1 the
price combination (V, V ) ∈ SE. Conversely, for p1−i ∈
[
c−i, p−i
)
there exists no p1i > p
1
−i
such that competition is sustained: We have p1−i < max {Pi(V ), Ri(V )} and due to Pi and
Ri falling in p
1
i , also p
1
−i < max
{
Pi(p
1
i ), Ri(p
1
i )
}
for all p1i ∈ [η, V ]. Thus there exists no
p1i which can yield a (p
1
−i, p
1
i ) ∈ SiU. With η ≥ p−i as shown below, also p1i = p1−i does not
yield (p1−i, p
1
−i) ∈ SE.
With Pi strictly falling in p
1
i and Pi(η) = η from the proof of proposition 1 we
have η = Pi(η) ≥ Pi(V ). Furthermore, Ri(p1i ) < p1i and thus with Ri also strictly
falling, η > Ri(η) ≥ Ri(V ). Therefore, η ≥ p−i follows directly. Next, we rewrite
Pi(V ) = c−i + pi/ [D − pi/ (V − ci)]. Since D (V − c1) > D (V − c2) ≥ δ D (V − c2) > pi
by assumption 1, the denominator is larger than zero but smaller than D and hence
Pi(V ) > c−i + pi/D = µ−i, which shows that also p−i > µ−i.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
First, we assume that R2(V ) binds in p1 = max {P2(V ), R2(V )}. From the proof of
lemma 2 we know that R2 is continuous and ∂p12 R2(p
1
2) < 0. As R2(c2) = c2 we have
with c2 < V that R2(V ) < R2(c2) = c2 always. Now, we assume P2(V ) binds. Then,
simple algebra yields that P2(V ) > c2 if and only if c1 > c1 for (c1, c2) ∈ CH. Conversely,
P2(V ) ≤ c2 if and only if c1 ≤ c1 for (c1, c2) ∈ CL.
When P2(V ) ≤ c2, then with R2(V ) < c2 always p1 ≤ c2 follows. Accordingly, for
P2(V ) > c2, we have p1 = P2(V ) and thus also p1 > c2. Now, we find p1 > µ2 if and
only if c1 > c1 + pi/D for (c1, c2) ∈ CH2. It follows then that c2 < p1 ≤ µ2 if and only if
(c1, c2) ∈ CH1 = CH \ CH2.
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The profit of supplier i is specified in A) for a price p1−i of the other supplier. The range
of prices p1−i is then in B) divided into intervals according to the possible responses. In C)
the best response of supplier i = 1 is calculated.
A) The profit pii(p
1
i ) depends on the relative size of prices and the ensuing market
structure in period 2.
UE) Underbidding and Exclusion. Setting p1i,UE < p
1
−i such that no strategic sourcing
follows excludes supplier −i and yields
pii,UE = D
(
p1i,UE − ci
)
+
{
pi2Mi for µi ≤ p1i,UE ≤ V
0 for p1i,UE < µi
.
UD) Underbidding and Duopoly. Supplier i posts p1i,UD < p
1
−i such that strategic
sourcing sustains competition. The profit is then pii,UD =
(
D−Q−i
)(
p1i,UD−ci
)
+pi2Di .
MA) Match. If supplier i sets p1i,MA = p
1
−i, for supplier i = 1 this entails a profit of
pi1,MA=

(
D −Q
2
)(
p11,MA − c1
)
+ pi2D1 for η ≤ p11,MA ≤ V
D
(
p11,MA−c1
)
+ pi2M1 for µ1 ≤ p11,MA < η
D
(
p11,MA−c1
)
for p11,MA < µ1
,
while the profit for supplier i = 2 is
pi2,MA =
{
pi for η ≤ p12,MA ≤ V
0 for p12,MA < η
.
OD) Overbidding and Duopoly. Supplier i posts p1i,OD in excess of p
1
−i such that
strategic sourcing sustains both suppliers. The profit is then pii,OD = pi + pi
2D
i .
OE) Overbidding and Exit. When supplier i sets p1i,OE > p
1
−i such that no strategic
sourcing follows, he will be excluded from the market and the profit is pii,OE = 0.
With ∂p1i,UE
pii,UE > 0 and ∂p1i,UD
pii,UD > 0, the respective maximum prices compati-
ble with UE and UD dominate all other p1i < p
1
−i with the same outcome. pii,OD and
pii,OE are independent of p
1
i , so supplier i is indifferent between all relevant prices.
B) We define a =
[
c−i , p−i
)
, b =
[
p−i , η
]
and c = ( η , V ], which divide the prices of
supplier −i into intervals according to the relevant profit functions of A). Supplier i
can always set p1i > p
1
−i such that he has to exit (OE). Matching the price (MA)
is possible as long as p1−i ≥ ci since p1i ∈ [ci, V ]. Similarly, excluding the other
supplier (UE) is feasible for all prices p1−i > ci. Setting a higher price which sustains
a duopoly (OD) is possible for p1−i ∈ b ∪ c and p1−i < V by lemma 2. Accordingly,
underbidding such that a duopoly arises is possible only for p1−i ∈ c as this is just
the condition from S−iU .
96
C) The best response p11,r of supplier i = 1 is now deducted for each of the intervals of
prices p12. With p
1
2 ≥ c2 > c1, MA is feasible for all p12. Then, matching the price
always yields pi1 > 0 and thus OE is strictly dominated.
C).a For p12 ∈
[
c2, p2
)
, the profit from underbidding (UE) is maximized by p11,UE,a = p
1
2−.
This leads to a lower pi1 than matching the price as long as p
1
1 < η, which always
holds in a.
C).b As above, p11,UE,b = p
1
2 −  for p12 ∈ b and thus for p12 < η, matching again dominates
underbidding to exclude supplier 2. It is also superior to overbidding for a duopoly
to arise, as with p12 ≥ p2 > µ2 > µ1, both first and second period profit is higher for
matching.
For p12 = η, pi1,MA = pi1,OD = pi + pi
2D
1 . Then, the profit-maximizing price to
underbid and exclude supplier 2 (UE) is p11,UE,b = max{P2(η), R2(η)} −  = η − 
as P (η) = η and R(η) < η from the proof of proposition 1. Then, in period 2,
pi21,UE,b = δ D (V − c1) > δD (V − c2) > pi = pi11,MA by assumption 1. Furthermore,
pi11,UE,b = D (η − − c1) > δD (c2 − c1) = pi2D1 = pi21,MA as δ ≤ 1 and η > µ2 > c2.
C).c For p12 ∈ c, profits from underbidding for a duopoly are lower than those from match-
ing due to marginal underbidding by , pi1,MA > pi1,UD. While also pi
2
1,OD,c = pi
2
1,MA,c,
as p12 > η first period profits when matching exceed pi
1
1,OD,c = pi. Maximizing the
profit from excluding supplier 2 now requires p11,UE,c = max
{
P2(p
1
2), R2(p
1
2)
}− .
Then, pi1,UE,c may or may not be higher than pi1,MA,c. The only case where the
equilibrium outcome is influenced is treated explicitly in lemma 6.
Consolidating the results, we find that for p12 ∈ [c2, η ) matching is the best response,
p1,r(p
1
2) = p
1
2, while for p
1
2 ∈ [η, V ] it is optimal to either match the price or underbid
drastically, p11,r(p
1
2) = argmaxp11 ∈{p12 , max{P2(p12),R2(p12)}−} pi1(p
1
1). Therefore, we always
have p11,r(p
1
2) ≤ p12.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
We use parts A) and B) of the proof of lemma 4 and introduce an additional lemma.
Lemma A.5.1. The set of price combinations SiU can be equivalently expressed as
SiU =
{(
p11, p
1
2
) | p1i ∈ [max{P−1i (p1−i), R−1i (p1−i)} , V ] , p1−i ∈ [p−i, η)} ∪{(
p11, p
1
2
) | p1i ∈ (p1−i, V ] , p1−i ∈ [η, V )} .
Proof of lemma A.5.1. By assumption we have p1−i < p
1
i ≤ V . From lemma 2, the
lowest price p1−i in SiU for which competition is sustained is p−i and thus p1−i ∈
[
p−i , V
)
.
The conditions on prices in SiU are solved for p1i . Assuming that Pi binds, we obtain
p1i ≥ P−1i (p1−i) by using p1−i ≥ p−i > µ−i (cf. lemma 2) and p1i > η > µi by proposition 1.
Now, if Ri binds, we obtain with δ D (V − c2) > pi by assumption 1 that p1i ≥ R−1i (p1−i).
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P−1i is continuous and with ∂p1−i P
−1
i (p
1
−i) < 0 falling for p
1
−i ≥ p−i > µ−i. Further-
more, we acquire P−1i (η) = η. With assumption 1, Ri is continuous and ∂p1−i R
−1
i (p
1
−i) < 0
as well as R−1i (ci) = ci. Also, p
1
i > p
1
−i and the intervals in SiU explicitly state that p1i > η
and p1i ≤ V .
First, for p1−i ∈
[
p−i, η
)
, it follows that P−1i (p
1
−i) > η > p
1
−i. If this holds for P
−1
i ,
it holds for max
{
P−1i , R
−1
i
}
as well. Thus, the interval of prices p1i is bounded below
by p1i ≥ max
{
P−1i , R
−1
i
}
. Now, we let p1−i ∈ [η, V ). With P−1i falling and P−1i (η) = η
it follows that P−1i (p
1
−i) ≤ p1−i. Accordingly, with Ri falling, R−1i (ci) = ci and using
η > µi > ci, we have R
−1
i (p
1
−i) < p
1
−i. Hence, p
1
i > p
1
−i ≥ η is the lower bound. For both
ranges, the upper bound is p1i ≤ V .
C) The best response p12,r of supplier i = 2 is calculated for each interval of prices p
1
1.
C).a For p11 ∈
[
c1, p1
)
in the case of (c1, c2) ∈ CL and p11 ∈ [c1, c2) in the case of (c1, c2) ∈ CH
it is only feasible to overbid and exit, p12,r ∈ [c2, V ]. For (c1, c2) ∈ CH, when p11 = c2
then matching yields the same profit, pi2,MA,i = pi2,OE,i = 0. With p1 ≤ η by lemma 2,
for p11 ∈
(
c2, p1
)
in cases (c1, c2) ∈ CH, the profit from underbidding to gain exclu-
sivity is maximized for p12,UE,a = p
1
1 − . Then, pi2,UE,a > pi2,MA,a = pi2,OE,a = 0 as
the first period profit is always higher than zero1.
C).b For p11 ∈
[
p
1
, η
]
maximizing the profit from underbidding and excluding supplier 1
yields a price p12,UE,b = p
1
1−, while overbidding for a duopoly corresponds to setting
p12,OD,b ∈
[
max{P−12 (p11), R−12 (p11) } , V
]
for p11 < η.
If (c1, c2) ∈ CL, then for p1 ∈
[
p
1
, c2
]
, it is optimal to overbid and be sustained in a
duopoly as then pi2,OD,b = pi > 0, while pi2,OE,b = 0 and pi2,MA,b = 0 for p
1
1 = c2. The
same holds for p11 ∈ (c2, µ2] for costs in CL and p11 ∈
[
p
1
, µ2
]
for costs in CH1, as then
pi2,UE,b = D
(
p11 − − c2
)
< pi = pi2,OD,b, where p
1
1 = µ2 is included due to marginal
underbidding and again pi2,OE,b = pi2,MA,b = 0. For (c1, c2) ∈ CH2 this interval is
empty as p
1
> µ2.
For (c1, c2) ∈ CL∪CH1 in the interval p11 ∈ (µ2, η) and for (c1, c2) ∈ CH2 in the interval
p11 ∈
(
p
1
, η
)
, the second period profit from underbidding pi22,UE,b = δD (V − c2) is
by assumption 1 alone greater than the overall profit from OD, pi2,OD,b = pi and
therefore also than the zero profits from matching or from overbidding and exiting.
The same holds for p11 = η except that now also pi2,MA,b(η) = pi.
C).c The profit from underbidding to exclude the other supplier for p11 ∈ ( η , V ] is max-
imized by p12,UE,c = max{P1(p11), R1(p11)} − , while p12,UD,c = p11 −  follows in the
case of underbidding for a duopoly.
Again, underbidding and excluding supplier 1 dominates all prices p12 ≥ p11, as
pi22,UE,c = δ D(V − c2) > pi = pi2,MA,c = pi2,OD,c and is also larger than pi2,OE,c = 0.
1Treating  strictly as the smallest unit of a discrete price space, the best response to p11 = c2 +  is
indifference between all prices. Due to our interpretation of , underbidding is always superior.
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The relative size of profits from UE and UD depends on the exact parameters and
is not explicitly calculated.
We thus have p2,r(p
1
1) ≥ p11 in two cases. The best response is p12,r ∈ [c2, V ] for p11 ∈
[
c1, p1
]
when (c1, c2) ∈ CL and for p11 ∈ [c1, c2] when (c1, c2) ∈ CH. Furthermore, we find that
p12,r ∈
[
max{P−12 (p11), R−12 (p11)}, V
]
holds for p11 ∈
[
p
1
, µ2
]
when (c1, c2) ∈ CL and for
p11 ∈
[
p
1
, µ2
]
when (c1, c2) ∈ CH1. Otherwise p12,r(p11) < p11.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 6
From lemma 4 the best response of supplier 1 to p12 = V is either matching the price
p11,MA = V or underbidding drastically p
1
1,UE = max {P2(V ), R2(V )} − . Straightfor-
ward algebra yields that P2(V ) and R2(V ) are equal for c1 = c˜1. With ∂c1 P2(V ) = 1
and ∂c1 R2(V ) = 0 we obtain that P2(V ) ≥ R2(V ) for c1 ≥ c˜1, while accordingly
P2(V ) ≤ R2(V ) for c1 ≤ c˜1. We first assume that P2(V ) binds in p11,UE, i.e., that c1 ≥ c˜1.
Then, by equating the profits and using the functional dependence on c1, we find that
pi1,UE,c (V ) ≥ pi1,MA,c (V ) if c1 > cP1 holds. The strict condition on c1 stems from marginal
underbidding when excluding supplier 1. For cases c1 ≤ cP1 , matching the price is supe-
rior. Now, we assume that R2(V ) binds (c1 ≤ c˜1). By again equating profits and using
the derivatives with respect to c1, we find that pi1,UE,c (V ) ≥ pi1,MA,c (V ) holds for c1 < cR1 ,
with strictness following from  > 0. For higher c1, matching is superior.
With (c1, c2) ∈ CL by assumption, setting p11,r(V ) = p1 −  is thus a best response if
and only if c1 ≤ c˜1 and c1 < cR1 or c1 ≥ c˜1 and c1 > cP1 , i.e., if and only if (c1, c2) ∈ CL2.
For all other (c1, c2) ∈ CL1 = CL \ CL2 matching is strictly preferred.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 2
A) First (c1, c2) ∈ CL2. By lemma 6, p11,r(V ) = p1−  is then a best response to p1∗2 = V .
Meanwhile, for p1∗1 = p1 − , the best response of supplier 2 is p12,r(p1 − ) ∈ [c2, V ]
according to lemma 5. This interval includes V and hence
(
p1∗1 , p1∗2
)
=
(
p
1
, V
)
is an
equilibrium.
To prove uniqueness, we show that no other price p˜12 6= V can be part of an equi-
librium, i.e., fulfills p˜12 ∈ p12,r
(
p11,r(p˜
1
2)
)
. For prices p˜12 ∈ [c2, V ) the best response of
supplier 1 is to underbid or match the price according to lemma 4, p11,r(p˜
1
2) ≤ p˜12.
Clearly then, p11,r < V holds. Also, p
1
1,r ≥ p1 as p1 ≤ c2 for (c1, c2) ∈ CL and
p
1
< max
{
P2(p˜
1
2), R2(p˜
1
2)
}−  for p˜12 < V by lemma 2. Therefore, p11,r ∈ [p1, V ).
Now if p11,r ∈
[
p
1
, µ2
]
, then supplier 2 sets a price p12,r ≥ max
{
P−12 (p
1
1,r), R
−1
2 (p
1
1,r)
}
by lemma 5. From the proof of lemma A.5.1 we know P−12 (p
1
1,r) > η if p
1
1,r < η which
is fulfilled here. Thus, p12,r > η. This can only yield an equilibrium if also the original
price p˜12 > η. When supplier 1 responded by matching p
1
1,r = p˜
1
2, this cannot be the
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case as then p11,r > η which is not in the interval of interest. Hence, if p˜
1
2 is part of an
equilibrium, then p11,r = max
{
P2(p˜
1
2), R2(p˜
1
2)
}−. However, this price was chosen in
the proof of lemma 4 such that no strategic sourcing equilibrium exists for
(
p11,r, p˜
1
2
)
.
Hence, with p11,r ∈
[
p
1
, µ2
]
and lemma A.5.1 then p˜12 < max
{
P−12 (p
1
1,r), R
−1
2 (p
1
1,r)
}
.
Above we found p12,r ≥ max
{
P−12 (p
1
1,r), R
−1
2 (p
1
1,r)
}
and therefore p˜12 < p
1
2,r.
If however p11,r ∈ (µ2, V ) then by lemma 5, supplier 2 underbids, p12,r < p11,r. With
p11,r ≤ p˜12, it follows that p12,r < p˜12. Hence, no p˜12 6= V can be part of an equilibrium.
From lemmas 4 and 6 we know that for p˜12 = V either p
1
1,r = p1 −  or p11,r = V . In
the latter case p12,r(p
1
1,r) < V = p˜
1
2. Thus,
(
p1∗1 , p1∗2
)
is the only equilibrium.
B) We let (c1, c2) ∈ CH. The best response of supplier 1 to p1∗2 = c2 is by the proof of
lemma 4, p11,r(c2) = c2 = p
1∗
1 . Accordingly, with lemma 5, for p
1∗
1 = c2, supplier 2
is indifferent between prices p12,r ∈ [c2, V ], which includes p1∗2 = c2 and thus(
p1∗1 , p1∗2
)
= (c2, c2) is an equilibrium.
To show that no other equilibria exist we proceed as in A) by showing that no other
price p˜12 > c2 exists with p˜
1
2 ∈ p12,r
(
p11,r(p˜
1
2)
)
. By lemma 4, for prices p˜12 ∈ (c2, V ]
supplier 1 always underbids or matches the price, p11,r(p˜
1
2) ≤ p˜12. Therefore, p11,r ≤ V
holds. Also, p11,r > c2 follows from matching and p
1
1,r ≥ p1− > c2 from underbidding
for exclusivity by lemma 3.
For p11,r ∈ (c2, V ] in the case of (c1, c2) ∈ CH2 and p11,r ∈
(
c2, p1
) ∪ (µ2, V ] in the case
of (c1, c2) ∈ CH1, supplier 2 responds by underbidding further, p12,r < p11,r according
to lemma 5 and thus p12,r < p˜
1
2.
If for costs CH1, p11,r ∈
[
p
1
, µ2
]
, then supplier 2 sets p12,r ≥ max
{
P−12 (p
1
1,r), R
−1
2 (p
1
1,r)
}
.
By the same arguments as for the corresponding interval in A) we find p12,r > p˜
1
2.
Thus, no p˜12 > c2 can be part of an equilibrium and with p
1∗
1 = p
1
1,r(c2) uniquely
determined,
(
p1∗1 , p1∗2
)
is the only equilibrium2.
C) Now we let (c1, c2) ∈ CL1. Then, no p˜12 6= V can be part of an equilibrium due
to the identical logic as in A). Also, p˜12 = V is not part of an equilibrium as with
lemmas 4 and 6, p11,r(V ) = V always, while p
1
2,r(p
1
1,r) < p˜
1
2 from lemma 5. Hence, no
equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
For all equilibrium prices of (c1, c2) ∈ CL2 ∪ CH, the buyer does not sustain competition
by proposition 1 and purchases myopically from supplier 1 only,
(
Q1∗1 , Q1∗2
)
= (D, 0). For
(c1, c2) ∈ CL2, we observe that with p1∗1 = p1 −  and p1 > µ1 by lemma 2, the profit of
supplier 1 always exceeds pi and he enjoys a monopoly in period 2. When (c1, c2) ∈ CH,
for supplier 1 to attain the profit threshold, p1∗1 = c2 > µ1 has to hold. Then a monopoly
follows, while otherwise both suppliers exit.
2Treating  as the smallest unit of a discrete price grid, another equilibrium
(
p1∗1 , p
1∗
2
)
= (c2 + , c2 + )
exists, which however for  → 0 becomes identical to (p1∗1 , p1∗2 ) = (c2, c2). Also, if p1 = c2 + 2 and
p11,r(V ) = p1− , then
(
p1∗1 , p
1∗
2
)
= (c2 + , V ) is an additional equilibrium. Similarly, when p
1
= c2 +  and
p11,r(V ) = p1 − , then also
(
p1∗1 , p
1∗
2
)
= (c2, V ) is an equilibrium, while (c2 + , c2 + ) is no longer one.
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A.8 Proof of Proposition 3
A) We let p11 6= p12 and p1i > p1−i. If a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists for n = 1,
then by proposition 1, the demand allocation is uniquely determined as Q1i = Qi
and Q1−i = D −Qi. For n ≥ 2, q1i,j = Qi/n and q1−i,j = d −Qi/n is then always an
equilibrium, as no profitable deviation to q˜1i,j 6= q1i,j with q˜1−i,j = d− q˜1i,j exists for any
buyer j. Deviating to q˜1i,j > q
1
i,j decreases period 1 surplus without increasing surplus
in period 2, BS2j = δ d (V − c2). Deviating to q˜1i,j < q1i,j decreases period 2 surplus to
zero as pi1i < pi, while increasing surplus in period 1 by
(
q1i,j− q˜1i,j
) (
p1i − p1−i
)
. Solving
for p1−i, no such deviation is profitable if and only if p
1
−i ≥ Ri(p1i ), which is fulfilled as
by assumption prices are in SiU. Thus, when a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists
for n = 1, a strategic sourcing equilibrium also exists for n ≥ 2.
Now, we let q1i,j for all j with q
1
−i,j = d− q1i,j define a strategic sourcing equilibrium
for n ≥ 2. Then competition is sustained by definition, i.e., ∑j q1i,j (p1i − ci) ≥ pi
and
∑
j q
1
−i,j
(
p1−i − c−i
) ≥ pi. Solving these relations for p1−i, we obtain that if a
strategic sourcing equilibrium exists, then p1−i ≥ Pi(p1i ) holds. Furthermore, as q1i,j
defines a strategic sourcing equilibrium, no profitable deviations exist and thus also
q˜1i,j = 0 is not profitable. Hence, the additional surplus in period 2 is at least as high
as the foregone surplus in period 1, q1i,j
(
p1i − p1−i
) ≤ δ d (V − c2). Summing these
conditions over all j and solving again for p1−i we obtain p
1
−i ≥ p1i −δD (V − c2) /Q1i .
With Q1i
(
p1i − ci
) ≥ pi, we then have p1−i ≥ Ri(p1i ). Comparing these conditions to
SiU we find that when a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists for n ≥ 2, prices always
lie in SiU. Then, by proposition 1 a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists also for a
single buyer. Combined we have that for p11 6= p12 a strategic sourcing equilibrium
exists for n ≥ 2 if and only if one exists for n = 1.
We now show that for p11 6= p12 and n ≥ 2, the aggregate demand allocation is
uniquely determined as
(
Q1S1 , Q
1S
2
)
. Q1i > Qi cannot follow from a strategic sourcing
equilibrium as there exists a buyer s which can deviate profitably to q˜1i,s < q
1
i,s,
thereby increasing her surplus in period 1 by
(
q1i,s−q˜1i,s
) (
p1i − p1−i
)
without decreasing
surplus from period 2, as q˜1i,s can be chosen such that pi
1
i ≥ pi still holds. Meanwhile,
forQ1i < Qi, supplier i exits and the demand allocation cannot be a strategic sourcing
equilibrium by definition.
If for equal prices p11 = p
1
2 a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists for n = 1, then by
proposition 1,
(
D − Q
2
, Q
2
)
is an equilibrium. This allows to always construct
a strategic sourcing equilibrium for n ≥ 2 buyers by setting q12,j = Q2/n with
q11,j = d − q12,j . No profitable deviation is possible as period 1 surplus is constant
and period 2 surplus cannot increase further. Thus also for n ≥ 2 there exists an
equilibrium which yields the aggregate demand allocation
(
D −Q
2
, Q
2
)
.
If conversely, for equal prices q1i,j is a strategic sourcing equilibrium for n ≥ 2, then
Q1i =
∑
j q
1
i,j defines a strategic sourcing equilibrium for a single buyer. Competition
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is sustained and therefore surplus cannot increase further due to the equal prices in
period 1. Thus, also for p11 = p
1
2, a strategic sourcing equilibrium for n ≥ 2 buyers
exists if and only if one exists for a single buyer.
B) We let p11 6= p12 and p1i > p1−i. By definition in a myopic sourcing equilibrium
competition is not sustained and therefore BS2j = 0. Thus if a myopic sourcing
equilibrium exists, then q1i,j = 0 and q
1
−i,j = d is the unique equilibrium demand
allocation. In aggregate then (Q1, Q2) =
(
Q1M1 , Q
1M
2
)
. Any other demand allocation
entails q˜1i,s > 0 for at least one buyer s. This cannot be a myopic sourcing equilibrium
as by definition BS2j = 0 and buyer s could deviate profitably by reducing q˜
1
i,s.
Now, this demand allocation is an equilibrium if and only if no profitable deviation
exists. As just discussed, any profitable deviation of supplier s has to sustain compe-
tition and therefore q˜1i,s ≥ pi/
(
p1i − ci
)
. This quantity must not exceed the demand
of a single buyer d, which is the case if and only if p1i ≥ µdi . Simultaneously, the
remaining quantity has to sustain the other supplier, i.e.,
(
nd− q˜1i,s
) (
p1−i − c−i
) ≥ pi.
Solving this for p1−i requires p
1
−i ≥ Pi(p1i ). In addition, buyer s deviates only if this
is profitable, i.e., if q˜1i,s
(
p1i − p1−i
) ≤ δd (V − c2) with the inequality following from
assumption 3. Rewritten, this requires p1−i ≥ ri(p1i ).
From p1−i ≥ Pi(p1i ), p1−i ≥ ri(p1i ) and p1i ≥ µdi , the lower bound on prices p1i for
which a deviation is possible is the lowest p1i for which max
{
Pi(p
1
i ), ri(p
1
i
}
< p1i and
µdi ≤ p1i . We find that ri(p1i ) < p1i always for p1i ≥ µdi . From the proof of proposition 1
we have ∂p1i
Pi < 0 and Pi(η) = η. Thus, p
1
i > η and p
1
i ≥ µdi have to hold.
Therefore, a profitable deviation from the unique myopic sourcing equilibrium exists
for unequal prices if and only if prices lie in MC,iU . Conversely, a unique myopic
sourcing equilibrium with
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
=
(
Q1M1 , Q
1M
2
)
exists for unequal prices p11 6= p12
if and only
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈MU = PU \MCU with MCU =MC,1U ∪MC,2U .
For equal prices p11 = p
1
2, period 1 surplus is always identical. Therefore all demand
allocations which do not sustain competition and which do not allow a single buyer s
to sustain competition by deviating are myopic sourcing equilibria. To deduct the
maximum price p12 for which a myopic sourcing equilibrium exists, we focus on the
demand allocation which requires a maximum deviation q˜1i,s to sustain competition.
This implies q1i,j = 0, as then sustaining competition requires q˜
1
i,s ≥ Qi. As µd2 > µd1
this is the case for i = 2. Therefore p12 is maximized for
(
q11,j , q
1
2,j
)
= (d, 0), which is
then a myopic sourcing equilibrium yielding
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
= (D, 0).
A profitable deviation is possible if and only if q˜12,s ≥ pi/
(
p12 − c2
)
is not higher than d.
The other buyers then sustain supplier 1 as c2 > c1. Accordingly, no deviation exists
for p12 < µ
d
2 . Since µ
d
2 > η, for equal prices a myopic sourcing equilibrium exists if
and only if
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈ME. Combining results, a myopic sourcing equilibrium exists
if and only if
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈M =MU ∪ME.
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A.9 Proof of Corollary 1
In the proof of proposition 3 we showed that for all
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈ S, a symmetric equilibrium
for n ≥ 2 buyers can be constructed from the strategic sourcing equilibrium of a single
buyer by setting
(
q11,j , q
1
2,j
)
=
(
Q11/n,Q
1
2/n
)
for all j.
For prices
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈ S and p1i > p1−i, proposition 3 assures that strategic sourcing equi-
libria exist and the aggregate demand allocation is uniquely Q1i = Qi and Q
1
−i = D −Qi.
Then, the non-symmetric demand allocations defined by q1i,s ∈
[
Q
i
/n,Q
i
/n + ξ
]
and
q1i,j 6=s =
(
Q
i
− q1i,s
)
/ (n− 1) are strategic sourcing equilibria if and only if buyer s cannot
profitably deviate. With
∑
j q
1
i,j = Qi, both suppliers are always sustained. Also, if buyer s
cannot profitably deviate, then with q1i,s ≥ q1i,j 6=s this holds for all buyers. A deviation to
q˜1i,s can only be profitable if it increases period 1 surplus by more than it decreases surplus
in period 2 due to the loss of sustained competition,
(
q1i,s − q˜1i,s
) (
p1i − p1−i
)
> δ d (V − c2)
with assumption 3. Then, using the upper bound of the interval of q1i,s values we find that
no deviation exists for ξ ≤ δ d (V − c2) /
(
p1i − p1−i
)− pi/ [n (p1i − ci)].
For p1−i = Ri(p
1
i ) we obtain ξ = 0. Then, only the symmetric equilibrium with
q1i,j = Qi/n for all j exists. This holds in general as follows from using p
1
−i = Ri(p
1
i ) in the
condition for the existence of a profitable deviation. Thus, no non-symmetric strategic
sourcing equilibria exist for
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈ RU. For p1−i > Ri(p1i ) however, we find ξ > 0 as the
first term increases while the second term is unchanged. Therefore, q1i,s ∈
(
Q
i
/n,Q
i
/n+ξ
]
is non-empty and thus for
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈ SU \ RU there exist infinitely many non-symmetric
strategic sourcing equilibria.
For p11 = p
1
2 in S the demand allocations defined by q12,s ∈
[
Q
2
/n,Q
2
/n + ξ′
]
and
q12,j 6=s =
(
Q
2
− q12,s
)
/ (n− 1) are strategic sourcing equilibria. As they yield the aggregate
demand allocation of proposition 3,
(
Q11, Q
1
2
)
=
([
D − Q
2
]
/n,Q
2
/n
)
, survival of both
suppliers is assured. Hence, no buyer can profitably deviate as period 1 surplus is identical
for all demand allocations. As Q
2
/n < d since Q11 = nd − Q2 > 0 for competition to be
sustained, ξ′ > 0 can always be chosen such that the interval q12,s ∈
(
Q
2
/n,Q
2
/n + ξ′
]
is
non-empty. Then, infinitely many non-symmetric strategic sourcing equilibria exist also
for
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈ SE.
A.10 Proof of Corollary 2
For p11 = p
1
2 we know from proposition 3 that for n ≥ 2 buyers there exist strategic
sourcing equilibria if and only if
(
p12, p
1
2
) ∈ SE and myopic sourcing equilibria if and only
if
(
p12, p
1
2
) ∈ ME. This requires p12 ≥ η and p12 < µd2 respectively. Thus, both equilibrium
types exist at least for p12 ∈
[
η, µd2
)
since µd2 > η from the the proof of proposition 3.
Let first p11 = p
1
2 such that both equilibrium types exist. Then buyer surplus in period 1
is identical in both cases for all buyers, BS1j = d
(
V − p12
)
. However, surplus in period 2 is
higher when competition is sustained with BS2Dj > 0. Thus strategic sourcing equilibria
yield a higher surplus for all buyers j and are thus pareto-superior for buyers.
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For p11 6= p12 meanwhile with p1i > p1−i such that both equilibrium types exist, from
proposition 3 the myopic sourcing surplus is for all buyers j equal to BSj = d
(
V − p1−i
)
.
The lowest surplus in a strategic sourcing equilibrium is realized by buyer s with
q1i,s = maxj q
1
i,j . Then BSs = q
1
i,s
(
V − p1i
)
+
(
d−q1i,s
) (
V − p1−i
)
+δ d (V − c2). Comparing
surplus values, the surplus in the strategic sourcing equilibrium is at least as high as in
the myopic one if and only if p1−i ≥ p1i − δ d (V − c2) /q1i,s. By the proof of proposition 3, if
a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists for a price combination, this condition is fulfilled.
Now, if this holds for buyer s, it clearly holds for all other buyers, since BSj 6=s > BSs
in a strategic sourcing equilibrium. Accordingly, strategic sourcing equilibria are weakly
pareto-superior for buyers.
Also from proposition 3, a profitable deviation from myopic sourcing exists in the
case of unequal prices if and only if p1i ≥ µdi and p1i > η. Meanwhile, the maximum p1i
which yields a strategic sourcing equilibrium is p1i = V . Hence, a strategic but no myopic
sourcing equilibrium exists for some prices if and only if both η < V and µdi ≤ V . For
equal prices p11 = p
1
2 a similar condition follows with µ
d
2 ≤ V . Thus, with µd1 < µd2 and
η < µd2 , the least restrictive condition follows as η < V and µ
d
1 ≤ V .
A.11 Proof of Corollary 3
With assumptions 3 and 5, whenever a strategic sourcing equilibrium exists one is imple-
mented. With propositions 1 and 3 this yields that for all
(
p11, p
1
2
) ∈ S buyers purchase
such that the aggregate demand allocation is identical to that for a single buyer. The same
then holds for
(
p11, p
1
2
)
/∈ S. Thereby, as assumed, for equal prices the same tie-breaking
behavior is implemented in aggregate as for a single buyer.
Since buyer behavior enters the profit function of suppliers only through the aggregate
quantities in period 1, supplier behavior is thus independent of the number of buyers.
Then, this holds also for the pure strategy subgame-perfect equilibria with regard to
prices, aggregate quantities and the market structure in period 2.
A.12 Proof of Lemma 7
When both suppliers are active in period 2 and the buyer sets
(
Q2Dlow, Q
2D
high
)
= (D, 0),
then supplier 1 sells Q2D1 = D for p
2D
1 ≤ p2D2 and Q2D1 = 0 otherwise. For supplier 2,
Q2D2 = D − Q2D1 always. This is identical to the one period model and therefore yields
unique equilibrium prices p2D1 = p
2D
2 = c2.
We assume now the buyer sets Q˜2Dlow < D and Q˜
2D
high = D − Q˜2Dlow instead. Supplier 2
then posts p2D2 > c2, since prices p
2D
2 ≤ c2 are strictly dominated due to Q˜12 > 0 always.
For p2D1 ≤ p2D2 , supplier 1 then sells Q˜2Dlow. The profit pi2D1 = Q˜2Dlow
(
p2D2 − c1
)
from matching
p2D1 = p
2D
2 then strictly dominates all prices p
2D
1 ≤ c2 except when Q˜2Dlow = 0. Then
however, any sales of supplier 1 are priced at p2D1 ≥ p2D2 > c2. The expected transaction
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price is thus always p2DT > c2 and therefore buyer surplus is lower than for Q
2D
low = D.
Accordingly, the same equilibrium arises as in the initial process.
If a single supplier i is active in period 2 then the buyer purchases all demand from this
supplier Q2Mi = D. Accordingly, supplier i prices at p
2M
i = V as in the initial process.
A.13 Proof of Lemma 8
When the buyer sets Q1low and Q
1
high = D − Q1low, for supplier 2 this implies Q12 = Q1low
for p12 < p
1
1 and Q
1
2 = D − Q1low otherwise. Setting p12 < c2 is then weakly dominated
by posting p12 = c2, as this always yields pi2 = Q
1
2
(
p12 − c2
)
= 0, while pi2 ≤ 0 for lower
prices. Then, also for supplier 1 prices p11 < c2 are weakly dominated by p
1
1 = c2. Since
p12 ≥ c2, supplier 1 is guaranteed pi11 = Q1low (c2 − c1) at p11 = c2. For p11 < c2, supplier 1
also sells Q1low but at a lower price and therefore pi
1
1 cannot increase. Period 2 surplus
cannot increase since if pi is attained with p11 < c2, this also holds for p
1
1 = c2. As both
suppliers thus set p1i ≥ c2, also the expected transaction price p1T ≥ c2.
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Appendix B
Experimental Instructions
Instructions1
Welcome to this experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. Do not talk with
other participants from now on and do not look at the screens of other participants. Please
switch off your mobile phone and let it remain switched off until the end of the experiment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will then
come to you.
This experiment will last about 1.5 to 2 hours. There are 4 firms, 2 “sellers” and
2 “buyers”. You take the decisions for one of these firms. The computer will inform
you at the start of the experiment whether your firm is a seller or a buyer. You keep your
role during the whole experiment.
Overview
The experiment runs for 20 rounds. Each of these rounds consists of 2 periods.
In both periods, the active sellers set a price for an identical good. In period 1 always
both sellers are active. In period 2 only those sellers are active who realized a profit in
period 1 at least as high as the profit threshold.
The two buyers purchase the same predetermined number of units of the good from the
sellers in both periods. Thereby buyers decide how many units to purchase from each of
the active sellers.
Details Sellers
Two sellers sell identical goods. The sale generates costs for the sellers. One seller has a
cost per unit of 200. For the other seller, the cost per unit is 400. These costs are identical
in both periods.
1Translated instructions for the baseline treatment REF. Instructions for other treatments are iden-
tical except for treatment-specific modifications. To facilitate understanding by subjects, suppliers are
designated as sellers in the experiment.
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Period 1. Independently from each other both sellers set their price per unit in period 1
at which they offer the good to the buyers. The price can be between 0 and 1000 in
both periods.
Period 2. Only the sellers who are active in period 2 set a price in period 2. This price
can be different from the price in period 1, but does not have to be so. If one of the sellers
is not active in period 2, he cannot set a price and therefore he cannot sell anything.
Per unit sold, a seller earns as a profit the difference between the price set by him and his
cost. In a given period a seller therefore earns as his profit the number of units sold to
both sellers together times the difference between his price in this period and his cost:
Profit of seller = Number of units × ( Price - Cost )
In period 1 always both sellers are active. If the profit of a seller in period 1 is at least
as high as the profit threshold of 700, then he is also active in period 2. Therefore, if
both sellers have made a profit at least as high as the profit threshold in period 1, then in
period 2 both sellers are active. If only a single seller has made a profit at least as high
as the profit threshold, then only this seller is active in period 2. If however none of the
sellers has made a profit in period 1 at least as high as the profit threshold, then no seller
is active in period 2.
Details Buyers
Two buyers purchase the good offered by the sellers in both periods. The good has a value
per unit of 1000 for each buyer. This value is identical in both periods. Each of the buyers
needs exactly 4 units of the good in each period.
Period 1. The buyers receive the prices of the sellers in period 1. Both buyers decide
independently of each other how many units to purchase from each seller. From both
sellers together each buyer purchases 4 units of the good.
Period 2. If both sellers are active in period 2, then both buyers decide again independently
of each other how many units to purchase from each seller. From both sellers together,
each of the buyers purchases 4 units of the good. If only a single seller is active in period 2,
then both buyers purchase 4 units from this seller. If no seller is active in period 2, then
the buyers cannot buy anything.
Per unit purchased, a buyer earns as a profit the difference between the value and the
price paid. In a given period a buyer thus earns as a profit the number of units purchased
from seller 1 times the difference between the value and the price of seller 1. In addition,
she earns the number of units purchased from seller 2 times the difference between the
value and the price of seller 2:
Profit of buyer = Number of units from seller 1 × ( Value - Price1 ) +
Number of units from seller 2 × ( Value - Price2 )
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Overview Parameters
The numerical values are again summarized here. During the experiment they are also
displayed on the screen.
Cost per unit seller 1 200
Cost per unit seller 2 400
Profit threshold 700
Value per unit for buyer 1000
Number of units needed per buyer per period 4
Experimental Procedure
The sequence of period 1 and period 2 is repeated for 20 rounds. Before the first round,
you will be informed on the screen whether your firm is a buyer or a seller. Your role
remains unchanged in all rounds. You are part of a group of 2 sellers and 2 buyers during
the experiment. The decisions of the 3 other firms are taken by other participants in
this room.
At the beginning of each round it is determined randomly for the sellers whom of the
sellers has a cost of 200 and whom of the sellers has a cost of 400. In the respective round
these costs are then identical in both periods. In the experiment, the seller with a cost
of 200 is always designated as “seller 1”. “Seller 1” is therefore not the same participant
in each round.
Each of the 20 rounds consists of the following steps:
- The computer informs each of the sellers about his cost in the current period.
- Both sellers set their prices in period 1. The decision can be simulated in the lower
half of the screen. [Screenshot with explanations]
- The prices of the sellers in period 1 are displayed to the buyers. Both buyers decide
how many units to purchase from each seller. The buyers can also simulate their
decision. [Screenshot with explanations]
- Your profit and the profits of the other firms in period 1 are displayed.
- The sellers who are active in period 2 set their prices for period 2.
- The prices of the active sellers in period 2 are displayed to the buyers. The buyers
can decide how many units to purchase from each seller. If no seller is active, the
buyers cannot purchase anything.
- Your profit and the profit of the other firms in period 2 are displayed.
Your total profit from all previous rounds is displayed in the upper right part of the
screen. You find the remaining time which is available for the respective decision centered
at the top.
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At the end of the experiment your total profit from all rounds is payed out to you in cash
with a conversion rate of 3000 = 1 EUR. For the payment you are called up one after
another with your seat number. Please leave these instructions at your place then.
Thanks a lot for your participation and we wish you successful decisions!
Control Questions
Before the experiment starts, please answer the following control questions. When you
have answered them, please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will then come to
you, check your answers and discuss open issues with you.
1. If your firm is a seller, is your cost then identical in all of the 20 rounds (yes/no)?
2. The seller with a cost per unit of 400 has set a price per unit of 750 in period 1.
a) The seller sells in total 1 unit of the good. What is the profit of the seller?
b) How many units does the seller at least have to sell to earn a profit in period 1
which is at least as high as the profit threshold?
3. How many units does a buyer purchase from both sellers together in period 1?
4. In period 2 none of the two sellers is active. What profit does a buyer then earn in
period 2?
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